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Questions pertaining to the unique structure and organisation of language have a
long history in the field of linguistics. In recent years, researchers have explored
cultural evolutionary explanations, showing how language structure emerges from
weak biases amplified over repeated patterns of learning and use. One outstand-
ing issue in these frameworks is accounting for the role of context. In particular,
many linguistic phenomena are said to to be context-dependent; interpretation
does not take place in a void, and requires enrichment from the current state
of the conversation, the physical situation, and common knowledge about the
world. Modelling the relationship between language structure and context is
therefore crucial for developing a cultural evolutionary approach to language.
One approach is to use statistical analyses to investigate large-scale, cross-cultural
datasets. However, due to the inherent limitations of statistical analyses, espe-
cially with regards to the inadequacy of these methods to test hypotheses about
causal relationships, I argue that experiments are better suited to address ques-
tions pertaining to language structure and context. From here, I present a se-
ries of artificial language experiments, with the central aim being to test how
manipulations to context influence the structure and organisation of language.
Experiment 1 builds upon previous work in iterated learning and communication
games through demonstrating that the emergence of optimal communication sys-
tems is contingent on the contexts in which languages are learned and used. The
results show that language systems gradually evolve to only encode information
that is informative for conveying the intended meaning of the speaker – resulting
in markedly different systems of communication. Whereas Experiment 1 focused
on how context influences the emergence of structure, Experiments 2 and 3 inves-
tigate under what circumstances do manipulations to context result in the loss
of structure. While the results are inconclusive across these two experiments,
there is tentative evidence that manipulations to context can disrupt structure,
but only when interacting with other factors. Lastly, Experiment 4 investigates
whether the degree of signal autonomy (the capacity for a signal to be inter-
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preted without recourse to contextual information) is shaped by manipulations
to contextual predictability: the extent to which a speaker can estimate and ex-
ploit contextual information a hearer uses in interpreting an utterance. When
the context is predictable, speakers organise languages to be less autonomous
(more context-dependent) through combining linguistic signals with contextual
information to reduce effort in production and minimise uncertainty in compre-
hension. By decreasing contextual predictability, speakers increasingly rely on
strategies that promote more autonomous signals, as these signals depend less on
contextual information to discriminate between possible meanings. Overall, these
experiments provide proof-of-concept for investigating the relationship between
language structure and context, showing that the organisational principles under-
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“Why did you write that?” asked the supervisor. “Because I thought it would be
a good example,” replied the student. What at first might seem like an unremark-
able and commonplace interaction is in fact a demonstration of an ability found
only in humans (Pinker, 1994). By using a set of sounds, strung together in a
particular sequence, the student and supervisor are able to convey their thoughts
to one another. This capacity to express almost any thought, and have someone
else understand your expression and reply in kind, reveals three fundamental as-
pects of what we call language. First, language is extremely productive, in that
it is capable of expressing novel thoughts. Second, the expressions generated are
not simply random sequences; they are systematic and rule-governed. Lastly,
even in the simple interaction above, to fully understand the supervisor’s ques-
tion, as well as the student’s response, you need to know the context in which
the expression is situated.
Questions pertaining to the unique structure and organisation of language
have a long history in the field of linguistics and philosophy (von Humboldt,
1836; Frege, 1884; Paul, 1897; de Saussure, 1916; Sapir, 1921; Wittgenstein,
1921; Bloomfield, 1933; Chomsky, 1957; Hockett, 1960; Greenberg, 1963). One
question which dominates many of these works is: Why is language structured in
a certain way and not another? This ultimately lends itself to the evolutionary
question of how language emerged in the first place and to what extent the fit
between form and function is the result of biological and cultural processes (Dar-
win, 1871; Chomsky, 1988; Gould, 1987; Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Christiansen &
Kirby, 2003). In recent years, cultural evolutionary explanations have made con-
siderable progress in exploring the origins and evolution of language, showing how
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language structure emerges from weak biases amplified over repeated patterns of
learning and use (for a recent review, see: Tamariz & Kirby, 2016). However,
little attention has been paid to the role of context in the cultural evolution of
language – and how it interacts with cognition and communication (see, e.g.,
Steels, 1999; Silvey, 2015 for notable exceptions).
Yet, knowledge of context is clearly a crucial component in how humans pro-
duce and comprehend language, as identified by work in psycholinguistics (for
review, see: Konopka & Brown-Schmidt, 2014), pragmatics (for review, see: At-
tardo, 2016), historical linguistics (for review, see: Traugott & Trousdale, 2013),
and cognitive linguistics (for review, see: Evans & Green, 2006). The central aim
of this thesis is to investigate the causal relationship between context, cognition,
and language structure using a cultural evolutionary framework. What consti-
tutes a context, and how it interacts with the structure and use of language, is
still subject to considerable debate (Terkourafi, 2009; Faber & León-Araúz, 2016).
As Herb Clark noted in motivating the use of his term common ground:
In the study of language use, investigators appeal time and again to
“context” to explain this or that phenomenon. The problem is that
they almost never say what they mean by “context” even when it
is essential to their explanations [...] it also allows psychologists to
hoodwink themselves as well as others into thinking they have expla-
nations for context effects when they don’t. I prefer to eschew the
term context for something less dangerous. (Clark, 1992: 6; emphases
in original).
Taking Clark’s point seriously, but opting for what is perhaps the more dan-
gerous path, I am going to stick with the term context and argue it can be a useful
explanatory device when approached correctly. The first step, then, is to come up
with a precise definition of context which can be operationalised, separated from
other causal factors, and investigated in a systematic fashion. In particular, I will
advocate the use of laboratory experiments, drawing on a growing body of work
in iterated learning and communication games. Experiments represent a natural
middle ground between the abstractness and manipulability of computational or
mathematical simulations and the need for observable, real world data found in
corpora. Through using experiments I will investigate how context interacts with
learning and communication to shape the evolution of distinct communication
systems; how context constrains the learning and use of compositional mappings;
and how manipulations to the context influence a speaker’s ability to estimate,
and therefore exploit, the information that a hearer is likely to use in interpreting
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an utterance. Parcelling out the effects of context from other constraints found
in learning and communication allows us to investigate how these factors interact
with one another in shaping the structure of language.
The subsequent sections of this introduction will ask what context is, how
it gets into the structure of language, and motivate the use of experiments as a
means of investigating the link between context and language structure. Lastly,
I will provide a roadmap for the rest of the thesis.
1.2 What is context?
As a concept, context is found in numerous disciplines, ranging from psychology
(Todorović, 2010) and linguistics (Faber & Leon-Arauz, 2016) to architecture
(Hinton, 2014) and computer science (Bazire & Brezillon, 2005). So, when pre-
sented with the question what is context?, it should not come as a surprise that a
clear cut answer is hard to come by – definitions are often subject to book-length
treatments (e.g., Givon, 2005; Bergs & Diewald, 2009; Finkbeiner, Meibauer
& Schumacher, 2012) and vary both between and within disciplines (Bazire &
Brezillon, 2005). Providing a consensual definition often results in a concept so
vague and nebulous that “context can refer to the whole universe” (Fetzer, 2004:
3), is a term “which is constantly used in all kinds of context but never explained”
(Quasthoff, 1998: 157) and acts as “conceptual garbage can” (Smith, Glenberg
& Bjork, 1978: 342). This is pretty much what we get when, based on a corpus
of 150 definitions, the notion of context is distilled down into several general pa-
rameters: “[context is] a set of constraints that influence the behavior of a system
(a user or a computer) embedded in a given task” (Bazire & Brezillon, 2005: 39;
emphases in original).
As the authors of the above quote concede, this definition of context fails
to address some of the key debates surrounding the term, and does not tell us
what these constraints are and how they influence the behaviour of the system.
For investigating the relationship between context and language structure this is
not a very useful definition. An alternative starting point comes from Sperber &
Wilson:
A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s as-
sumptions about the world. It is these assumptions, of course, rather
than the actual state of the world, that affect the interpretation of an
utterance. A context in this sense is not limited to information about
the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding
13
utterances: expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or
religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions,
beliefs about the mental state of the speaker, may all play a role in
interpretation. (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 15; my emphasis).
Like other definitions, Sperber & Wilson include an expansive list of proper-
ties which may be considered part of the context, but the important take-home
message is their approach to context as a psychological construct (for review, see:
Attardo, 2016). Similar approaches are found in Baars (1998), who thinks of
the context as a mental phenomenon more accurately located inside the nervous
system, and Clark & Carlson’s (1992: 65) view of context as the “information
that is available to a particular person for interaction with a particular process
on a particular occasion”. Thinking of context in this way disentangles the defi-
nition from being tied to an external property of the world, synonymous with the
environment, and firmly places it in the minds of individuals. And, as a psycho-
logical construct, context is very much embedded in the business of cognition: to
generate predictive models of the world (Clark, 2015).
To illustrate the relationship between context, cognition, and prediction con-
sider the 13/B visual illusion in Figure 1.1. When reading from top to bottom,
the central object is interpreted as the number 13, whereas reading from left to
right results in interpreting the central object as the letter B. This simple illu-
sion demonstrates that placing the same object in different situations can have
a profound impact on our interpretation. Viewed in this light, context links
together cognition, perception, and the environment in generating predictions
via a frame of interpretation (Goffman, 1974; Minsky, 1975; Fauconnier, 1985;
Fillmore, 1985): defined in this thesis as knowledge derived from perceivable rela-
tionships in the environment used in generating a prediction.
Figure 1.1: The 13/B illusion. The left image highlights the number context and
the right image highlights the alphabet context.
14
Treating context as a frame of interpretation allows us to break it down into
three key components: the figure (target of interpretation), the ground (the im-
mediate information brought to bear to the task of interpretation), and the back-
ground (prior knowledge which helps delineate what enters into a frame) (Duranti
& Goodwin, 1992; Terkourafi, 2009). In the case of the 13/B illusion, the figure
is the central object, the ground is either the letter context or alphabet context,
and the background is prior knowledge about numbers and letters. Arriving at
an interpretation is therefore contingent on the contextual frame and the way it
integrates what is currently predicted with incoming sensory data (Clark, 2015).
As such, generating a predictive model depends not only on the environment in
which the object is situated – it is also the cognitive and perceptual apparatus
of the individual engaged in a task and how these factors conspire together to
create a frame.
The first point to note is that the contextual frame directs attention: it high-
lights and backgrounds information in making a prediction. In order to do this,
an organism must be capable of detecting and extracting information from latent
structures in the environment, through “narrowing down from a vast manifold of
information to the minimal, optimal information that specifies the affordance of
an event, object, or layout” (Gibson & Pick, 2000: 149). For the 13/B illusion, an
individual must use their perceptual apparatus to perceive character strokes, and
integrate these strokes to form a holistic character, before they can differentiate
and learn the relationships between a sequence of these characters.
This leads us to our second point: what enters into a frame also consists of
prior knowledge about previous frames. This creates a causal link where previous
frames, and the interpretations derived from those frames, influence the creation
of subsequent frames. Knowledge here refers to stored tokens of experience which
are categorised and matched with similar tokens to form exemplars (Evans &
Green, 2006; Elman, 2009; Bybee, 2010; Port & Ramscar, 2015). For example,
based on our experience of the English alphabet, we store information about how
the letter B, when arranged in a certain sequence (alphabet context), normally
follows the letter A and precedes the letter C. A contextual frame is therefore built
up over repeated experiences, refined through feedback from prior predictions, and
then used in generating the current prediction: if a literate English speaker sees
a character situated between the letters A and C there is a high probability this
is the letter B. And it is this probability which creates a strong bias in making a
prediction.
All this leads to the general conclusion where establishing a contextual frame
creates a discrimination pressure: determining what is and is not informative
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in reducing uncertainty in interpretation. Organisms fine-tune their predictive
models of the world through integrating information from the contextual frame to
discriminate against uninformative cues (those that do not improve predictions)
and reinforce informative cues (those which tend to improve predictions) (Ram-
scar & Port, 2015). By deliberately attending to some information, and learning
to ignore information irrelevant to the task, an organism is able to improve its
predictions over time. Such strategies are widely-acknowledged in the decision-
making literature where situations characterised by a high degree of uncertainty
are more accurately solved using less information or computation (e.g., less-is-
more effects: Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
To spell out how contextual information becomes embedded in a system of
behaviour imagine a rat placed in a T-Maze: the contextual frame consists of a
set of options (in this case, the left arm or the right arm), the rat’s ability to
perceive the relationship between these options, and its prior knowledge about
which of these options contains a reward. Making a decision about which arm
contains a reward is at chance in the first trial: the rat simply knows there are
two options and it makes a guess as to the location of the reward. Even in this
simple situation the rat is attending to salient aspects of the environment (e.g.,
the two options) and ignoring irrelevant information (e.g., the colour of the maze
walls). Over successive trials, the rat learns that the reward is consistently in the
left arm, and adjusts its behaviour to always go to this location. If the reward
is now switched to the right arm for several trials, then the rat uses this new
data to update its predictions, and gradually shifts from a left-arm to a right-
arm preference. By continually switching the reward arm the rat becomes more
efficient in updating its predictions and incorporates the contextual cues into its
model: if the rat predicts the reward is in the left arm, and this prediction turns
out to be incorrect, then in the next trial the rat predicts the reward is in the right
arm (serial reversal-learning paradigm; for review, see: Lloyd & Leslie, 2013).
As the rat example illustrates, discrimination is inherent to any perceptual
task (Wade & Swanston, 2001), and is thus independent from language and com-
munication1. By providing a clearer definition of context (as a frame of interpre-
tation), and how it relates to cognition and behaviour, we can now move onto
the issue of the relationship between context and the structure of language.
1But as we shall see the pressure to discriminate can be motivated by communicative needs.
The point here is to separate the capacity for discrimination, which is broadly a perceptual
propensity found in numerous cognitive domains, from our capacity to use language as a tool
for communication.
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1.3 Filling the expressive gaps
Like other behaviours, linguistic structure appears to rely on contextual infor-
mation for disambiguation. Consider how even a simple English sentence, such
as she passed the mole, is ambiguous as to whether the verb passed refers to a
form of motion or an act of giving, and whether the noun mole refers to a small
burrowing mammal, a person engaged in espionage, a brand of Mexican sauce or a
type of causeway. Context in this sense could be as immediate as the surrounding
linguistic information (e.g., Maria was riding her bike and she passed the mole
which was was burying into the ground) and as remote as knowledge about the
prior discourse (e.g., the story is about cold war spies).
What both of these aspects share is that they form a frame of interpretation.
This is important because it focuses on the effects of context – to create a discrimi-
nation pressure which determines what is and is not informative for interpretation
– and less on listing all of the possible types of context. In short, contextual in-
formation increases the probability of some interpretations over others (for more
details on referential context and ambiguity resolution, see: Haywood, Pickering
& Branigan, 2005; Spivey-Knowlton & Tanenhaus, 2015). Still, we need to at
least establish what the relationship is between language use, language structure
and context, before we can move on to discuss how and why this relationship
emerged in the first place. Indeed, the fact that contextual information is needed
to resolve communicative issues, such as the presence of ambiguity, is often held
up as an example of how language is poorly designed with respect to its commu-
nicative utility (e.g., Berwick et al., 2011):
The natural approach has always been: is it [language] well designed
for use, understood typically as use for communication? I think that’s
the wrong question. The use for communication might turn out to be a
kind of epiphenomenon. I mean, the system developed however it did,
we really don’t know. And then we can ask: how do people use it? It
might turn out that it is not optimal for some of the ways in which we
want to use it. If you want to make sure that we never misunderstand
one another, for that purpose language is not well designed, because
you have such properties as ambiguity. (Chomsky, 2002: 107).
Many authors have argued that Chomsky’s approach is completely backwards,
with ambiguity not only being an easily resolvable problem, but also an ex-
pected property of an efficient communication system which combines our pow-
erful inferential capacities with contextual information (Piantadosi et al., 2012;
Scott-Phillips, 2015). In fact, the extent to which ambiguity genuinely impedes
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communication is so rare, or so quickly resolved, that an optimally efficient com-
munication system should be ambiguous (Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Juba et al.,
2011):
. . . when context is informative, any good communication will leave
out information already in the context. . . [A]s long as there are some
ambiguities that context can resolve, efficient communication systems
will use ambiguity to make communication easier. (Piantadosi, Tily
& Gibson, 2012: 284; emphasis is mine).
This relationship between context, language use, and language structure can
thought of as filling in expressive gaps: if the context already contains infor-
mation about the intended meaning, then there is no need to explicitly express
this information linguistically. This offers a functional explanation for the fit
between context and language structure: language is context-dependent because
it is efficient for the purposes of communication. Hermann Paul made a similar
observation 126 years ago when he wrote:
The more economical or more abundant use of linguistic means of
expressing a thought is determined by the need... Everywhere we
find modes of expression forced into existence which contain only just
so much as is requisite to their being understood. The amount of
linguistic material employed varies in each case with the situation,
with the previous conversation, with the relative approximation of
the speakers to a common state of mind. (Paul, 1890: 251).
Still, the fact that context-dependency makes good design sense does not nec-
essarily explain why this relationship emerged in the first place. The next section
will sketch out a model where context becomes instantiated in the structure of
language through the process of cultural transmission.
1.4 The interaction of minds and data
Understanding the causal relationship between context and language structure
requires that we take seriously the problem of linkage (Kirby, 1999): How are
individual behaviours linked to the way language is organised and structured?
That is, given the observation of context-dependency in language, and the corre-
sponding claim that this is communicatively efficient, we still do not know how
these advantages “become realized in language as a system of human behaviour”
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(Smith & Kirby, 2012: 494). An increasingly prominent approach to addressing
the problem of linkage is to think of language as a Complex Adaptive System
(henceforth, CAS) (Steels, 2000; Beckner et al., 2009):
(1) The system consists of multiple agents (the speakers in the speech
community) interacting with one another. (2) The system is adap-
tive, that is, speakers’ behavior is based on their past interactions,
and current and past interactions together feed forward into future
behavior. (3) A speaker’s behavior is the consequence of competing
factors ranging from perceptual mechanics to social motivations. (4)
The structures of language emerge from interrelated patterns of ex-
perience, social interaction and cognitive processes. (Beckner et al.,
2009: 3).
Crucially, language is viewed as “the interaction of minds and data” (Hurford,
2003: 51), and exists at two interdependent junctures, consisting of an idiolect
(the set of form-meaning mappings belonging to an individual language user)
and the communal language (the set of conventions shared by a community of
language users). Both of these aspects are emergent: idiolects emerge from each
individual’s use of their language through repeated interactions in the speech
community, and the communal language is a product of negotiated interactions
between these idiolects (Beckner et al., 2009). This feedback loop between idi-
olects and the communal language means that the link between language struc-
ture and individual behaviours is characterised by an additional dynamic system:
cultural transmission (Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Kirby et al., 2007; Christiansen &
Chater, 2008).
Cultural transmission forms the backbone of theories where language is the re-
sult of cultural evolutionary processes (Smith & Kirby, 2012). As with biological
systems, language and other cultural systems are considered evolutionary because
they meet the requirements of reproduction, heritable variation, and differential
amplification of variants (Boyd & Richerson, 19852; Croft, 2000; Mufwene, 2001;
Ritt, 2004; Steels, 2012; Kirby, 2013). Unlike biological evolution, where in-
heritance involves the direct replication of DNA, the cultural transmission of
language is indirect and takes place through a process known as iterated learning:
“by which a behaviour arises in one individual through induction on the basis of
observations of behaviour in another individual who acquired that behaviour in
the same way” (Kirby, Griffiths, & Smith, 2014: 108; emphasis in original).
2Boyd & Richerson (1985) provide a general approach to cultural evolution that employs
methods from population genetics to investigate the effects of psychological biases on cultural
variants. Also see Mesoudi (2011) for a relatively up-to-date overview of research into cultural
evolution.
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Treating language as a culturally transmitted system solves the problem of
linkage through showing how short-term behaviours, used in solving immediate
communicative needs, are amplified over repeated interactions to shape sets of
behaviours shared by a population of individuals. What are the individual be-
haviours in language? What is transmitted during these interactions? The key
unit of individual behaviour which is transmitted from speakers to hearers3 is the
utterance: “a situated instance of language use which is culturally and contextu-
ally embedded and represents an instance of linguistic behaviour on the part of
a language user”. (Evans & Green, 2006: 110; emphasis in original).
As the above quote indicates, an utterance is strongly coupled to its contexts
of use, and recognises that language behaviour is fundamentally communicative.
This introduces an important distinction in discussing context and its relationship
to language when compared to context and other behaviours involving perception:
The intrinsic context [the directly relevant information for completing
a specific task] for comprehension is different in one fundamental way
from most other notions of intrinsic context. In areas like visual per-
ception, the notion of common ground isn’t even definable, because
there are generally no agents involved other than the perceiver himself.
Defining the intrinsic context in terms of common ground appears to
be limited to certain processes of communication. Context, therefore,
cannot be given a uniform treatment across all psychological domains.
In language comprehension, indeed, the intrinsic context is something
very special. (Clark & Carlson, 1992: 77).
So, whereas the role of context in many perceptual domains is to coordinate
the behaviour of individuals with the world, language is special in that indi-
viduals are also trying to coordinate with one another (Chater & Christiansen,
2010). That is, in producing and comprehending an utterance, speakers and
hearers engage in a collaborative activity where they draw on shared situational
and world knowledge in order to align on similar frames of interpretation (Clark,
1992; Parikh, 2001; Franke, 2013). If we consider meaning to simply reside in
the act of interpretation, and context is the information which contributes to
this interpretation by creating a frame, then this provides a mechanism through
which utterances inherit interpretations as they are produced and perceived dur-
ing transmission.
3A hearer can be anyone who is capable of learning and using a language. This allows us to
reconcile any differences which exist between transmission between already-competent users of
language and näive learners (for a discussion on these differences, see: Labov, 2007; Lupyan &
Dale, 2010; Kirby et al., 2015).
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Under this account, utterance meaning is not really “prepackaged chunks of
information” (Geeraerts, 1993: 263), with linguistic coding being “less like defini-
tive content and more like interpretive clue” (Levinson, 2000: 29). Importantly,
the production and comprehension of these utterances is governed by competing
constraints, ranging from the organisation of thought processes and perceptuo-
motor machinery to cognitive and pragmatic factors (Christiansen & Chater,
2008; Chater & Christiansen, 2010). In this sense, a constraint is essentially a
canalising factor – limiting the search space in which behavioural variation is
allowed to explore. What enters into a contextual frame during language use is
therefore contingent on the constraints inherent to the transmission of utterances.
Cultural evolutionary approaches have been particularly successful in demon-
strating how competing constraints interact over multiple timescales (Kirby et
al., 2007; Smith, 2009; Kirby et al., 2015; Thompson, Kirby & Smith, 2016).
Much of the focus in these works has been on two constraints: the first is a
domain-independent cognitive bias for simplicity (Chater & Vitanyi, 2003; Kemp
& Regier, 2012; Clark, 2015; Culbertson & Kirby, 2016) and the second is a task-
specific bias of expressivity (Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Fay,
Garrod & Roberts, 2008; Frank & Goodman, 2012; Piantadosi et al., 2012; Kemp
& Regier, 2012; Kirby et al., 2015)4. A bias for simplicity reduces the algorithmic
complexity of a system by making it more compressible (Tamariz & Kirby, 2014),
i.e., the description length of the system is shorter than a list of the possible
signal-meaning mappings. An expressivity bias corresponds to the task-specific
goal of communication: to reduce uncertainty about the intended meaning in
context. Language structure emerges from the interplay between these two bi-
ases as utterances are transmitted from speakers to hearers, with the effects of
these biases being instantiated as system-wide characteristics:
language learning by näive individuals introduces a pressure for sim-
plicity arising from a domain-independent bias for compressibility in
learning, and a pressure for expressivity arises from language use in
communication. Crucially, both must be in play: neither pressure
alone leads reliably to structure. The structural design features of
language are a solution to the problem of being compressible and
4Many of these authors do not use the term expressivity, but use a closely related term such
as informativeness (Kemp & Regier, 2012; Frank & Goodman, 2014), accuracy (Fay, Garrod &
Roberts, 2008), or clarity (Piantadosi et al., 2012). Furthermore, the definition of expressivity
has subtly shifted from earlier works, where it originally corresponded to a motivation to convey
all possible distinctions in a meaning space (Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Kirby et al., 2008), to its
current incarnation: to discriminate an intended referent from possible alternative referents in
a context (Kirby et al., 2015).
21
expressive, a solution delivered by the process of cultural evolution.
(Kirby et al., 2015: 88).
Languages shaped solely by the pressures found in learning result in degener-
ate structure where every possible meaning is conveyed using a single, maximally
ambiguous signal (see Kirby et al., 2008 for an experimental demonstration).
Conversely, when using languages to communicate, the bias for expressivity is
amplified and leads to the maintenance of holistic languages (i.e., an incom-
pressible system where its description length is equal to simply listing all of the
form-meaning mappings). The tradeoff between these two pressures results in the
emergence of structured languages: a compressible set of form-meaning mappings
which are functional for the task of communication.
The central goal of this thesis is to investigate how context influences the
tradeoff between these pressures found in learning and communication. For our
purposes, we can ask three questions relating context to language: (i) What dis-
tinctions does a system need to make in order to identify the intended meaning
in context (discrimination pressure)? (ii) How generalisable is the system to
new meanings and contexts (generalisation pressure)? (iii) How aligned is the
speaker’s intended meaning with the hearer’s interpretation (coordination pres-
sure)?
1.4.1 Discrimination Pressure: Context and Expressivity
The picture presented so far places context as a frame of interpretation that
governs the discrimination pressure: determining what is and is not informative
for reducing uncertainty in interpretation. To illustrate how this discrimination
pressure interacts with language consider the simple toy world in figure 1.2: here,
an individual is exposed to a set of objects (coloured shapes), with the context
being knowledge about the perceivable relationship between the objects, and the
task is to produce utterances which discriminates one object from another. In
this case, the figure is an utterance (e.g., miko), the ground is the three objects in
the world, and the background is prior knowledge about the utterance and how
it relates to discriminating between these three objects.
There are two problems facing speakers and hearers when generating a set of
utterances. First, a speaker needs to discriminate their intended referent from
possible alternative referents, i.e., the set of utterances must be expressive (Pinker
& Bloom, 1990; Kirby et al., 2015). Second, in inferring the relationship between



















Figure 1.2: An example of a weak discrimination pressure (Blue child), where
there are multiple informative dimensions, in this case colour and shape, and an
example of a strong discrimination pressure (Orange child), where one dimension
is informative for discrimination (shape) and the other dimension is backgrounded
(colour). The task is to generate an internal system which discriminates between
each of the referents in a context (the black box with three coloured shapes).
Boxes with dotted lines are some of the possible sets of form-meaning mappings
which can discriminate between objects given the context.
referential uncertainty (Quine, 1960; Blythe, Smith & Smith, 2016): What as-
pects of the referent is the utterance referring to? Context helps solve these two
problems through providing information about which features are informative
and uninformative for the task of discrimination. For a speaker, this translates
into: maximise the capacity of an utterance to successfully convey each of the
objects (Frank & Goodman, 2012). Meanwhile, hearers want utterances which,
when coupled with information provided by the context, minimise the uncertainty
about the intended referent (Piantadosi et al., 2012; Frank & Goodman, 2014).
23
Importantly, the strength of the discrimination pressure is contingent on the
context: a strong discrimination pressure is created when the contextual frame
unambiguously highlights which feature(s) are informative and backgrounds any
which are uninformative, whereas a weak discrimination pressure arises from
there being multiple informative features in the context (none of which are back-
grounded). In short, information provided by the context helps rule out possible
utterances, i.e., when the discrimination pressure is strong, the number of expres-
sive utterances is lower than when the discrimination pressure is weak.
1.4.2 Generalisation Pressure: Cognition and Simplicity
Discrimination is not just a one-shot affair: speakers and hearers must produce
and comprehend utterances across multiple exposures. To remain expressive a
set of utterances need to resolve future predictive uncertainty (Port & Ramscar,
2015): the discrepancy between what is currently predicted and incoming sen-
sory data (Lupyan & Clark, 2015; Clark, 2015). The challenge now is to draw
on knowledge of previous interactions and use utterances which solve the imme-
diate task at hand whilst anticipating future problems. Possible future problems
in this instance include any new data (e.g., new referents, new situations etc)
which decreases the probability of making successful predictions (i.e., discrimi-
nating between referents). If utterances are used only on the basis of maximising
expressivity, then there is the potential for overfitting, where the set of form-
meaning mappings are not generalisable to new data.
One solution to this generalisation pressure is to generate compressible sets
of utterances. Figure 1.3 builds on the previous example to illustrate this point.
Assume a speaker generates a language at t1 which discriminates holistically (e.g.,
miko refers only to red square). Now, for the speaker facing a weak generalisation
pressure this is not an issue: the data at t1 are identical to the data at t2 and
the language is adequate for the task of discrimination. However, when faced
with a strong generalisation pressure, the same language is poorly equipped for
discrimination, with the set of utterances generated at t1 not being generalisable
to the new data at t2. As such, the strength of the generalisation pressure is
tied to exposure to the data: a weak generalisation pressure is one where all
future data are highly predictable, whereas a strong generalisation pressure is one
where future data is associated with a high level of uncertainty. Importantly, the
generalisation pressure can either be directly tied to exposure, where individuals
are only exposed to a subset of the data, or indirectly related (e.g., due to general
















































Figure 1.3: An example of a weak and strong generalisation pressure. At t1 and
t2 an individual is exposed to a set of data (consisting of forms, meanings, and
contexts) and must generate an internal system of form-meaning mappings. The
task is to generate mappings at t1 which accurately discriminate between referents
at t2 (arrows with dotted lines). In the case of the weak generalisation pressure,
Blue is exposed to the same referents at t1 and t2, with any of the three systems of
form-meaning mappings generated at t1 being adequate for discrimination at t2.
Conversely, when faced with a strong generalisation pressure, Orange is exposed
to different sets of referents at t1 and t2. The optimal approach is to use the form-
meaning mappings which discriminate using shape information – allowing Orange
to reuse the form-meaning mappings generated at t1 for t2. Another approach
is to generate a new set of form-meaning mappings every time an individual is
exposed to new data. For instance, Orange could maintain the general hypothesis
that colour information is important for discrimination, but this would result in
low predictive power as it entails ignoring the data at t1. It is also important to
note that, even though the strength of discrimination pressure has not changed
from t1 to t2, the strong generalisation pressure does narrow down the set of
optimal form-meaning mappings.
2010; Smith & Kirby, 2012).
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1.4.3 Coordination Pressure: Communication and Con-
vention
So far, we have considered how context generates a frame of interpretation, which
regulates the discrimination pressure, and how repeated exposures to these frames
governs the generalisation pressure. Yet, as previously mentioned, language is not
simply an internal system used by individuals (idiolects) – communication and
social interaction are key components which cannot be ignored. If language is used
for communication, then speakers and hearers need to align on shared system of
communication. Without a shared system, the task of aligning on similar frames
of interpretation is made extremely difficult, resulting in speakers and hearers
being faced with a coordination problem (Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1980; Bratman,
1992; Clark, 1996).
Coordination problems are instances where two or more individuals must solve
a collaborative task by aligning on the same or corresponding strategy (Lewis,
1969). Many forms of cultural activities can be classed as coordination problems
– from two dancers engaged in a tango to performers in a string quartet – but
communication poses a particularly salient coordination problem: there are nu-
merous ways in which an utterance may be interpreted and interlocutors cannot
read each other’s minds (Croft, 2000). As such, every communicative situation is
a recurrent coordination problem; speakers try to convey their intended meaning
using an utterance, and hearers try to arrive at the correct interpretation of this
utterance.
Solving the coordination problem requires speakers and hearers align on a set
of conventional5 utterances (Lewis, 1969; Clark, 1996; Beckner et al., 2009). Es-
tablishing shared conventions is arbitrary to a certain extent, with the goal being
for interlocutors to conform to what was previously negotiated, but these solu-
tions also interact with the other pressures of discrimination and generalisation:
speakers and hearers need to align on a shared system which is both expressive
and compressible. The fact that these systems are negotiated between speakers
and hearers in piecemeal fashion also hints at an important role for historical
contingency (Lass, 1997; Millikan, 1998): previous interactions, and the solutions
stemming from these interactions, constrain future outcomes. As a result, past
communicative solutions can result in systems ending up in suboptimal states,
where there is inertia from the set of previously established conventions:
5Beckner et al (2009: 4) define a convention as “a regularity of behavior (producing an
utterance of a particular linguistic form) that is partly arbitrary and entrenched in the speech
community”
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That a token of any form instances a convention or piece of a con-
vention is a matter of its individual history, not a matter of what it
matches... Only tokens reproduced due to weight of precedent are
conventional, and which convention each instances depends on the
precedent from which it is derived. (Millikan, 1998: 175)
Aligning on shared communicative conventions draws upon two general re-
sources. The first of these is feedback (De Ruiter et al., 2010; for overview, see:
Spike et al., 2016): interlocutors are able to provide information to one another
as to whether or not their interpretation is correct, allowing one, or both, of the
parties to modify their behaviour in future interactions6. With feedback, speakers
can modify their behaviour through trying to clarify the intended meaning, and
use utterances which pick out relatively smaller sections of the context (Frank &
Goodman, 2014: 85). Conversely, hearers can adjust their form-meaning map-
pings, aligning their interpretation with that of the speaker’s intended meaning
(Selten & Warglien, 2007; Moreno & Baggio, 2015).
The second of these resources is shared knowledge and the beliefs held by
interlocutors about their conversational partner (Bell, 1984; Brennan & Clark,
1996; Branigan et al., 2011; Bergmann et al., 2015). Accurately assessing the
degree of shared knowledge is crucial as it allows speakers to use utterances which
are tailored to the needs of the hearer (Clark & Marshall, 19817). For instance,
when choosing referring expressions to describe a particular object, a speaker
is more likely to repeat an expressions previously used by their conversational
partner when they believe that partner is a computer (as humans reason they
are less likely to share common ground with a computer; see Branigan et al.,
2011). Similarly, if a speaker believes a hearer is part of the same community,
then both individuals can assume they share some conventional knowledge, with
the speaker’s utterances being constructed to not only express their intended
meaning, but to also indicate common ground with the hearer (e.g., contrast the
use of Empire State Building, which relies on shared knowledge about the name
of a particular building in New York City, with the 102-story skyscraper located
on Fifth Avenue between West 33rd and 34th streets; Isaacs & Clark, 1987).
To explicitly spell out the coordination pressure, and how it interacts with the
pressures of discrimination and generalisation, consider the situation in figure 1.4.
6Feedback is used in a very general sense here to refer any information transmitted after
signalling that helps identify the intended meaning of the speaker and/or conveys the hearer’s
interpretation (Spike et al., 2016: 15).
7Clark & Marshall highlight three distinct sources of shared knowledge: the speech com-
munity of the interlocutors, the physical environment in which interlocutors are situated, and
the internal linguistic context (e.g., the choice of words as well as the syntactic and discourse
structure).
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Two individuals gradually build up a system of communication and generate their
own internal set of form-meaning mappings. From t1 to t3 communication pro-
ceeds unimpeded in that the set of forms are capable of discrimination and there
is an underlying rule which allows for generalisation to novel objects. In these
series of interactions, the coordination problem is solved through integrating con-
textual information into the linguistic system, allowing both Blue and Orange to
ignore colour when considering which meaning they intended to convey. However,
at t4, colour is now also informative for discrimination: to solve this coordination
problem Orange draws on knowledge of previous interactions and uses a new sig-
nal to convey their intended meaning. In using a new signal, Orange is relying
on the prior knowledge shared with Blue – that two of the possible referents are
already associated with a conventional form – and reasons that the novel form is
more likely to be associated with a novel object (in this case, a yellow square).
The consequences of this interaction are made apparent at t5: here, Blue opts
for the specific form for yellow square, as opposed to the general term for square,
due to the precedent set at t4.
Taken together, a key issue facing this thesis is disentangling these three
pressures, and how they interact with context in shaping the organisation and
structure of language at multiple timescales of learning and use. The next section
will outline a methodological framework for investigating the effects of context.
In particular, an argument will be made for using laboratory experiments, con-




























Figure 1.4: An example of how the coordination pressure might shape a commu-
nication system across a series of interactions. The task is for both individuals
to successfully communicate with one another by taking turns to convey their
intended meaning (which is always the object on the left). For the purposes of
simplicity, the listener always correctly infers the intended meaning, even when
this is just a good guess (as is the case in t1 where miko could have referred to any
of the three objects). From t1 to t3 Blue and Orange build up a shared system of
communication whereby miko maps onto square and guwa maps onto arrow (the
contextual frame backgrounds colour, making it uninformative in these initial
interactions). However, at t4, both shape and colour are informative for discrimi-
nation and Orange uses a novel signal, peya, to convey the yellow square. Blue is
able to identify the intended meaning as they reason that the yellow square is the
only novel object and Orange would have either used miko to refer to the green
square or guwa to refer to the green arrow (as these are previously established
mappings). The consequences of this interaction are made apparent at t5: here,
Blue opts to use peya, rather than the more general miko, due to precedent set
during the interaction at t4.
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1.5 Methodological Commitments
There are three ways one might go about investigating the effects of context on
language structure.
The first is to use statistical techniques to search for correlations in corpora
and cross-linguistic databases (e.g., WALS: Dryer & Haspelmath, 2013). Such
techniques have gained in prominence over the last decade and are increasingly
viewed as a viable way of investigating questions about language structure (for re-
view, see: Ladd, Roberts & Dediu, 2015). An obvious advantage of this statistics-
driven approach is that the data more closely reflects language in its natural en-
vironment – allowing us to quantify the degree of variation and similarity in how
language is structured cross-linguistically. A good example of this cross-linguistic
approach is Lupyan & Dale’s (2010) study into the relationship between social
context and morphological complexity. Here, the authors compare the structural
properties (e.g., inflectional synthesis of the verb, coding of evidentiality, number
of cases etc) of more than 2000 languages with three demographic variables which
act as a proxy for social context: speaker population, geographic spread, and the
number of linguistic neighbours. In this case, certain demographic characteristics,
such as a small versus a large population, are arguably useful for capturing com-
peting pressures acting upon the structure of language. The key idea being that
differences in social context correspond to variability in a society’s reliance on
shared cultural and contextual information for communicating with one another
(Wray & Grace, 2007; Trudgill, 2011; Hurford, 2011; see Chapters 4 and 5 for a
fuller discussion).
Still, as detailed in Chapter 5, there are several pitfalls with this approach,
especially when trying to infer causal relationships. Operationalising context is
particularly difficult, and hard to parcel out from other factors, such as frequency
(but see: Winter & Ardell, 20168). Computational models provide another route
of investigation: these offer a useful way for exploring the parameter space in
a transparent and quantifiable manner (Irvine, Roberts & Kirby, 2014). Opera-
tionalising context is easier as it can be implemented as a parameter in a model.
However, models are heavily reliant on the simplifying assumptions of the re-
searcher, making it difficult to connect the results of the model to real world
phenomena.
8Winter & Ardell (2016) show that, when controlling for contextual diversity (the number
of different contexts a word appears in), word frequency does not predict the number of word
senses. Importantly, the results of their statistical analyses are robust to operationalising con-
textual diversity using different sources (e.g., the number of different movies, the number of
different Ngrams etc).
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Experiments represent a natural middle ground by allowing us to opera-
tionalise context whilst testing predictions about causal relationships. As with
other methods, experiments come with their own set of inherent limitations, such
as circumscribed control over the parameter space when compared to compu-
tational models, and lacking in the richness of real linguistic data available for
analysis with statistical techniques. However, as Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will demon-
strate, experiments offer a powerful tool for investigating the relationship between
context and language. For this thesis I will draw upon work in iterated learning
(e.g., Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008) and communication games (e.g., Galantucci,
2005). These studies often use artificial languages (Reber, 1967; Saffran et al.,
1996) as simplified abstractions for natural languages, and see under what con-
ditions a language transitions from one state to another. This allows us to probe
how individual-level biases, found in learning and using a language, contribute
to the emergence of systematic structure. For operationalising and manipulating
context, reference games offer a useful entry point (Olson, 1970; Sedivy, 2005;
Frank & Goodman, 2012; Franke & Degen, 2016): here, manipulations to the
referential context – the relationship between the intended referent and a set of
possible alternative referents – have been previously shown to influence pragmatic
reasoning (Franke & Degen, 2016) and the use of referring expressions (Konopka
& Brown-Schmidt, 2014). Chapters 2 and 4 will further motivate these experi-
mental paradigms.
1.6 Thesis road map
The thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 reviews some of the key literature linking context to how language is
learned, used and structured. It then presents Experiment 1, which builds upon
previous work in iterated learning and communication games by manipulating
the referential context, i.e., which dimensions of a referent are informative and
uninformative for discriminating between other possible referents. The results of
this experiment shed light on how short-term communicative interactions, where
the goal is for the speaker to convey a specific referent to the hearer, shape and
constrain the long-term emergence of linguistic structure as it is transmitted to
future generations: that is, language systems gradually evolve to only specify
information relevant for discrimination, resulting in markedly different systems
of communication.
Experiments 2 and 3, presented in Chapter 3, take as their starting point the
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observation that context motivates the loss of compositionality: the decrease in
transparency between a form (e.g., John kicked the bucket) and its intended mean-
ing (e.g., John died). Using a compositional language, where the subcomponents
of a signal refer to specific features of a referent, these experiments see whether
manipulations to the referential context increase the probability of maintaining
or losing structure as the language is learned and used. While the results are
inconclusive across these two experiments, there is tentative evidence that con-
text can disrupt compositional structure, but only when interacting with other
factors.
Chapter 4 investigates whether contextual predictability (the extent to which
a speaker can estimate, and therefore exploit, the contextual information a hearer
uses in interpreting an utterance) shapes the degree of signal autonomy (how re-
liant a signal is on contextual information for discriminating between possible
referents). Experiment 4 uses an asymmetric communication game, where speak-
ers and hearers are assigned fixed roles, to test for the effect of contextual pre-
dictability on signal autonomy by making two manipulations: (i) whether or not
a speaker has access to contextual information; (ii) the consistency with which a
particular dimension (e.g., shape) is relevant for discrimination across successive
trials. The key finding is that, when the context is predictable, speakers organise
languages to be less autonomous by combining linguistic signals with contex-
tual information, whereas less predictable contexts result in speakers relying on
strategies that promote more autonomous signals.
Chapter 5 addresses the advantages and limitations of applying statistical
analyses to large-scale, cross-cultural datasets. In particular, the chapter high-
lights how the noisiness of the dataset, the borrowing of cultural traits, and the
shared inheritance of cultures are all fundamental limitations on the explanatory
power of such studies. Taken together, these three problems make correlational
studies poorly equipped to test causal relationships, with the chapter concluding
that experiments are better suited to answering questions relating to context and
language structure.
The final chapter provides a summary of the work presented and offers some
possible directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Languages adapt to their
contextual niche
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 outlined a theoretical framework for how we might go about approach-
ing the causal relationship between context and language structure, arguing that
an experimental approach is best equipped to address such questions. The next
three chapters investigate how context, learning and communication interact with
one another in shaping the structure of an artificial language. The aim is to use
experiments to tease apart the three pressures identified in Chapter 1: a dis-
crimination pressure arising from a need to discriminate between objects in the
world, the fact that languages need to generalise to new meanings and contexts
(generalisation pressure), and that speakers and hearers need to align on a shared
system of communication (coordination pressure).
Experiment 1 builds upon previous work in iterated learning and communi-
cation games to investigate how context links short-term language use with the
long-term emergence of different types of language systems. To operationalise
context we manipulate the situational context1, defined as the physical environ-
ment in which an utterance is produced (Evans & Green, 2006), by changing
which feature is informative (and uninformative) for discriminating between pos-
sible referents. This allows us to address the following questions: (i) To what
extent does the situational context influence the conventional encoding of fea-
tures in the linguistic system? (ii) How does the effect of the situational context
work its way into the structure of language?
1Also referred to as the referential context and visual context in other work (e.g., Konopka
& Brown, 2014).
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The results of this experiment show that languages gradually evolve to only
encode information which is informative for the task of learning and using a
language to discriminate between referents in context. The fact that different
systems evolve for conveying the same set of referents demonstrates that context
plays an important role in the emergence of structure in language.
2.2 Author contributions
The following section contains a paper which was co-authored with my super-
visors, Simon Kirby and Kenny Smith, and published in Language and Cogni-
tion. The experiments were conceived during supervision meetings, with both
co-authors contributing to the analysis and writing of the paper.
2.3 Winters, Kirby & Smith (2015): Languages
adapt to their contextual niche
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Abstract 
It is well established that context plays a fundamental role in how we learn and use language. Here we 
explore how context links short-term language use with the long-term emergence of different types of 
language systems. Using an iterated learning model of cultural transmission, the current study 
experimentally investigates the role of the communicative situation in which an utterance is produced 
(SITUATIONAL CONTEXT) and how it influences the emergence of three types of linguistic systems: 
UNDERSPECIFIED languages (where only some dimensions of meaning are encoded linguistically), 
HOLISTIC systems (lacking systematic structure) and SYSTEMATIC languages (consisting of compound 
signals encoding both category-level and individuating dimensions of meaning). To do this, we set up 
a discrimination task in a communication game and manipulated whether the feature dimension shape 
was relevant or not in discriminating between two referents. The experimental languages gradually 
evolved to encode information relevant to the task of achieving communicative success, given the 
situational context in which they are learned and used, resulting in the emergence of different 





One of the fundamental axioms of modern cognitive-functional linguistics is that "[word] meaning is 
highly context-sensitive, and thus mutable" (Evans, 2005: 71). When interpreting a particular 
utterance, language users must not only rely on the meaning encoded in linguistic forms, but also on 
what they infer from contextual information. Such notions were explicitly acknowledged in the early 
work of Grice (1957), with a distinction being made between SIGNAL MEANING1 and CONTEXTUAL 
MEANING (Evans & Green, 2006). Signal meaning refers to the senses stored in semantic memory, 
forming part of the user's linguistic knowledge. Contextual meaning is constructed on-line and 
constitutes an extension of the original signal meaning through an individual's inferential capacities 
(cf. Evans & Green, 2006; Hoefler, 2009: 6). Put simply: “[...] some meaning is encoded in linguistic 
forms and some is inferred” (Wedgwood, 2007: 652). 
 
In this sense, context broadly refers to the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance, besides the 
information already specified in the signal meaning, and constitutes a psychological construct that 
                                                 
1 We use signal meaning to refer to what Evans & Green (2006) refer to as encyclopaedic meaning. 
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comprises a subset of an individual's assumptions about the world (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 15-16)2. 
Consider the word MOLE. Besides referring to a small burrowing animal, MOLE can also denote a form 
of espionage, a type of birthmark and a unit in chemistry. Each of these senses are said to be stored in 
semantic memory, with their use and interpretation being governed by the very specific contexts in 
which they occur. Viewed in isolation words such as MOLE might be construed as communicatively 
dysfunctional. Yet, in context, it is typically easy to distinguish one sense from another. Having 
specific knowledge of the context thus enables a hearer to change their expectations regarding the 
intended meaning of a given word. In other words, when the context is known and informative, it 
necessarily decreases uncertainty (Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2012). 
 
As context is used as a resource to reduce uncertainty, it might alter our conception of how an optimal 
communication system should be structured (Zipf, 1949; Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2012). Levinson 
(2000: 29), for instance, argues that our cognitive abilities favour communication systems which are 
skewed in their design towards hearer inference over speaker effort. Meanwhile, Pinker & Bloom 
(1990) note language exhibits design for communication because it allows for "minimising ambiguity 
in context" (pg. 713, emphasis added). Evidence for the role of context is also apparent in the way we 
structure our utterances, with syntax being sensitive to the wider discourse and the immediate 
communicative needs of interlocutors (Chafe, 1976; DuBois, 1987; Fery & Krifka, 2008). 
Furthermore, these immediate communicative needs can give rise to longer-term patterns: here, the 
way in which speakers pragmatically design utterances (INVITED INFERENCES, Traugott & Konig, 
1991), as well as how hearers interpret utterances (CONTEXT-INDUCED INTERPRETATION, Heine, 
Claudi & Hunnemeyer, 1991), is posited to play a fundamental role in historical processes, such as 
grammaticalization (cf. Traugott & Trousdale, 2013). 
 
There are a number of different kinds of context we could talk about in relation to a particular usage 
event (Evans & Green, 2006; Bach, 2012). Our present study is specifically focused on the 
SITUATIONAL CONTEXT: the immediate communicative environment in which an utterance is situated 
(Evans & Green, 2006: 221) and how it influences the distinctions a speaker needs to convey. In an 
experimental setting, situational context can be manipulated by tailoring both the types of stimuli and 
the way in which they are organised. For example, in a study examining how adjectives were used in 
referring expressions, Sedivy (2005) discovered that speakers were more likely to use an adjective 
when one object shared a feature dimension with another object (e.g., a blue cup and green cup), but 
not when the object belonged to a different category (e.g., a cup and a teddy bear). Similarly, Ferreira, 
Slevc & Rodgers (2005) found that when speakers were faced with conceptual ambiguities, such as 
                                                 
2 This can refer to the wider sentential context in which a word is embedded as well as the situational and 
interpersonal contexts that make up the salient common ground, among others (see: Bach, 2012; Evans & 
Green, 2006: 221). 
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having to discriminate between two types of bat (the flying mammal), they would disambiguate on a 
relevant dimension (e.g., using the small bat in their utterance rather than just the bat when a large bat 
was also present in the context), whereas when speakers were presented with linguistic ambiguities 
(e.g., a baseball bat and an animal bat) they were less likely to engage in ambiguity avoidance.   
 
If the situational context plays a fundamental role in how language is structured, then the general 
observation that some meaning is encoded and some is inferred leaves open the questions: (i) To what 
extent does the situational context influence the encoding of features in the linguistic system? (ii) 
How does the effect of the situational context work its way into the structure of language? To help 
answer these questions we investigate how situational context influences the emergence of linguistic 
systems. Using an artificial language paradigm, we experimentally simulate cultural transmission in a 
pair-based communication game setup (cf. Scott-Phillips & Kirby, 2010; Galantucci, Garrod & 
Roberts, 2012). Participants learn an artificial language which provides labels for a set of pictures, 
‘meanings’ to be communicated. These stimuli vary on the dimension of shape, with each referent 
also having a unique, idiosyncratic element. After learning the language, participants play a series of 
communication games with their partner, taking turns to describe pictures for each other. We 
modified the situational context in which communication took place by manipulating whether the 
feature dimension of shape was relevant or not for a discrimination task: for example, some 
participants would encounter only situational contexts in which the objects to be discriminated during 
communication differed in shape, whereas others would be confronted with contexts in which the 
objects to be discriminated during communication were of the same shape. Finally, these pairs of 
participants were arranged into transmission chains (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008; Scott-Phillips & 
Kirby, 2010; Thiesen-White, Kirby & Oberlander, 2011), such that the language produced during 
communication by the nth pair in a chain became the language that the n+1th pair attempted to learn. 
This method allows us to investigate how the artificial languages change and evolve as they are 
adapted to meet the participants’ communicative needs and/or as they are passed from individual to 
individual via learning. We predict that languages in different types of situational context will adapt to 
become optimally structured as follows: 
 When the feature dimension of shape always differs between pairs of referents which are to 
be discriminated, we predict that the languages will evolve to only encode shape in the 
linguistic signal, and become underspecified on all other dimensions. 
 When the feature dimension of shape is always shared between pairs of referents which are to 
be discriminated, we predict that a holistic systems will emerge, in which each referent is 
associated with an idiosyncratic label that encodes that referent’s idiosyncratic feature; 
 When the feature dimension of shape sometimes differs and is sometimes shared within pairs 
of referents, we predict that the languages will become systematically structured to encode 
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both the shape (via a category marker) and idiosyncratic features (via an individuating 
element of the signal).  
 
1.1 Iterated Learning and Communication Games: A method for investigating the emergence and 
evolution of language 
Language is not only a conveyer of cultural information, but is itself a socially learned and culturally 
transmitted system, with an individual's linguistic knowledge being the result of observing and 
reconstructing the linguistic behaviour of others (Kirby & Hurford, 2002). This process can be 
explored experimentally using ITERATED LEARNING: a cycle of continued production and induction 
where individual learners are exposed to a set of data, which they must then reproduce and pass on to 
the next generation of learners (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). 
 
Using this method, researchers have demonstrated that cultural transmission can account for the 
emergence of some design features in language, including ARBITRARINESS (Thiesen-White, Kirby & 
Oberlander, 2011; Caldwell & Smith, 2012), REGULARITY (Reali & Griffiths, 2009; Smith & 
Wonnacott, 2010), DUALITY OF PATTERNING (Verhoef, 2012) and SYSTEMATIC COMPOSITIONAL 
STRUCTURE (Kirby et al., 2008; Theisen-White et al., 2011). Typically, a participant is trained on a 
target system (e.g., an artificial language) and then tested on their ability to reproduce what they have 
learned, with the test output being used as the training input for the next participant in a chain. 
 
These studies show that cultural transmission can account for the emergence of structure in 
communication systems. In particular, communication systems adapt to constraints inherent in the 
learning process: domain-general limitations in our memory and processing capabilities (Christiansen 
& Chater, 2008) introduce a LEARNABILITY PRESSURE (Brighton, Kirby & Smith, 2005), meaning that 
languages that are difficult to learn tend not to be accurately reproduced, and therefore change. Recent 
work in this paradigm shows that the incorporation of situational context can change the extent to 
which the evolving language encodes certain features of referents. Silvey, Kirby & Smith (2014) 
show, using a transmission chain paradigm, that word meanings evolve to selectively preserve 
distinctions which are salient during word learning. Using a pseudo-communicative task, where 
participants needed to discriminate between a target meaning and a distractor meaning, the authors 
were able to manipulate which meaning dimensions (SHAPE, COLOUR and MOTION) were relevant and 
irrelevant in conveying the intended meaning. If a meaning dimension was backgrounded, in that it 
was not relevant in distinguishing between the target and distractor, then the languages evolved not to 
encode this particular meaning dimension. Instead, the languages converged on underspecified 
systems based on the relevant feature dimensions for discriminating between meanings.  
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However, language is not merely a task of passively remembering and reproducing a set of form-
meaning pairings. Language is also a process of JOINT ACTION (Bratman, 1992; Clark, 1996; Croft, 
2000): that is, language is fundamentally a social and interactional phenomenon, whereby the role of 
usage, communication and coordination are salient pressures on the system (also see: Tomasello, 
2008; Bybee, 2010). Experimental communication games have been used to investigate the 
emergence of combinatorial (Galantucci, Kroos & Rhodes, 2010) and compositional (Selten & 
Warglein, 2007) structure, the emergence of arbitrary symbols from iconic signs (Garrod, Fay, Lee, 
Oberlander & MacLeod, 2007), and how common ground influences the extent to which a 
communication can become established in the first place (Scott-Phillips, Kirby & Ritchie, 2009). 
 
Converging evidence from iterated learning and communication games point to both learning and 
communication as powerful forces in shaping the structure of language (Smith, Tamariz & Kirby, 
2013; Fay & Ellison, 2013). With this in mind, the basic premise of the current experiment is to 
expend upon this work by: (a) adding a communicative element to the experimental setup of Silvey, 
Kirby & Smith (2014), and (b) manipulating the types of situational context. 
 
1.2 The Problem of Linkage: Language Strategies and the emergence of language systems 
Explaining how context works its way into the structure of language requires that we consider the 
PROBLEM OF LINKAGE (Kirby, 1999; Kirby, 2012). Rather than there being a straightforward link 
between our individual cognitive machinery and the features we observe in language, we are instead 
faced with an additional dynamical system: SOCIO-CULTURAL TRANSMISSION. Treating language as a 
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM (Beckner et al., 2009; Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, 2009) solves this 
problem of linkage because we can consider how short-term LANGUAGE STRATEGIES (Evans & Green, 
2006: 110) used in solving immediate communicative needs can give rise to LANGUAGE SYSTEMS 
through long-term patterns of learning and use (Bleys & Steels, 2009; Steels, 2012; Beuls & Steels, 
2013). 
 
The language strategy a speaker selects to enable a listener to identify their intended meaning is 
dependent not only on the referential information available, but also the context in which the utterance 
is situated. Take the relatively simple communicative situation in Figure 1: here, there are several 
language strategies that a language user could employ to convey the intended meaning. In context 1A, 
the intended meaning can easily be conveyed by using the label DOG as opposed to CAT. If, however, 
the situational context pairs the intended referent with another dog (as in context 1B), then it makes 
little sense to use the referential label of DOG, as the listener is very unlikely to be able to distinguish 
between the two referents on the basis of that label. Instead, other strategies must be employed, such 
as providing a unique identifier that is more specialised (DALMATIAN) or creating a compound signal 
(Ay, Flack & Krakauer, 2007) that has both specialised and generalised components (SPOTTED DOG). 
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Figure 1. Language strategies and example contexts. The green coloured boxes correspond to the 
intended referent. As we can see, DOG is a viable strategy for conveying the intended meaning in 
context A, but we need to either use a more specific label (DALMATIAN) or provide additional 
referential information alongside the generalised form (SPOTTED DOG) to convey the intended 
meaning in context B. 
 
The current experiment explores how these short-term strategies of achieving communicative success 
in a situational context influence the emergence of different types of language systems. In particular, 
we focus on the evolution of three types of language systems: UNDERSPECIFIED, HOLISTIC and 
SYSTEMATIC. Underspecification captures the observation that languages abstract across referents by 
encoding some feature dimensions and ignoring others (Silvey, Kirby & Smith, 2014). Using the 
examples above, the word DOG is underspecified with respect to whether or not its referent is spotted 
or brown. Conversely, the labels DALMATIAN, POODLE, SIAMESE and TABBY are holistic, in that they 
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embody an arbitrary set of one-to-one mappings between signals and their meanings3: holistic signals 
serve the purpose of individuation (Lyons, 1977). Finally, in a systematic mapping between forms and 
meanings the signals share elements of form (unlike in a holistic mapping, where each signal is 
unrelated to the other signals) but are nonetheless one-to-one: systematic languages consist of 
compound signals (e.g., SPOTTED DOG), whereby part of the structure refers to a general-level 
category (e.g., DOG) and part of the structure refers to an individuating component (e.g., SPOTTED). 
 
To test for the effect of situational context, we use a GUESSING GAME setup (cf. Steels, 2003; Silvey, 
Kirby & Smith, 2014): the task is to discriminate between pairings of a target object and a distractor 
object. In our case, possible referents are drawn from a set of images which vary in shape (see Figure 
2 below). Manipulating these pairings gives us three experimental conditions based on: (a) whether 
the feature dimension of shape is relevant or not in discriminating between two referents, and (b) the 
extent to which stimuli pairings remain consistent over time with respect to the relevance of the 
feature dimension of shape. 
 
Figure 2. All eight meanings for the image stimulus set used in this experiment. Note that each 
individual image is comprised of two components: a basic-level of shape (star or blob) and a 
subordinate-level (a unique idiosyncratic feature). 
 
 
In the SHAPE-DIFFERENT condition, pairings of target and distractor are constructed such that the 
feature dimension of shape is always relevant with respect to discrimination, i.e. target and distractor 
differ in shape. Since the two objects in such situational contexts have different shapes, then they can 
be discriminated merely by referring to shape. We therefore predict that the languages in the Shape-
Different condition will evolve to become underspecified, specifying shape but not differentiating 
                                                 
3It should be noted that these holistic labels are also underspecified in respect to other possible signals (e.g., 
dalmatian puppy, spotted dalmatian). The important point to keep in mind is the relevance of dimension we are 
trying to signal. In this case, the signal dog is underspecified when compared with dalmatian and poodle. We 
could also highlight instances where dog is more specific than other signals, such as animal. Such notions are 
widely acknowledged in any linguistic theory that takes into account hierarchical relations between referents. 
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between the objects within a given shape category: such an underspecified system is functionally 
adequate for achieving communicative success in this situational context, and is highly learnable 
(Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). Conversely, in the SHAPE-SAME condition target and distractor are 
always of the same shape – differing only on their idiosyncratic features. Consequently, the feature 
dimension of shape is always irrelevant in discrimination, and therefore does not need to be specified 
linguistically, with abstracting across referents of the same shape being communicatively 
dysfunctional for these situational contexts. We therefore predict that holistic systems will emerge in 
the Shape-Same condition, where each individual referent is associated with a unique label that maps 
onto its idiosyncratic feature. Lastly, for the MIXED condition we manipulated the predictability of 
situational contexts across trials: on some trials target and distractor share the same shape and on 
others they differ in shape. When encountering this mix of situational contexts, we hypothesise 
languages will become systematically structured, encoding in the linguistic signal both the basic-level 
of shape and individuating information of the idiosyncratic feature. Furthermore, we expect that the 
labels for the basic-level feature will becomes conventionalised earlier than those specifying the 
individuating information, with participants attempting to meet their immediate communicative needs 
on a piecemeal basis, through minimising effort and maximising communicative success; the quickest 
way to achieve this would be for participants to first align on conventional forms for two shapes (as 
this minimises effort and will ensure communicative success in contexts where shape is relevant in 
discrimination) followed by conventional forms for the eight idiosyncratic features (as these are 
needed to make these distinctions in contexts where shape is irrelevant in discrimination).  
 
1.3 Ecologically-Sensitive, Learning Bias and Historically Contingent Accounts 
Our prediction that manipulations to the situational context will bias the probability of one linguistic 
system emerging over another is consistent with a broader class of predictions that we will term 
ECOLOGICALLY-SENSITIVE accounts. Under this perspective, languages adapt to the structure of their 
niche in an analogous manner to that of biological organisms: just as environmental niches constrain 
and guide the evolution of species, so too are socio-cultural niches salient constraints on the types of 
languages that emerge (Lupyan & Dale, 2010). The ecologically-sensitive account is consistent with a 
range of observations including: that social structure patterns with differences in language structure 
(Wray & Grace, 2007; Lupyan & Dale, 2010); that word frequency is a product of the range of 
individuals and topics (Altmann, Pierrehumbert & Motter, 2011); that interactional constraints and 
conversational infrastructure lead to cultural convergence of linguistic form (Dingemanse, Torreira & 
Enfield, 2013); that objects and events in the world guide word learning discrimination (Ramscar, 
Yarlett, Dye, Denny & Thorpe, 2010); that word length patterns with the complexity of the meaning 
space (Lewis, Sugarman & Frank, 2014); that the structure of languages is shaped by the structure of 
meanings to be communicated (Perfors & Narravo, 2014).  
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These ecologically-sensitive accounts can be contrasted with two other theoretical perspectives that 
make different predictions about the relationship between the situational context and the emergence of 
linguistic systems. The first of these is the LEARNING BIAS approach. This makes the prediction that 
language structure is closely coupled to the prior expectations and biases of language learners (e.g. 
Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Reali & Griffiths, 2009; Fedzechkina, Jaeger & Newport, 2012; Culbertson, 
Smolensky & Wilson, 2013; Culbertson & Adger, 2014). The learning bias approach can be further 
contrasted with what we term the HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY account, which holds that the types of 
systems that emerge are primarily constrained by random historical events, subtly biasing the 
language in one direction or another. When compared with the ecologically-sensitive and the learning 
bias accounts, a historical contingency prediction is that language structure is the result of lineage-
specific outcomes (Lass, 1997), with “the current state of a linguistic system shaping and constraining 
future states” (Dunn et al. 2011: 1). 
 
In their extreme incarnations, the learning bias and historical contingency accounts both predict that 
manipulating the situational context will have little effect on the types of systems that emerge in our 
experiment. For a learning bias account we would predict considerable convergence across all 
experimental conditions: there will be a globally-optimal solution in terms of a prior constraint (or set 
of constraints), with the languages then converging towards this prior. By contrast, the historical 
contingency account would predict a much higher degree of variation in the types of systems that 
eventually emerge, with the states of these systems being better predicted by individual variation and 




72 undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Edinburgh (42 female, median age 22) 
were recruited via the SAGE careers database and randomly assigned into 12 diffusion chains. Each 
chain consisted of a pair of initial participants who learned a random language, and two pairs of 
successive participants who learned the previous pair of participants' output language, making 3 
generations in total. These chains were further subdivided into three experimental conditions (see 
§2.3).     
 
2.2 Stimuli: Images and Target Language 
Participants were asked to learn and then produce an alien language, consisting of lowercase labels 
paired with images. The images were drawn from a set of 8 possible pictures, which varied on the 
dimension of shape (4 blobs and 4 stars), with each individual image also having 1 unique, 
idiosyncratic subordinate element (see Figure 2).  
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The training language for the first participant pair in each chain was created as follows. From a set of 
vowels (a,e,i,o,u) and consonants (g,h,k,l,m,n,p,w) we randomly generated 9 CV syllables which we 
then used to randomly generate a set of 24 2-4 syllable words. These parameters ensured that there 
were 3 unique labels for every picture. Each chain was initialised with a different random language. 
The training language for later pairs of participants consisted of the language produced by the 
previous participant pair while communicating (see below). 
 
2.3 Procedure: Training Phase and Communication Phase 
At the start of the experiment, participants were told they would first have to learn and then 
communicate using an alien language. Participants completed the experiment in separate booths on 
networked computers. The experiment consisted of two main phases: a TRAINING PHASE and a 
COMMUNICATION PHASE. Before each phase began, participants were given detailed information on 
what that phase would involve and were explicitly told not to use English or any other language they 
knew during the experiment4. For the training phase, participants were trained separately, and it was 
only during the communication phase that they interacted (remotely, over the computer network). 
 
2.3.1 Training Phase 
In each training trial, the participant was presented with a label and two images, one of which was the 
target and one a distractor. The participant was told that the alien wanted them to pick which of the 
two images corresponded to the label. Once the participant had selected an image (by clicking on it 
using the mouse) they were told whether their choice was correct or incorrect, shown the label and 
target image for 2 seconds, and then instructed to retype the label before proceeding to the next trial. 
Both targets and distractors were presented in a random order within the following constraints: (i) the 
pairing of target and distractor varied based on the experimental condition (see §2.4 below for more 
details on the conditions); (ii) within each training block, each of the 8 meanings appeared three times 
as a target. The training phase of the experiment consisted of 4 such blocks, each of 24 trials; each 
block contained the same 24 training trails, with the order of these trials being randomly shuffled. 
 
2.3.2 Communication Phase 
During the communication phase of the experiment, participants took alternating turns as director and 
matcher: 
 
 DIRECTOR: As directors, participants were presented with two images: a target and a 
distractor. Targets were highlighted with a green border. The director was prompted to type a 
                                                 
4 Compliance with the instructions was high – to our knowledge participants did not make use of English or any 
other language in the current experiment. 
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label that would best communicate the target to the matcher. The label was then sent to the 
matcher’s computer. 
 MATCHER: Participants were presented with the same two images as the director, with the 
label provided by the director appearing underneath. The matcher was then prompted to click 
on the image they thought corresponded to the label provided. 
 
Following each trial, participants were given feedback as to whether or not the matcher had correctly 
identified the picture described by the director, followed by a display showing the image the director 
was referring to and the image the matcher selected. Target and distractor pairings were randomly 
generated within the constraints imposed by the experimental conditions (see §2.4 below), and 
communication trials were presented in random order. The communication phase consisted of 2 
blocks, the length of each block varied depending on the experimental condition (see below). 
 
2.4 Manipulating Context: Mixed, Shape-Same and Shape-Different Conditions 
To test the role of context, a simple manipulation was made to the possible combinations of target and 
distractor images within a single trial during training and communication. This provides three 
experimental conditions. For the Shape-Same condition, participants only ever saw pairings of images 
that shared the same shape, but differed in their idiosyncratic element (see Figure 3A). In the Shape-
Different condition, participants were exposed to pairings of images that differed in both their shape 
and idiosyncratic features (see Figure 3B). Participants in the Mixed condition encountered a mixture 
of image pairings: some image pairings shared the same shape but differed on their idiosyncratic 
features, whereas other image pairings differed on both their shape and idiosyncratic features (see 
Figure 3C). 
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Figure 3. 3A is an example of a pairing in the Shape-Same condition: here, participants only ever 
observe pairings that share the same shape. 3B is an example of a pairing found in the Shape-
Different condition; the two stimuli always differ in shape. 3C shows an example of the pairings used 
in the Mixed condition: here, we get a mixture of stimuli that in some contexts differ in shape and in 
other contexts share the same shape. 
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In the Mixed condition, one communication block contained 56 trials, with 24 trials consisting of 
pairs of images that shared the same basic-level category but differed on subordinate-level features 
(24 trials exhausting all such possible pairings), whereas the remaining 32 trials differed on both their 
basic-level category and subordinate-level features (again, 32 trials covering all such possible 
pairings). To ensure that Shape-Different and Shape-Same conditions were comparable to the Mixed 
condition in the number of trials, we doubled up the possible combinations of images in the other two 
conditions, i.e., the Shape-Different condition involved 64 trials (32x2) per communication block and 
the Shape-Same condition involved 48 trials (24x2) per communication block; participants underwent 
two such blocks of communication. 
 
2.5 Iteration 
The labels produced by a pair of participants in the second block of the communication phase, and 
their associated target and distractor images, were used to construct the training language for the next 
pair of participants: we simply randomly sampled from the communicative output of generation n to 
produce the training language for generation n+1, (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. An example of the random selection process employed for a single meaning in the Shape-
Same condition. Here, one target meaning is associated with 6 (possibly unique) signals during 
communicative testing. However, only three trials are required to construct a training block for the 
next generation: in order to generate this training block, we sample randomly from the appropriate 
contexts.  
 
The random sampling process was constrained in the following ways. First, for all three conditions, 
we had a bottleneck on the number of signals that could be passed onto the next generation, i.e., for a 
single meaning we could only pass on three labels. As such, the number of signals transmitted from 
the final communication block of a generation stayed consistent between conditions, but the size of 
the sampling space differed slightly: Mixed (24/56 signals sampled), Shape-Different (24/64 signals 
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sampled), Shape-Same (24/48 signals sampled). Second, in the Mixed condition, the random selection 
process was additionally constrained so that a given stimuli would appear in at least one shape-same 
context and one shape-different context, and that that there were an equal number (12) of shape-same 
and shape-different contexts in total. This meant that, in the Mixed condition, individual stimuli might 
appear in different ratios of shape-same and shape-different contexts. By contrast, the Shape-Same 
condition contained all possible pairings of target and distractor in training, and the Shape-Different 
condition had a subset of all possible contexts (24 out of 32 possible stimuli pairs). 
 
2.6 Dependent Variables and Hypotheses 
2.6.1 Measuring Communicative Success 
To measure communicative success we simply recorded the number of successful interactions, where 
the matcher clicked on the target image. Given the differing trial numbers, the maximum success 
score differs across conditions: Shape-Different (128 points for two blocks of 64 interactions), Mixed 
(112 points for two blocks of 56 interactions) and Shape-Same (96 points for two blocks of 48 
interactions). These maximum scores are converted into proportions to allow visual comparison 
between the three conditions, but the statistical analyses are conducted on the binary dependent 
variable. 
 
2.6.2 Measuring Language Types: Difference Scores 
In addition to conducting qualitative analyses of the languages that are produced during 
communication, we used the Normalised Levenshtein edit distance5 to provide objective measures for 
WITHIN-CATEGORY DIFFERENCE and BETWEEN-CATEGORY DIFFERENCE. To compute within-category 
difference for a given block, all labels associated with objects of a given category were compared with 
one another (i.e., all labels for the 4 blob-shaped images are paired with one another and given a total 
normalised Levenshtein edit distance, as were all labels for the 4 star-shaped images); the resulting 
pair of scores  (a score for the blob-shaped category and a score for the star-shaped category) were 
then averaged to obtain a composite within-category difference score. Between-category difference 
was calculated for a given block by pairing all 4 labels for blobs with all 4 labels for star-shaped 
images at the same block and calculating average normalised Levenshtein distance. 
 
These two difference scores provide us with an objective measure of language type.  In particular, 
holistic, systematic and underspecified languages are discriminable on these scores, primarily the 
within-category difference scores. A holistic language only encodes the idiosyncratic feature of 
objects in the linguistic system – shape category distinctions are not encoded. As such, we should 
                                                 
5 The Normalised Levenshtein edit distance is calculated by taking the minimum number of edits (insertions, 
deletions, or substitutions of a single character) needed to transform one label into another, and then dividing by 
the length of the longer label.  
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expect the within-category and between-category differences to be similar. As a systematic language 
encodes both the shape category and the idiosyncratic element, systematic languages should exhibit 
smaller within-category difference scores than between-category difference scores, and should also 
exhibit lower within-category difference scores than holistic languages. For an underspecified 
language, we expect that only shape category information will be encoded, leading to substantial 
differences in within-category and between-category difference scores, with within-category scores 
being close to 0.  
 
2.6.3 Measuring Uncertainty: Conditional Entropy 
To further assist in quantifying the language types that emerge, we can calculate the degree of 
uncertainty in the system, which allows us to quantify the relationship between signals and their 
associated meaning. First, we need to operationalise two types of uncertainty about signal-meaning 
pairs. SIGNAL UNCERTAINTY arises from one-to-many pairings of meanings-to-signals (as in cases of 
synonymy in natural language). Conversely, MEANING UNCERTAINTY arises from one-to-many 
pairings of signals-to-meanings (as in cases of homonymy and polysemy in natural languages6). We 
predict that the languages in all three conditions will evolve over cultural transmission to lower their 
signal uncertainty: that is, as a system becomes more conventionalised, it is more likely to only have 
one signal for each meaning (cf. Reali & Griffiths, 2009). The Mixed and Shape-Same conditions are 
predicted to evolve toward a one-to-one mapping between signals and meanings (i.e. we should see 
eight signals for eight meanings in these conditions), leading to low meaning uncertainty. However, 
the Shape-Different condition is predicted to show higher levels of meaning uncertainty: the 
prediction is that these chains should involve one-to-many signal-meaning pairs, as an underspecified 
system leads to the same label being associated with multiple objects which share the relevant feature 
(here, shape).  
 
To quantify signal uncertainty and meaning uncertainty we measure two aspects of the CONDITIONAL 
ENTROPY of the system. This gives us a measure of predictability that we can apply to both meaning 
uncertainty and signal uncertainty. H(M|S) is the expected entropy (i.e. uncertainty) over meanings 
given a signal, and therefore captures meaning uncertainty, 
H(𝑀|𝑆) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑠) ∑ 𝑃(𝑚|𝑠) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑚|𝑠)
𝑚∈𝑀𝑠∈𝑆
 
where the rightmost sum is simply the entropy over meanings given a particular signal s∈S. P(m|s) is 
the probability that meaning, m is the intended meaning given that signal s has been produced. This 
entropy is weighted by a distribution P(s) on signals. We can also reverse the position of signals and 
                                                 
6 We recognise there is a distinction between ambiguity, vagueness and polysemy in the lexical semantics and 
cognitive linguistics literature (cf. Tuggy, 1993; Geeraerts, 1993). For the sake of convenience, we use meaning 
uncertainty or ambiguity to simply refer to a one-to-many mapping of signals and meanings. 
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meanings in this equation to get the conditional entropy of H(S|M), i.e., a  measure of signal 
uncertainty: 
H(𝑆|𝑀) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑚) ∑ 𝑃(𝑠|𝑚) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑠|𝑚).
𝑠∈𝑆𝑚∈𝑀
 
High H(M|S) means that a signal is highly uninformative about the intended meaning (due to the 
signal having multiple meanings), whilst a high H(S|M) means that a meaning is highly uninformative 
about the intended signal (due to the meaning having multiple signals).  
 
While these measures capture relevant aspects of the structure of the evolving languages, they do not 
take context into account, and therefore do not capture the functional adequacy of the system for 
communication in context. To account for the contextual meaning we incorporate one last measure 
meaning uncertainty in context, H(M|S, C), 
H(𝑀|𝑆, 𝐶) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑠, 𝑐) ∑ 𝑃(𝑚|𝑠, 𝑐) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑚|𝑠, 𝑐)
𝑚∈𝑀𝑠,𝑐∈𝑆,𝐶
 
where the various sums are over signals and meanings GIVEN A CONTEXT. This measure captures the 
(potential) communicative utility of a system: we predict that the degree of in-context meaning 
uncertainty will decrease in all three conditions (the languages will be functionally adequate for 
conveying the correct/intended meaning), whereas meaning uncertainty (disregarding context) will 
differ across conditions depending on the emerging linguistic systems, as discussed above. As such, 
we are able to compare these two measures to provide an accurate account of how these types of 
systems are evolving over time, and whether or not they are adapting to their situational contexts. 
 
2.6.4 Mixed Effects Model Overview 
We used R (R Core Team, 2013) and lme4 (Bates, Maechler & Bolker, 2012) to perform several 
separate linear mixed effects analyses based on the dependent variables of (a) communicative success, 
(b) within-category difference scores, (c) between-category difference scores, (d) H(S|M), (e) H(M|S) 
and (f) H(M|S,C). For our independent variables, we entered condition (Mixed, Shape-Same and 
Shape-Different), generation and block as fixed effects with interactions. As random effects, we had 
random intercepts for chain and participant, as well as chain and participant random slopes for 
generation and block. Each of these models used the Mixed condition as a baseline category. Visual 
inspection of residual plots did not reveal any noticeable deviations from assumptions of normality or 
homoscedasticity. P-values were obtained using a MCMC sampling method (pvals.fnc) provided by 
the languageR package (Baayen, 2008). 
 
2.6.4 Hypotheses 
Here we recap and summarise our various hypotheses. 
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HYPOTHESIS ONE: Participants will increase their communicative success over successive blocks and 
generations. 
 
HYPOTHESIS TWO: Languages in the Mixed condition will consistently evolve towards systematic 
category-marking systems. 
 
HYPOTHESIS THREE: Languages in the Shape-Same condition will consistently evolve towards 
holistic systems. 
 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: Languages in the Shape-Different condition will consistently evolve towards 
underspecified systems. 
 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE: The degree of signal uncertainty will decrease across all three conditions over 
successive blocks and generations. 
 
HYPOTHESIS SIX: The Shape-Different condition is predicted to show higher levels of meaning 
uncertainty than the Mixed and Shape-Same conditions. 
 




3.1 Qualitative Results: Languages 
This section will provide an overview of a representative selection of languages observed in each of 
these three conditions. We contrast the initial starting language participants were trained on with very 
early systems at the start (generation 1, block 1 of communicative interaction) and at the end 
(generation 1, interaction block 2) of a single generation, as well as   systems in the final generation of 
the chain (generation 3, interaction block 2).  
 
Figure 5 shows an example from chain 1, from the Mixed condition. In generation 1, the labels for 
each individual referent tend to show some individuation: for instance, MUWUMUWU is only ever 
associated with one particular blob. However, even at this early stage, we start to see evidence that the 
labels are patterning systematically according to shape. For instance, the initial syllable MU is 
consistently associated with blob-shaped referents, and the template H*PA is associated with star-
shaped referents. There is also some underspecification: HAPA, for instance, is used with all four stars 
(albeit at different frequencies). Words lengths also appear to differ systematically between shapes 
(although this strategy is not repeated in other chains). At the end of the first generation (block 2) a 
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few clear patterns emerge. First, the degree of heterogeneity has decreased in terms of the number of 
unique words and the number of unique syllables. Second, there is a higher degree of conventionality 
for each individual referent, as evident in some labels only ever appearing with one referent (e.g., 
MUHUMU and HEPA). Lastly, there is less underspecification across star-shaped referents –  HAPA is 
now only associated with two stars. The language of the third generation extends these patterns of 
increased conventionality: each individual referent has a unique label that distinguishes it from other 
referents. Furthermore, these labels show systematic relations with one another: three of the blob-
shaped images are distinguished from one another through varying the length of (partially) 
reduplicated syllables (MUWU, MUWUMU and MUWUMUWU). Meanwhile, all of the star-shaped 
images persist with the basic template of h*pa, and individual referents within this category differ 
only in the vowel of the first syllable. Finally, there is no underspecification by generation 3: as 
predicted, the language marks the basic-level category of shape as well as the individuating element. 
This observation supports our hypothesis that systematic structure will emerge in the Mixed 
condition, with languages first converging on conventionalised forms for shape followed by the 
idiosyncratic features. 
 
Figure 5. A table showing the initial training language and all of the signal-meaning pairs produced at 
generation 1 (communication block 1), generation 1 (communication block 2) and generation 3 
(communication block 2) in chain 1 (Mixed condition). Each meaning appears with a collection of 
labels beneath it: this constitutes the combined output of a pair of participants in a particular 
generation. 
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In the first generation of the Shape-Same condition (Figure 6) we see some commonalities with the 
early stages of the Mixed condition: there are examples of conventionality (e.g., GIGI and ZARA) as 
well as diversity (e.g., the wide range of labels for the blob with antennae and the star with dots) in the 
labels used for the individual referents. By time we reach block 2 of the first generation there is 
almost a completely conventionalised system (in that the participants are aligned on a stable set of 
labels for each referent). Furthermore, unlike the Mixed condition, this conventionalised system tends 
to recycle holistic variants instead of introducing systematicity: while there are pockets of 
systematicity (e.g., KANAKU and NAKAKU), these are circumscribed when compared to the Mixed 
condition. Interestingly, at the third generation, the NAPAWE variant has been favoured over the 
NAKAKU variant, lending additional weight to the notion that the situational context is biasing the 
system AGAINST systematic structure. These observations provide support for our hypothesis that 
holistic languages evolve in the Shape-Same condition. However, we should note systematicity is 
tolerated to a certain extent, as is the case for the blob-shaped images (KAPA and KAPAPA and GUGU 
and GIGI).  
 
Figure 6. A table showing the initial training language and all of the signal-meaning pairs produced at 
generation 1 (communication block 1), generation 1 (communication block 2) and generation 3 
(communication block 2) in chain 6 (Shape-Same condition). 
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For the Shape-Different condition (Figure 7), we see that there is a high level of heterogeneity in both 
the labels used between and within the referents. There is, however, some clustering of syllable types 
(e.g., NO, GO, NI etc) and combinatorial patterns (e.g., PUGO, GOGO, PUMA) according to the basic-
level category of shape. Interestingly, this diversity persists in the first generation (block 2), with less 
conventionality than that found in the Mixed and Shape-Same conditions. Still, there is an increase in 
conventional patterns, with forms becoming more predictable over time in both the number of 
syllables and the way in which they are arranged (e.g., ME and HE tend to disproportionately occur in 
the initial syllable position). The most noticeable difference between generation 1 and generation 3 is 
the collapse towards underspecification: we see high frequency forms for all blob-shaped referents 
(e.g., PUGU) and all star-shaped referents (e.g., HEHA). In addition to this loss of variation at the word 
level, variation also decreases at the syllable level (e.g., there are only four syllables for blob-shaped 
images: PU, PO, GU, and GO). The emergence of underspecified languages supports our hypothesis that 
languages in Shape-Same condition will evolve to abstract across the meaning dimension of shape. 
 
Figure 7. A table showing the initial training language and all of the signal-meaning pairs produced at 
generation 1 (communication block 1), generation 1 (communication block 2) and generation 3 
(communication block 2) in chain 12 (Shape-Different condition). Highlighted labels show 
underspecification. 
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It is important to note that all three conditions started off with a language that consists of randomly 
generated pairings of labels and meanings. Although the individual pairings differ between 
conditions, they do share an important structural characteristics: all initial languages have high levels 
of synonymy (three labels for each meaning). A consistent pattern shared across all three conditions is 
a shift from this system with many-to-one signal-meaning mappings to systems where we observe 
one-to-one and one-to-many mappings.  
 
3.2 Communicative Success 
Communicative Success scores tended to follow a similar trajectory in all three conditions (see Figure 
8). Over successive blocks we observe a clear increase in the overall communicative success rate, 
leading to near-perfect communication by the end of generation 3. Analysis of the logistic mixed 
effects model revealed a significant main effect of Generation (β = 1.13, SE = 0.19, z = 6.646, p < 
.001) and Block (β= 1.03, SE = 0.30, z = 3.399, p < .001), but no effect of Condition and no other 
significant interactions (p >.074). 
 
Figure 8. Average communicative success scores by generation (1-3), communication block, and 
condition. The vertical dotted lines represent the start of the next generation. Error bars represent the 
95% confidence intervals.  
 
These results show that, in all conditions, the languages are becoming increasingly effective at 
achieving communicative success through (a) repeated interactions between individual participant 
pairs and (b) across successive generations of participant pairs. 
 
3.3 Difference Scores 
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Table 1 shows the idealised and observed (in the second block of generation 3) values for the within- 
and between-category difference measures. Figure 9 shows how these measures evolve over time. Our 
hypothesis that languages in the Mixed condition should evolve systematic category-marking and 
should therefore produce a within-category difference score of around 0.5 (characteristic of a system 
in which signals tend to be composed of a general category-marker and an individuating element) and 
a between-category difference score of 1 (distinctive labels used across categories).  For the Shape-
Same condition, we predicted the emergence of holistic languages, where each object is associated 
with a unique and distinctive label: this is characterised by high within- and between-category 
differences. As can be seen from Table 1, these predictions were borne out. For the Shape-Different 
condition, we predicted the emergence of systems that underspecified, using a single label for all 
objects sharing a shape, which would correspond to 0 within-category difference and a high between-
category difference: as can be seen from the table, while this prediction was partially supported 
(within-category difference is lower than between-category difference), the within-category difference 
in this condition remains high – this is due to the slower conventionalisation seen in this condition, as 




Within-Category Difference Between-Category Difference 
Idealised Observed Idealised Observed 
Shape-Same 1 0.74 (SD = .05) 1  0.80 (SD = .07) 
Mixed 0.5 0.47 (SD = .07) 1 0.88 (SD = .05) 
Shape-Different 0 0.62 (SD = .10) 1 0.90 (SD = .08) 
Table 1. The idealised (left-hand columns) and observed (right-hand columns) scores for within-
category differences and between-category differences.  Numbers in brackets indicate the 
bootstrapped standard deviation. 
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Figure 9. Between-category (solid lines) and within-category (dotted lines) difference scores 
(measured by the average normalised Levenshtein edit distance) over successive communication 
blocks for the Mixed (blue lines), Shape-Same (green lines) and Shape-Different conditions (red 
lines). Generation 0 gives values for the initial random language. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Analysis of the mixed-effects model for Within-Category difference showed a significant effect of 
Generation (β = -0.07, SE = 0.02, t(84) = -2.823, p <.001), and a significant main effect of Shape-
Same condition (β = 0.20, SE = 0.04, t(84) = 5.043, p <.001). There was one significant interaction for 
Shape-Same condition x Generation (β = 0.07, SE = 0.03, t(84) = 2.266, p =.017). All other main 
effects and associated interactions were non-significant (p >.061). These results partially support our 
predictions: within-category difference remains high in the Same-Shape condition, reflecting the 
development of labels which individuate within categories, and decreases in the other conditions; 
however, the Within-Category differences remain surprisingly high in the Shape-Different condition, 
where we predicted the emergence of a fully underspecified system, associated with Within-Category 
difference of 0. 
 
Analysis of the model for Between-Category difference showed that only the main effect of 
Generation was significant (β = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t(84) = 2.46, p <.001), supporting the contention that 
Between-Category labels become increasingly distinct from one another over generations. All other 
main effects and associated interactions were non-significant (p >.139). 
 
3.4 Conditional Entropy 
3.4.1 Signal Uncertainty H(S|M) 
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For the conditional entropy of signals given meanings, H(S|M), we observe a general decrease across 
all three conditions (see fig. 10). However, the decline in entropy for the Shape-Different condition 
appears to be less pronounced than that of the Mixed and Shape-Same conditions: as discussed above, 
within-category variation persists unexpectedly in this condition. For H(S|M) the mixed-effects model 
contained significant results for the main effects of Generation (β = -0.61, SE = 0.13, t(72) = -4.561, p 
<.001), Block (β = -0.38, SE = 0.09, t(72) = -4.366, p <.03) and Shape-Different condition (β = 0.62, 
SE = 0.31, t(72) = 2.011, p <.009). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (p 
>.259). 
 
Figure 10. Degree of signal uncertainty, measured as H(S|M), against Generation and Block. Higher 
entropy scores indicate a higher degree of signal uncertainty. The error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
3.4.2 Meaning Uncertainty H(M|S) 
Figure 11 plots the conditional entropy of meanings given signals, H(M|S), against the number of 
blocks. As predicted, there is a clear difference between the conditions, with the Shape-Different 
condition showing a general increase in entropy in contrast to the Mixed and Shape-Same conditions, 
corresponding to the development of underspecified labels. For H(M|S) the mixed-effects model 
contained significant results for the main effect of the Shape-Different condition (β= 0.41, SE = 0.10, 
t(72) = 4.053, p<.001). There was also a significant Shape-Different condition x Block interaction (β 
= 0.32, SE = 0.09, t(72) = 3.424, p <.001). There were no other significant main effects or interactions 
(p >.265). 
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Figure 11. Degree of meaning uncertainty, measured as H(M|S).  
 
3.4.3 Meaning Uncertainty of signals in context H(M|S,C) 
The conditional entropy of meanings given signals in context, H(M|S,C), is shown in figure 12. In all 
three conditions we observe a decrease in entropy over time, with each of the conditions showing 
strikingly similar trajectories of change: as indicated by the communicative accuracy scores, the 
languages in all conditions evolve towards allowing optimal communication in context. For H(M|S,C) 
the mixed-effects model contained significant results for the main effects of Generation (β = -0.08, SE 
= 0.03, t(72) = -3.300, p <.001) and Block (β = -0.07, SE = 0.01, t(72) = -5.927, p <.001). There were 
no other significant main effects or interactions (p >.078). 
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Figure 12. Meaning uncertainty of signals in context, measured as H(M|S,C). 
4 Discussion 
Our findings support the general hypothesis that language structure adapts to the situational contexts 
in which it is learned and used. As we outlined in the introduction, some meaning is encoded and 
some meaning is inferred, with interactional short-term strategies of conveying the intended meaning 
feeding back into long-term, system-wide changes. In our experiment, languages gradually evolved to 
encode information relevant to the task of achieving communicative success in context, with different 
language systems evolving in each experimental condition. In the Shape-Same condition, where the 
dimension of shape was always the same for stimuli pairings, holistic systems of communication 
emerged, whilst in the Shape-Different condition, where the dimension of shape was always different 
for stimuli pairings, the system generalised and became underspecified (although unexpectedly 
variable: see discussion below). For the Mixed condition, which featured both Shape-Same and 
Shape-Different contexts, the systems that emerged were systematically structured: that is, both shape 
category and individual identity were encoded in the linguistic signal. These divergent systems arise 
given a very simple meaning space, through slight manipulations to the situational context. 
 
Despite these inherent differences between the languages that emerged, all of the conditions showed: 
(a) an increased level of communicative success and (b) a reduction in in-context meaning 
uncertainty, H(M|S,C). This observation suggests each condition produces languages that are 
functionally adequate for the task of achieving communicative success in context. The fact that 
different systems evolve for conveying the same set of meanings is important for how we view the 
role of context. Our explanation rests on the premise that languages are adapting to their niche, which 
in this case comprises the situational context, to become optimally structured.   
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Underspecified systems emerge in the Shape-Different condition because “when context is 
informative, any good communication system will leave out information already in the context” 
(Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2012: 284). This lends weight to studies showing that participants are 
making use of pragmatic reasoning to convey information at the least cost given common knowledge 
and the task at hand (Frank & Goodman, 2012).  These underspecified systems could be construed as 
being highly ambiguous when taken out of their communicative context. However, when we take into 
account the context in which the signals were used (as measured by the H(M|S,C)) then the apparent 
ambiguity is not counter-functional: that is, the system is perfectly adequate for achieving 
communicative success. When examined out of context, adapted communication systems can give the 
appearance of ambiguity, as Miller (1951: 111-2) noted: “Why do people tolerate such ambiguity? 
The answer is that they do not. There is nothing ambiguous about 'take' as it is used in everyday 
speech. The ambiguity appears only when we, quite arbitrarily, call isolated words the unit of 
meaning.” 
 
While the amount of synonymy (as measured by H(S|M)) decreased over time across all conditions, 
the Shape-Different condition appeared to tolerate a higher level of synonymy than the other two 
conditions. One possible explanation is the way in which participants viewed the task. An initially 
diverse input could be construed as priming the participants to reproduce a diverse output. If the labels 
are easy enough to learn and reproduce, and they achieve the goal of successfully allowing the 
matcher to choose the correct image, then this variation may be tolerated for longer. This also partly 
explains why the Shape-Different condition deviates from its predicted within-category difference 
score: labels are not conventionally associated with any one particular meaning within a category. For 
instance, as discussed in the qualitative analysis (see Fig. 7), PUGU and POGO (which are quite distinct, 
with a normalised Levenshtein edit distance of 0.5) are not conventionally associated with any 
particular blob; instead, they pattern synonymously, with the two labels being optional forms for any 
blob-shaped image. This reflects a limitation of the difference measurement to distinguish between 
systematic languages and this kind of synonymy. However, these languages do have distinct profiles, 
as evidenced by the various entropy measurements.      
 
It is also worth noting that not all chains in the Shape-Different condition converged on an 
underspecified system, with chain 11 evolving a holistic-like system. This mismatch with our 
predictions is perhaps due to the Shape-Different condition having more optionality provided by the 
situational context: that is, any of three hypothesised systems (Underspecified, Holistic, Systematic) 
are expressively adequate for conveying the intended meaning, although these systems differ in their 
parsimony in terms of memory and learning demands. This increases the probability that we will see 
more variation in the types of systems that evolve in the Shape-Different condition. Whereas 
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underspecified and, to a lesser extent, systematic category-marking languages are communicatively 
sub-optimal in the Shape-Same condition, the Shape-Different condition does not share such 
restrictions. A similar story applies when comparing the Mixed and Shape-Different conditions: 
neither holistic nor systematic category-marking languages are disfavoured for either condition, but an 
underspecified system would be problematic in the Mixed condition (as 43% of the contexts have 
images that share the same shape). Chain 11 thus serves as an important reminder of lineage-
specificity, and how the historical properties of a particular system can bias future states. 
 
For the Shape-Same condition, the chains consistently converge on holistic systems: that is, each 
individual stimulus has a unique label, with these labels being relatively distinct from one another. 
The decrease in H(S|M) and H(M|S) shows that the system is converging towards a one-to-one 
mapping of forms and meanings, whereas the high within-category difference scores show these 
signals are highly distinct from one another, and indeed more distinctive than those found in the other 
two conditions. Our rationale for the emergence of holistic systems in the Shape-Same condition is 
similar to that of the Shape-Different condition: where the situational context is informative, 
information will be left out of the linguistic system. In this instance, the context was informative 
through virtue of having the pairs of stimuli always sharing the same shape. This explains why 
systematicity is minimised in the Shape-Same condition: the linguistic system does not need to 
conventionally encode shape into the signal because context makes it irrelevant in discriminating 
between meanings. Instead, these languages specialise and become holistic, allowing them to meet the 
participants’ communicative needs in context. 
 
Even though the languages which emerge in the Shape-Same condition do reliably differ from those 
that evolve in the Mixed condition, through being more holistic, there is some evidence of 
systematicity in these chains. In chain 6, for instance, a language evolved in which two of the blob-
shaped stimuli share similar labels (KAPA and KAPAPA) as do the other two blob-shaped stimuli 
(GUGU and GIGI). These pockets of correlations between word forms suggest a certain degree of 
systematicity is tolerated – albeit not to the same extent as that found in the Mixed and Shape-
Different conditions. One explanation for this finding is that the situational context and 
communication are not the only factors shaping the system, with learnability pressures also acting on 
the structure of language (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). 
 
Only in the Mixed condition do we consistently observe the emergence of systematic category-
marking languages. The first line of evidence is that the observed within-category difference score 
lines up with our expected score (see Figure 11): this suggests part of the label is specifying shape and 
the other part is specifying the individuating component. While, as noted above, a difference score of 
approximately 0.5 is not necessarily indicative of systematic language structure, the H(S|M) and 
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H(M|S) scores show that, by generation 3, the languages in the Mixed condition have low conditional 
entropy, showing that the form-meaning pairs embody one-to-one mappings. 
 
A holistic language would be just as successful as conveying the correct meaning as a systematic 
language in the Mixed condition. So why do we see the emergence of systematic instead of holistic 
languages? Part of the reason rests on how these languages evolve in the early stages of their 
emergence: participants quickly establish a conventionalised specification of shape, before arriving 
upon conventionalised forms that encode the individuating elements. As a strategy, specifying shape 
information only requires participants to align on two signals, one that specifies star-shaped objects 
and one that specifies blob-shaped objects, which would allow them to successfully communicate on 
57% of trials (those where discrimination only requires that shape information is conventionally 
encoded). 
 
We can view this strategy as a negotiated exploration of the specification space during interaction, 
giving rise to a two-stage process: (i) THE CONVENTIONALISATION OF CATEGORY-MARKING FOR 
SHAPE; (ii) THE CONVENTIONALISATION OF INDIVIDUATING ELEMENTS. Supporting this contention of 
a two-stage process is the main effect of Generation for both the within-category difference scores and 
the conditional entropy of H(S|M): even though the within-category difference scores suggest 
systematic category-marking emerges by the end of generation one, the H(S|M) entropy is much 
higher in this initial generation than it is at later generations. The decrease in H(S|M) reflects the 
conventionalisation of individuating elements in the linguistic system - that is, there is less synonymy 
in later generations.  
 
Another striking finding in the Mixed condition was the rate at which systematic category-marking 
emerged, within a single generation of participants. Part of the explanation could be in how the 
manipulation of context exerts a strong constraint for participants to quickly converge on conventional 
markers for shape. There are several reasons why the rapid evolution seen in this experiment might 
prove to be an exception, rather than a general tendency. First of all, there are only two possible 
dimensions that the language may encode: the basic-level category and the subordinate idiosyncratic 
component. There are also differences between the initial generation and successive generations (as 
mentioned above): namely, later generations show greater degrees of conventionalisation in their label 
usage.  
 
If languages are adapting to their contextual niche, then what are the implications for the learning bias 
and historical contingency accounts? Even though our results are broadly consistent with the 
ecologically sensitive account, there is also evidence consistent with the learning bias (e.g., pockets of 
systematicity in the Shape-Same condition and the overall reduction of synonymy across all 
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conditions) and historical contingency (e.g., the emergence of a holistic language in chain 11 of the 
Shape-Different condition) accounts. It is likely that all these theoretical perspectives hold true to 
some extent, with the role of context being mediated by partially-competing motivations of prior 
learning biases and historical contingency. Such notions reflect the converging evidence that 
languages, and the way in which they are organised, “are better explained as stable engineering 
solutions satisfying multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the 
constraints of human cognition” (Evans & Levinson, 2009: 429).    
 
5 Conclusion 
We set out to investigate the role of situational context in the emergence of different types of 
linguistic systems that evolve through iterated learning. By manipulating the ways in which stimuli 
were paired with one another, we showed that situational context is an important factor is determining 
what is and is not encoded in the linguistic system. Our results offer a potential insight into how the 
situational context can bias the cultural evolution of language. The type and predictability of the 
situational contexts relate to how language users will employ certain communicative strategies for 
conveying the intended meaning, with the resulting language systems reflecting the contextual 
constraints in which they evolved. 
 
One of the major findings in our experiment is that the types of linguistic systems that evolve are 
highly predictable based on their contextual constraints during communication. This interplay 
between short-term linguistic strategies for resolving communicative interactions, and the implication 
for language systems through long-term patterns of change, speaks to real-world processes such as 
grammaticalisation: the types of change we observe in languages show predictable patterns, as evident 
in the unidirectionality hypothesis (cf. Hopper & Traugott, 2003), but importantly these changes show 
how contextual constraints on the moment-to-moment communicative strategies deployed can have 
widespread ramifications on whole linguistic systems (Steels, 2012). Natural languages are subject to 
a larger and more diverse range of contexts, with a key future question being the extent to which our 
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter set out to investigate how manipulations to the situational context
shape the emergence of distinct systems of communication. In particular, the
bias introduced by the situational context, based on which feature is informative
for discrimination, is amplified over repeated instances of learning and using
a language. The experiment also provided proof-of-concept for systematically
investigating the effects of context: by manipulating the situational context, we
directly influence the frame of interpretation created in the minds of interlocutors,
with inferences about form-meaning mappings being made in relation to which
dimensions are informative and uninformative for discrimination.
More broadly, the results provide a stepping stone for thinking about lan-
guage as a complex adaptive system, with language structure being the result of
multiple, interacting pressures. In this experiment, the situational context im-
posed a strong discrimination pressure through providing a clear indication as to
what is and is not informative for discrimination. However, this pressure interacts
with two other motivating factors: learning and communication. For learning,
a memory bottleneck is present, with participants at earlier generations being
unable to remember all of the form-meaning mappings in their input data (gen-
eralisation pressure). This forces participants to generalise and use forms which
are learnable and expressive. For communication, participants are trying to solve
the immediate communicative problem, where the goal is to discriminate between
possible referents, as well as the long-term problem of aligning on a shared system
of communication (coordination pressure). Having generalisable forms, which are
capable of discrimination in context, solves the coordination problem as a set of
conventional form-meaning mappings can be established2.
2All 95% CIs were bootstrapped by resampling the original data sample 10000 times using
the Hmisc package (Harrell Jr et al., 2014). This allows us to approximate a CI for the sample




From cup board to cupboard: The
loss of compositionality in
linguistic systems
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 showed how manipulations to the referential context can result in rad-
ically different systems of communication based on what features of the meaning
space are informative (and uninformative) for discrimination. As with all ex-
periments, this general conclusion operates under a set of assumptions, which
includes the initial set of form-meaning mappings an individual is exposed to
(i.e., the training language). In the case of Experiment 1, as well as with pre-
vious experimental work in this area (e.g., Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008; for
review, see: Tamariz & Kirby, 2016), the emphasis is on why a system transitions
from an unstructured (e.g., a randomly generated language) to a structured (e.g.,
compositional language) set of signals. This is useful if, following Lindblom, Mac-
Neilage & Studdert-Kennedy (1984: 187), our goal is to “Derive language from
nonlanguage!”. However, this transition from unstructured to structured is only
one possible set of experimental scenarios we can explore, and there are good
reasons why we should consider other types of initial languages.
One such motivation is the patterns observed across historical timescales
where changes take place in highly structured languages. If our goal is to model
such changes, then it makes little sense to start from a position where the lan-
guage is unstructured. For instance, imagine investigating word order change
in English: in this case, it is useful to start with an initial language which has
free word order (e.g., forms that alternate between Object-Verb (OV) and Verb-
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Object (VO)), and see under what conditions it transitions to the more rigid VO.
The second point to make is that experimental studies rarely focus on situations
where structure is lost: that is, the focus is on how structure gets into language,
and not on instances where structure is lost within the system. Yet historical
linguistics is often concerned with questions that pertain to the loss of structure
in individual form-meaning mappings.
Consider the English noun cupboard. Originally, cupboard consisted of two
independent morphemes, cup and board, which combined to form a compound
noun that meant a piece of wood used for displaying cups (and could be pro-
ductively contrasted with other types of board, such as washboard and cutting
board). Nowadays, cupboard refers to a closed storage area, having shifted in
morphological status from a complex to a simplex form (Traugott & Trousdale,
2013: 22-23). The history of English is replete with similar examples, from the
lexicalization of compound nouns, such as the aforementioned cupboard but also
neighbour and mincemeat (Bussmann, 1996; Brinton & Traugott, 2005), to the
emergence of idiomatic forms (e.g., kick the bucket and pull strings) (Bybee, 2010)
and grammatical constructions (e.g., be going to and let us) (Hopper & Traugott,
2003).
A recurring theme across all of these examples is a loss of compositionality1.
Compositionality is where “the meaning of an expression is a function of the
meaning of its parts and the way they are syntactically combined” (Partee, 1984:
281). From this point of view, a loss of compositionality simply refers to a mis-
match between the individual meaning of the parts, and the interpretation of the
whole sequence. Returning to our idiom example: John kicked the bucket can
have a literal interpretation, whereby a person (John) performed an action (kick-
ing) on an object (a bucket), or a non-literal interpretation (John died). Only
in the second interpretation do we observe the loss of compositionality in that a
hearer cannot use an underlying combinatorial rule to access the intended mean-
ing of a speaker – the transparency between form and meaning is lost (Traugott
& Trousdale, 2013).
This loss of compositionality will remain a key focus for the rest of the chapter.
In the next section, we will consider the underlying mechanisms for the loss
1An important distinction needs to be made between the loss of compositionality and the
loss of analysability (Langacker, 1987; Bybee, 2010). Analysability refers to the extent to which
a language user can identify internal parts in an expression (Bybee, 2010). Even though these
measures of compositionality and analysability are correlated they are clearly separate from one
another. For example, both the idiom kick the bucket and the preposition beside have lost their
original compositional mapping, but only beside has lost its analysability (which originated from
the phrase by the side of).
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of compositionality, reinterpretation and chunking, and discuss claims that this
change is principally motivated by the context. In particular, context can generate
ambiguity in how a form maps onto a meaning, resulting in a reanalysis where
compositionality is lost. This relationship between the loss of compositionality
and context is investigated in two discrimination game experiments.
Experiment 2 takes as its starting point the observation that context moti-
vates the loss of compositionality. To test this claim we expose participants to
an initially compositional language for describing coloured shapes, manipulating
which dimension (shape or colour) is relevant for discrimination in both learning
and communication. The results suggest that manipulations to context do have
an effect, albeit one which interacts with a bias to encode shape. One possible
source of this preferential encoding of shape is the unbalanced number of values
for the shape and colour dimensions (i.e., there were more colours than shapes).
In light of this, Experiment 3 follows up on these findings in two ways. First, we
increase the number of participants, and second we control for the confound by
introducing an additional manipulation where participants were either exposed
to a Colour-Skewed (4 colours, 3 shapes) or a Shape-Skewed (3 colours, 4 shapes)
meaning space. Taken together, these two experiments provide tentative evi-
dence that manipulations to context can disrupt a compositional mapping, but
only when interacting with other factors (e.g., a skew in the number of dimen-
sions). The chapter will close by discussing some problems with the experimental
design as well as highlighting potential directions for future work.
3.1.1 Loss of compositionality: reuse, chunking, and con-
text
Considerable work has gone into elucidating the mechanisms underpinning the
loss of compositionality (Estill & Kemper, 1982; Gibbs & Gonzales, 1985; Lan-
gacker, 1987; Millikan, 2001; Wray, 2002; Hopper & Traugott, 2003; Wray &
Grace, 2007; Bybee, 2010; Cruse, 2011; Traugott & Trousdale, 2013). For the
purposes of this chapter, we shall reduce these to just two, reinterpretation and
chunking.
The first mechanism, reinterpretation, subsumes other explanatory mecha-
nisms of semantic innovation, such as analogy (Hopper & Traugott, 2003), catego-
rization (Bybee, 2010), and metaphor (Smith & Hoefler, 2014), under one general
definition: an inferential innovation where a pre-existing form maps onto a new
interpretation. Reinterpretation therefore focuses on the functional side of the
loss of compositionality: it is concerned with how an original meaning (e.g., cup
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+ board: a board on which cups are placed) comes to have a new interpretation
(e.g., cupboard: a general purpose storage unit). Importantly, reinterpretation
is viewed as the principle mechanism for semantic change, covering phenomena
such as generalisation (e.g., dog: restricted→ general), specialisation (e.g., hound:
general → restricted), metaphor (e.g., back: a body part → a spatial meaning)
and metonymy (e.g., blue collar: workers who wear blue shirts → a particular
type of work) (Fortson, 2004).
As the lexical examples illustrate, reinterpretation need not be restricted to
compositional constructions, and is a general mechanism involved in semantic
innovation and change. For reinterpretation to apply to compositional construc-
tions we need our second mechanism, chunking: a way of organising memory
that allows us to take a set of sequential units and group them into larger units
(Miller, 1956; Newell, 1990; Bybee, 2010). A non-linguistic example of chunking
is number memorisation: the sequence 4-9-7-5-2-5 is easier to store in memory if
we chunk the sequence into 497-525. In language, chunking allows for a repeated
sequence of words or morphemes to be packaged together as a single unit, and is
argued to be the primary mechanism behind the formation of constructions and
constituent structure (Bybee, 2002; 2010). As a standalone mechanism, chunk-
ing is not sufficient to explain the loss of compositionality, as demonstrated by
collocations: knife and fork is a chunked unit, in that it can be accessed as a
single unit when compared with the dispreferred fork and knife, but importantly
the meaning has not changed – knife and fork and fork and knife both refer to
the same two types of cutlery. It is only when reinterpretation and chunking act
together do we observe a loss of compositionality through reanalysis: “a mech-
anism which changes the underlying structure of a syntactic pattern and which
does not involve any immediate or intrinsic modification of its surface structure”
(Harris & Campbell, 1995: 61). To summarise: as a sequence of words or mor-
phemes are used together they are reanalysed as a single, cohesive unit which,
when combined with a shift in the underlying meaning, results in the creation of
a new form-meaning mapping (also see form-meaning reanalysis: Croft, 2000).
Why do some constructions undergo a loss of compositionality whereas others
do not? What is special about cupboard when compared with cutting board or
bookshelf? As with many aspects of language change, historical contingency is
a key factor in shaping the trajectories of change, and its role should not be
downplayed (Lass, 1997). Still, linguists have identified some motivations for the
loss of compositionality (Bybee, 2010; Traugott & Trousdale, 2013). Frequency
effects (Bybee, 1985), and in particular relative frequency (Hay, 2001; 2002),
are often cited as crucial motivating factors. Relative frequency refers to the
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frequency of the base word (e.g., mortal) when compared with a derived form
(e.g., immortal). Hay (2001; 2002) observed that morphologically derived forms
which are more frequent than their bases (e.g., abasement is more frequent than
abase) tend to be less compositional than complex forms which are less frequent
than their base (e.g., top is more frequent than topless).
Relative frequency is clearly part of the story, but as Bybee (2010: 48) ex-
plains, “Semantic and pragmatic shifts that reduce compositionality are aided by
frequency or repetition, but their source is in the contexts in which the complex
unit is used”. What Bybee is referring to is that the loss of compositionality ul-
timately stems from inferences made by language users in particular contexts of
learning and use. It has long been appreciated that context is used to enrich in-
terpretation of utterances (Principle of Contextuality: Frege, 1884; Wittgenstein,
1921; Grice, 1957). Consider the sentence To bank money at the bank on the river
bank: here, the word bank takes on three distinct meanings (a verb meaning to
store, a financial institution, and a type of geological formation), each of which
is framed by the internal linguistic context in which it is used. Out of context,
bank is ambiguous with respect to these possible interpretations (even if there is
a more prototypical meaning; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Gärdenfors, 2000; Ramscar
& Port, 2015). Context can also generate ambiguity. For example, the man with
the binoculars has the unambiguous interpretation of a man who is in possession
of binoculars, but when placed in a linguistic context, such as the boy saw the
man with the binoculars, we get a two-way ambiguous construction: either the
boy could be using the binoculars and saw a man or the man has binoculars and
a boy saw him (Berwick et al., 2011).
Context is therefore tied to uncertainty in interpretation – and in some cases
this uncertainty in interpretation becomes part of the conventional meaning
through repeated inferences (see Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer, 1991: context-
induced reinterpretation and Traugott & Konig, 1991: invited inferences). Lin-
guists normally distinguish between two types of context involved in this change:
onset and isolation contexts. An onset context is where the context introduces
the possibility of a new interpretation. To unpack this into a series of incremen-
tal steps, consider the loss of compositionality in the be going to construction.
In Shakespeare’s English, be going to was unambiguously a purpose clause and
could be interpreted as a subject travelling to a location to do something, yet due
to the semantic generality of go the construction found itself in contexts where
there was the potential for an ambiguous interpretation between a motion event
and future intent (Bybee, 2003; Bybee, 2010; Traugott & Trousdale, 2013). The
sentence, I am going to marry Maria, is an example where travelling is inherent
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to the meaning, but the fact that it has not happened yet implies future intent.
Repetitive use of be going to in these contexts leads to a chunking of the phrase,
subsequently triggering a reanalysis along the lines of: [I am going [to marry
Maria]]→ [I [am going to] marry Maria]. This reanalysis now supports the infer-
ence that future is an inherent part of the meaning. Isolating contexts are distinct
from onset contexts in that this new interpretation is used in an unambiguous
way, i.e., the future meaning of be going to is unmasked due it being extended to
contexts that were previously unavailable. The sentences I am going to go and
marry Maria or the leaves are going to fall off the tree are isolating contexts for
be going to as it results in an unambiguous interpretation: be going to must refer
to an event in the future that is interchangeable with other future constructions
(the leaves will fall off the tree) but not motion constructions (*the leaves are
travelling to fall off the tree) (Bybee, 2003).
Under this perspective uncertainty in interpretation is viewed as the engine
of change in the loss of compositionality. But what triggers this uncertainty
are inferences made in particular contexts. The first step in this process is that
an initially compositional construction is chunked and used in an onset context,
generating the possibility of a new interpretation. In the second step, this new
interpretation becomes associated with a chunked construction, and is then used
in an isolating context: this severs the link between the original form-meaning
mapping by allowing for an unambiguous interpretation of the new meaning.
3.1.2 Modelling the loss of compositionality
The general hypothesis is that manipulations to context can result in the loss or
maintenance of compositionality. More specifically, context can increase or de-
crease uncertainty in interpretation, with an increase in uncertainty being causally
related to a decrease in compositionality. If the initial mapping is compositional,
and there is a high uncertainty in interpretation, then the probability of the
hearer recovering this compositional mapping decreases – and thus requires an
alternative interpretation as to how the signal maps onto the meaning.
How can this general hypothesis be investigated experimentally? The first
step is to introduce an initially compositional language into the set up. This can
be achieved using an artificial language paradigm where a set of signal forms are
mapped onto a set of multidimensional meanings (see Chapter 2). The meanings
used in this experiment will consist of images that vary on two dimensions: colour
and shape. The signals are structured such that the initial CV syllable refers to
colour and the final CVC syllable refers to shape (see 3.2.1 for more information on
78
the method). This allows participants to entertain three hypotheses about how a
particular form maps onto a meaning. The first is that subcomponents of the form
map onto the individual features of a meaning (compositional mapping). The
second is that the whole form maps onto one feature (underspecified mapping).









Figure 3.1: An example of three possible form-meaning mappings for the same
referent (a blue square). From top to bottom: Compositional (where mi maps
onto blue and kop maps onto square), Underspecified (where mikop maps onto
square), and Holistic (where mikop maps onto blue square).
Which of these mappings is selected depends on the constraints participants
bring to the task of learning and using a language. Two of these constraints are
the domain-general cognitive bias of simplicity and the communication-specific
bias of expressivity (Chapter 1; Kirby et al., 2015; Culbertson & Kirby, 2015). A
simplicity bias makes the system more compressible, i.e., the description length of
the system is shorter than a list of signal-meaning mappings, whereas the pressure
from expressivity requires that the system is communicatively functional, i.e.,
capable of identifying the intended meaning in context. Languages must reach a
tradeoff between these two constraints. How this tradeoff is reached is dependent
on the way these constraints interact with the context and task.
All else being equal, an underspecified mapping is the simplest of the sys-
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tems mentioned, as it can be described by a more compressible rule than either
a compositional or holistic mapping. With this simplicity comes a decrease in
expressivity: an underspecified mapping is only functional insomuch as a partic-
ular feature remains relevant to discrimination (i.e., it is context-dependent). By
contrast, a set of holistic mappings is the least compressible of all systems; a de-
scription of the system requires listing every signal and the meaning it maps onto
(i.e., description length is equal to list length). Holistic mappings are highly ex-
pressive if discrimination takes place between meanings that are already known.
However, a holistic language is costly for two reasons. First, it requires remem-
bering an increasing number of unique form-meaning mappings, which over time
creates a burden on memory (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008; Cornish, 2010;
Pleyer & Winters, 2014). Second, in a context consisting of two or more new
meanings, discrimination becomes difficult (as, without any additional inferential
clues, the new signal could refer to any of the new meanings; see Chapter 4 for a
fuller discussion). Compositional mappings sit in-between underspecified (most
compressible) and holistic (least compressible) in terms of simplicity: this al-
lows compositional systems to be generalisable (i.e., it can convey new meanings)
without a decrease in expressivity (i.e., disambiguation relies less on the external
context) (Kemp & Regier, 2012; Kirby et al., 2015).
The only way an underspecified mapping is going to be favoured is if we am-
plify the bias for simpler form-meaning mappings. One way of achieving this
is to manipulate what is and is not relevant for discrimination. We already es-
tablished in Chapter 2 that manipulations to the referential context can shape
the types of systems that emerge (also see: Silvey, Kirby & Smith, 2014). As
in previous work, the context in this study is manipulated across conditions to
make a particular dimension (e.g., shape) more relevant than another dimension
(e.g., colour) for discriminating between meanings. When there is a discrimina-
tion pressure to only convey one dimension, we predict that this increases the
probability of transitioning from a compositional to underspecified system. This
gives us three conditions based on manipulations to the referential context. For
the Shape-Different condition, trials are constructed so that shape is always the
relevant feature for discriminating between a target and a distractor (which share
the same colour). Conversely, the Colour-Different condition only ever has tri-
als whereby colour is the relevant feature, with the target and distractor always
sharing the same shape. Lastly, the Both-Different condition consists of trials
where both shape and colour are (potentially) relevant for discrimination (that
is, the target and distractor always differ on both colour and shape).
Leveraging the referential context in this way means that the optimal system
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in all three conditions is underspecified: it is expressive (i.e., a capable of discrim-
inating between meanings in a context) and it is compressible (i.e., the system can
be described using a simple rule). For Shape-Different and Colour-Different condi-
tions, the discrimination pressure directs the attention of participants toward the
relevant feature and backgrounds the irrelevant feature – increasing uncertainty
in interpretation as the probability of recovering the compositional mapping de-
creases. For Both-Different, the context cues both colour and shape – that is,
these dimensions have equal salience in terms of discrimination. Therefore, our
hypothesis is that uncertainty in interpretation is lower in Both-Different: partic-
ipants have a higher probability of interpreting a compositional mapping as both
dimensions are (potentially) relevant for successful discrimination.
The experimental set up also needs to control the amount of data partici-
pants are exposed to in training. By backgrounding a dimension, as is the case
for Shape-Different and Colour-Different, we increase the bias against a compo-
sitional mapping due to one dimension being irrelevant for discrimination. Still,
even though we predict an effect of context, it is unlikely this is enough to over-
come the bias imposed by the full set of compositional mappings. This bias from
the set allows the learner to easily recover the compositional system: that is,
the signal-meaning data overwhelmingly favours a compositional mapping, with
there being systematic correlations between the forms and the meanings. Train-
ing participants on a full set is also problematic for methodological reasons: it
is hard to discern whether participants learned a compositional rule or simply
memorised all of the form-meaning mappings.
To get around these issues we incorporate a generalisation pressure (see Kirby,
Cornish & Smith, 2008; Cornish, 2010) into the set up: this involves training par-
ticipants on a subset of all possible signal-meaning pairs and then placing them
in a communication task where they need to convey the full set of meanings.
By looking at how participants generalise, we can investigate whether they are
learning the compositional rule and using novel combinations to express unseen
meanings, or whether they reuse pre-existing forms to generalise across multiple
meanings (underspecification). As such, the learning task entails that partici-
pants infer the signal-meaning mapping, with the context being designed to bias
inferences in one direction or another, and the communication task allows us to








60 participants at the University of Edinburgh (39 female) were recruited via
the SAGE careers database and randomly assigned to one of the possible three
experimental conditions (see 3.2.1). Each condition consisted of a pair of par-
ticipants who learned an artificial language and then used this language in a
communication game. Participants were paid £5 for their participation.
Stimuli: Images and Input Language
Participants were asked to learn and then use an alien language, consisting of
lower-case labels paired with images. There were 12 images that varied along
three features: shape, colour, and a unique identifier (see figure 3.2). Of these
12 images, eight were randomly selected for training (training set) within the
following constraint: the set of 8 images could not have less than 2 and more than
3 members with the same feature (e.g., figure 3.2). Each image was then assigned
a label as follows: from a set of vowels (a,e,i,o,u) and consonants (g,h,k,l,m,n,p,w)
we randomly generated 4 CV and 3 CVC syllables which were then assigned to
4 colours and 3 shapes. Each label therefore contained 1 initial CV syllable for a







Figure 3.2: Meaning space used in Experiment 2. Images and forms inside green
boxes indicate an example training set. Images without green boxes and labels
were only seen during the communication phase.
Procedure
At the start of the experiment, participants were told they would first have to
learn and then communicate using an alien language. Participant pairs completed
the experiment in separate booths on networked computers. The experiment
consisted of two main phases: a training phase and a communication phase.
Before each phase began, detailed instructions were given on what that phase
would involve, with a reminder not to use English or any other language during the
experiment. For the training phase, participants completed the task separately,
and it was only during the communication phase where they interacted (remotely,
over the computer network). Both training and communication phases are the
same as in Experiment 1 (see Chapter 2)
Manipulating Context-Type
To test for the role of context, a simple manipulation was made to the possible
combinations of target and distractor images within a single trial during train-
ing and communication. This provides three experimental conditions based on
which dimensions are relevant for successfully discriminating the target from the
distractor (see Figure 3.3). For the Shape-Different condition, a trial consists of
a target and distractor that always differ in shape, but share the same colour,
whereas in the Colour-Different condition the reverse is true: targets and distrac-
tors are always differentiated on colour, but share the same shape. Lastly, for the
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Both-Different condition, we constructed the target and distractor so that they




Figure 3.3: Example of the three types of referential context used in this experi-
ment. From top to bottom: Shape-Different (Shape always differs between target
and distractor, Colour is always the same), Colour-Different (Colour always dif-
fers between target and distractor, Shape is always the same), Both-Different
(Shape and Colour always differ between target and distractor).
3.2.2 Dependent Variables and Hypotheses
Measuring Communicative Success
To measure communicative success we recorded the number of successful trials
between the speaker and the hearer, i.e., when the hearer clicked on the target
image. The maximum success score was 48 points for two blocks of 24 trials.
The aim of this measure is to see whether distinct communication systems are
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communicatively functional, i.e., successfully discriminating between a target and
distractor above the level of chance.
Measuring Uncertainty: conditional entropy
To quantify the types of mappings between signals and meanings we measured
the conditional entropy (Winters, Kirby & Smith, 2015; Chapter 2). However,
the measures of signal uncertainty and meaning uncertainty do not tell us on
what dimension participants are generalising. To resolve this problem we added
a measure of feature uncertainty, H(F |S), which is the expected entropy (i.e.,
uncertainty) over features given a signal:






P (f |s) logP (f |s) (3.1)
where the rightmost sum is the entropy over features given a particular signal
s ∈ S. P (f |s) is the probability that feature f is the intended feature given that
signal s has been produced. This entropy is weighted by the distribution P (s)
on signals. F is the set of shapes and colours, and f ⊂ F is either Shape =
{f ∈ F |f /∈ Colour} or Colour = {f ∈ F |f /∈ Shape}. A high H(F |S) indicates
there is uncertainty about a feature (within one of the two subsets) due to a signal
mapping onto multiple features. It also tells us which dimension has the highest
uncertainty given a signal: if a language only encodes colour, then H(F |S) for
the dimension of shape will be high and the H(F |S) for the dimension of colour
will be low (and vice versa for a language which only encodes shape).
Hypotheses
Here we provide a set of hypotheses related to our specific measurements:
Hypothesis One: Communication systems will be functionally adequate for
identifying the intended meaning in context. As such, we predict all condi-
tions will reach a communicative success score higher than chance (>50%).
Hypothesis Two: Participants in the Shape-Different condition are predicted
to show greater levels of underspecification where only shape is encoded.
This will result in systems with a high H(M |S), a low H(S|M), a high
H(F |S) for the Colour-Dimension and a lowH(F |S) for the Shape-Dimension.
Hypothesis Three: Participants in the Colour-Different condition are predicted
to have greater levels of underspecification where only colour is encoded.
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This will result in systems with a high H(M |S), a low H(S|M), a low
H(F |S) for the Colour-Dimension and a highH(F |S) for the Shape-Dimension.
Hypothesis Four: Participants in the Both-Different condition are predicted to
have higher levels of compositionality where both colour and shape are en-
coded. This will result in systems with a low entropy for H(M |S), H(S|M),
and H(F |S).
3.2.3 Results
Analysis: Mixed Effect Models
All analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2016) and used the lme4 package
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 2015) to run logit mixed-effect regressions for
the dependent variables of communicative success and H(S|M), and linear mixed-
effect regressions for the dependent variables of H(M |S) and H(F |S). Random
effects included intercepts for Participant and Initial Training Language. Each
intercept had random slopes for the fixed effects and P-values for the fixed effects
were obtained using the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff & Christensen,
2014).
Communicative Success
Performance during the communication phase was extremely high in all three
conditions, with the mean scores of Shape-Different (M = 97.92%, 95% CI2
[96.25, 99.38]), Colour-Different (M = 84.58%, [76.46, 91.46]), and Both-Different
(M = 93.13%, [89.17, 96.25]) all being above chance (see Figure 3.4). However, as
these means highlight, there appears to an effect of condition. A logit regression
with Block and Condition (reference level = Colour-Different3) as fixed effects
supports this observation: communicative success is significantly higher in Shape-
Different relative to Colour-Different (β = 2.373, SE = 0.812, p = .004). There
is also a significant intercept (β = 2.281, SE = 0.460, p < .001) confirming
performance is above chance. All other predictors and associated interactions are
non significant (p > .294).
2All 95% CIs were bootstrapped by resampling the original data sample 10000 times using
the Hmisc package (Harrell Jr et al., 2014). This allows us to approximate a CI for the sample
statistic without making assumptions about the shape of the distribution (it is nonparametric).
3There was no a-priori hypothesis specified about differences in communicative success based
on condition. For exploratory purposes, we used Colour-Different as the reference level, given



























Figure 3.4: Average communicative success scores by condition. Error bars rep-
resent bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals. Red dotted line is the chance level
of communicative success (50%).
Signal Uncertainty
Figure 3.5 shows the degree of signal uncertainty, measured by H(S|M), for the
three experimental conditions. As the visual inspection suggests, participants
in Colour-Different (M = 0.27, [0.21, 0.33]) produced considerably less variable
signals when compared with those in Shape-Different (M = 0.56, [0.5, 0.63]) and
Both-Different (M = 0.49, [0.44, 0.56]). This is unexpected given our prediction
that all three conditions should have low signal uncertainty. A logit regression
with Block and Condition (reference level = Both-Different) indicates that partic-
ipants in Colour-Different (β = −1.343, SE = 0.589, p = .023) have significantly
lower levels of signal uncertainty. All other predictors and associated interactions















Figure 3.5: Degree of signal uncertainty, measured by H(S|M). Higher entropy
values indicate a higher degree of signal uncertainty. The errors represent boot-
strapped 95% CIs.
Meaning Uncertainty
Figure 3.6 shows the extent to which signals are used across multiple meanings,
measured by H(M |S). Our hypothesis is that both the Shape-Different and
Colour-Different conditions should show higher levels of meaning uncertainty than
the Both-Different condition. This is somewhat confirmed by the higher average
for Shape-Different (M = 0.42, [0.35, 0.51]) than Both-Different (M = 0.34,
[0.28, 0.41]). One unexpected result is that the average meaning uncertainty for
Colour-Different is the lowest (M = 0.12, [0.08, 0.18]) and suggests participants in
this condition are underspecifying less than predicted. A linear mixed effect model
with Block and Condition (reference level = Both-Different) as fixed effects shows
that Shape-Different (β = 0.140, SE = 0.125, p = .004) is a significant predictor
of H(M |S). What this tells us is that participants in Shape-Different are more
likely to reuse signals across multiple meanings when compared with participants
in Both-Different. However, there is only a marginal difference between Both-
Different and Colour-Different conditions (β = −0.253, SE = 0.127, p = .054).

















Figure 3.6: Degree of meaning uncertainty, measured as H(M |S).
Feature Uncertainty
There are two interesting aspects about the feature uncertainty, measured by
H(F |S) (see Figure 3.7). The first is that there is generally lower feature un-
certainty for the Shape-Dimension (M = 0.03, [0.02, 0.04]) than the Colour-
Dimension (M = 0.28, [0.24, 0.31]). This suggests a general preference for en-
coding shape over colour. The second point is that this preference tends to be
modulated by condition; indicated by the clear difference in means for Shape-
Different (Shape-Dimension: M = 0.02, [0.00, 0.03]; Colour-Dimension: M =
0.43, [0.35, 0.51]) and Both-Different (Shape-Dimension: M = 0.04, [0.02, 0.06];
Colour-Dimension: M = 0.32, [0.26, 0.39]) when compared with Colour-Different
(Shape-Dimension: M = 0.04, [0.02, 0.07]; Colour-Dimension: M = 0.09, [0.06, 0.14]).
A linear mixed-effect model, with Block, Condition (reference level = Both-
Different) and Dimension (reference level = Colour-Dimension) as fixed effects,
confirms that both Shape-Dimension (β = −0.276, SE = 0.046, p < .001)
and Colour-Different condition (β = −0.13, SE = 0.062, p = .039) are sig-
nificant predictors of H(F |S). The significant interactions for Colour-Different
x Shape-Dimension (β = 0.222, SE = 0.064, p < .001) and Shape-Different x
Shape-Dimension (β = −0.151, SE = 0.066, p = .022) also provides confirma-
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tion that the shape bias is modulated by condition. First, the interaction for
Colour-Different x Shape-Dimension tells us that there is little difference in fea-
ture uncertainty for Shape- and Colour-Dimensions in Colour-Different (when
compared to the difference between these dimensions for Both-Different). The
fact that both Colour and Shape have low feature uncertainty suggests that par-
ticipants in Colour-Different are not underspecifying. Second, the interaction for
Shape-Different x Shape-Dimension shows that the difference in feature uncer-
tainty for Shape- and Colour-Dimensions is higher than that in Both-Different:
that is, participants in Shape-Different are less likely to encode colour than par-
ticipants in Both-Different. All other predictors and associated interactions are

















Figure 3.7: Degree of feature uncertainty, measured asH(F |S), for the dimensions
of Shape and Colour.
3.2.4 Experiment 2 Discussion
Experiment 2 provides tentative support for the hypothesis that contextual con-
straints can disrupt an initially compositional system. The results show that (i)
the systems used by participants are communicatively functional in discriminating
between meanings (as indicated by high communicative accuracy across condi-
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tions); (ii) participants in Shape-Different and Both-Different conditions tend to
produce more variable signals (i.e., higher signal uncertainty) and show higher
levels of signal reuse across multiple meanings (i.e., higher meaning uncertainty);
(iii) signal reuse in Shape-Different and Both-Different conditions tends to under-
specify on colour and encode shape (i.e., high feature uncertainty for the colour
dimension).
The key finding is the unexpected interaction between our manipulations to
the referential context and a bias to encode shape. This results in more un-
derspecification when shape is a relevant dimension for discriminating between
meanings. Furthermore, this effect is amplified when shape is the only relevant
dimension and colour is backgrounded: that is, participants in Shape-Different
tend to underspecify more than participants in Both-Different. Figure 3.8 shows
an example of an underspecified language from the Shape-Different condition:
if participants are using the compositional rule, then we would expect them to
produce the forms nimel, hawuh, pukup, and kakup for the unseen set, where in
fact this pair reused forms from their training data (e.g., nikup, which originally
meant grey (ni) star (kup)) to convey shape (e.g., nikup is now used for grey,
pink, orange and blue stars). This mirrors what linguists observe in the histor-
ical record: an initially compositional construction is chunked, reanalysed as a
single linguistic unit and then generalised to convey novel meanings.
By contrast, participants in Colour-Different overwhelmingly preferred to
maintain compositional systems (see Figure 3.9). This suggests that our prior
assumptions are wrong, with the results for Colour-Different most likely being
the product of two competing pressures: a contextual bias (to discriminate on
the basis of colour) and a shape bias (to use shape as a categorisation cue). Cases
where we do see underspecification in Colour-Different also tend to encode shape,
and partly explains why participants in this condition have lower average success
scores.
What do these results mean for our predictions? It ultimately depends on the
source of this preference to encode shape over colour. One explanation is that
there is a shape bias which interacts with our manipulations to the referential
context. For instance, when extending object names, children tend to do so on the
similarity of shape as opposed to other features, such as size, colour or material
(Smith et al., 2002; Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003; Elman, 2008). Still, the claim as
to the nature of a shape bias, let alone the specific details concerning the strength
of this bias and its underlying mechanisms, is disputed (for review, see: Elman,
2008). Alternatively, the shape bias could be attributable to another source, such




































Figure 3.8: An example of an Underspecified language in the Shape-Different
condition. The top box shows the signals and meanings participants were trained
on and the bottom box shows the forms participants produced during communi-
cation.
rules for English onto what is and is not permissible in the artificial language.
For English speakers, dropping the adjective in the sentence The red square is
perfectly valid in terms of grammaticality (i.e., The square), whereas dropping
the noun is considered ungrammatical (i.e., *The red). It could be the case that
this alters the participants’ expectation about what should and should not be
encoded.




































Figure 3.9: An example of a compositional language in the Colour-Different con-
dition. The top box shows the signals and meanings participants were trained on
and the bottom box shows the forms participants produced during communica-
tion.
then this nicely explains our experimental results: both the shape bias and contex-
tual bias interact with one another, influencing the probability of a participant
learning and using a compositional mapping in discrimination. In the Shape-
Different condition, the prior shape bias and the contextual bias are reinforcing,
which results in a strong pressure to generalise and only encode shape. By con-
trast, the Colour-Different condition has a potential conflict between the shape
bias (which favours the encoding of shape) and the discriminatory need to convey
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colour (as this is the only dimension relevant for discrimination). It is possible
these conflicting biases decrease uncertainty in interpretation by highlighting both
dimensions, making it more probable that participants will learn and maintain
the compositional system. Lastly, for the Both-Different condition, the contextual
bias to convey shape might not be as strong, as colour is also a relevant feature,
but if participants do underspecify then the shape bias provides an added in-
centive to preference shape over colour (and this is what we see on the basis of
feature uncertainty).
The last possibility is a confound in the experimental design: due to there
being fewer shapes (Blob, Oval, Star) than colours (Blue, Grey, Pink, Yellow),
a bias was introduced to encode the dimension with the fewest features. This
still leaves open the following question: how does having fewer features relate to
underspecification? One possibility is that it is easier to learn a mapping where
the set of signals map onto 3 shapes than it is to learn a mapping where the set
of signals map onto 4 colours. Under this account, there is nothing intrinsically
special about shape, with participants simply being more likely to underspecify
on the dimension with the fewest features. There is already evidence to suggest
that, when the dimensions are balanced, the preference for one dimension over
another is contingent on history (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008) and context (Sil-
vey, Kirby & Smith, 2015). Under this account, we should expect that switching
the skew in the opposite direction, so that there are 4 shapes and 3 colours, will
create a bias to convey the colour dimension. Furthermore, this skew also intro-
duces a frequency bias in training: participants are provided with more evidence
about how signals map onto shapes than colours. These two aspects potentially
explain why participants are more likely to underspecify when shape is relevant
for discrimination: having fewer shapes in the set, as well as having a greater
exposure to shapes across trials, supports the hypothesis that signals only map
onto the shape dimension. Similarly, the reason why participants maintain com-
positional languages in Colour-Different is because there is a functional pressure
to learn colour (for discrimination) and a skewness bias to learn shape (as there
are fewer shapes). That is, in terms of learning, shape is a useful categorisation
cue even when it is not useful for discrimination.
We explicitly test these competing hypotheses in Experiment 3 by counter-
balancing for the skew in the number of dimensions. The general methodology is
the same as in this experiment except each condition now has two subsets: one
group of participants is exposed to a meaning space of 4 colours and 3 shapes
(Colour-Skewed) and the other group is exposed to a meaning space of 3 colours
and 4 shapes (Shape-Skewed). In particular, we were interested in whether there
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is a bias to encode the dimension with fewer features, and to see if this interacts
with a contextual bias for discriminating between meanings.
3.3 Experiment 3
3.3.1 Shape Bias or Unbalanced Dimensions?
In Experiment 2 we found that, when communication systems did transition from
a compositional to an underspecified one, there was a preference to specify the
shape dimension over the colour dimension. Importantly, this bias to specify
shape was not restricted to the Shape-Different condition, as our original hy-
potheses had predicted; it was also detected in Both-Different and, to a much
lesser extent, Colour-Different conditions. Based on our experimental set up,
there are two possible sources for this bias: either shape is simply a better cate-
gorisation cue than colour (Shape Bias hypothesis) or the preference for shape is
an artefact of the skew in the number of features (Skewness Hypothesis).
To test these two hypotheses we counterbalanced across all three conditions for
the number of features: half of the participant pairs are presented with meaning
spaces with a Colour Skew (4 colours, 3 shapes) and the other half are presented
with meaning spaces with a Shape Skew (3 colours, 4 shapes) (see 3.3.2 for fur-
ther details). A Shape Bias Hypothesis predicts this manipulation to have little
effect, with the results mirroring those in Experiment 2: underspecification will
only take place when shape is the relevant dimension for discrimination. By
contrast, if the bias is due to a skew in the number of features (Skewness Hy-
pothesis), then the expectation is that participants will only underspecify when
the dimension with the fewest features is also relevant for discrimination. Lastly,
there is the possibility of an interaction between the Shape-Bias and Skewness,
which predicts underspecification only when shape is relevant for discrimination
and is the dimension with the fewest features (Colour-Skewed).
3.3.2 Method
Participants
96 participants at the University of Edinburgh (67 female) were recruited via
the SAGE careers database and randomly assigned to one of the possible three
experimental conditions (see 3.2.1). Each condition consisted of a pair of par-




There were 16 images that varied along three features: shape, colour, and a unique
identifier (see Figure 3.10). One feature was removed depending on whether
participants were in Shape-Skewed or Colour-Skewed (see 3.3.2 for more details).
Image selection and generation of labels was the same as in Experiment 2 (see
section 3.2.1). Note that a possible confound was unintentionally introduced with
these new stimuli in that they are brighter in colour than those in Experiment 2
(see 3.3.4).
Figure 3.10: The full meaning space used in this experiment. Note that in the
experiment one feature was removed depending on whether participants were in
Shape-Skewed (i.e., one colour would be removed, e.g., yellow) or Colour-Skewed
(i.e., one shape would be removed, e.g., star).
Procedure
The procedure is identical to Experiment 2 (see 3.2.1).
Controlling for Unbalanced Dimensions
To control for the unbalanced dimensions we introduced a new shape and ma-
nipulated the skew in the number of dimensions. This resulted in two possible
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meaning spaces based on the number of shapes and colours. If the counterbal-
ance was colour-skewed, then there were 3 shapes and 4 colours, whereas for the
shape-skewed counterbalance there were 4 shapes and 3 colours. This manipula-
tion was done systematically across all three conditions: within each condition 8
participant pairs were exposed to a colour-skewed meaning space and 8 partici-
pant pairs were exposed to a shape-skewed meaning space. All possible meaning
spaces were covered within the constraints of the skew.
3.3.3 Results
Communicative Success
Performance during the communication phase was extremely high in all three
conditions, with the mean scores of Shape-Different (M = 94.01%, 95% CI
[89.32, 97.79]), Colour-Different (M = 93.10%, [89.19, 96.48]), and Both-Different
(M = 92.71%, [89.32, 95.83]) all above chance (see Figure 3.11). A Logit regres-
sion with Block, Condition (reference level = Both-Different) and Counterbalance
(reference level = Colour-Skewed) as fixed effects confirms performance is above
chance (β = 3.412, SE = 0.696, p < .001) and that there are no significant ef-
fects for any of these predictors (p > .127). Like the second experiment, it seems
all three conditions have communicatively functional systems, in that a signal is
capable of identifying the intended meaning in context. Although, in contrast




























Figure 3.11: Average communicative success scores by condition. Error bars
represent bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals for 10000 runs. Red dotted line
is the chance level of communicative success (50%).
Signal Uncertainty
Signal uncertainty in Experiment 3 shows that participants in the Shape-Different
condition (M = 0.32, [0.28, 0.36]) appear to produce lower levels of signal un-
certainty than participants in the Both-Different (M = 0.49, [0.44, 0.54]) and
Colour-Different (M = 0.45,[0.41, 0.51]) conditions (Figure 3.12). In a model with
Condition (reference level = Both-Different), Block and Counter-Balance (refer-
ence level = Colour-Skewed) as fixed effects, both Colour-Different (β = −0.715,
SE = 1.043, p = .493) and Shape-Different (β = −0.477, SE = 1.039, p = .646)
are non-significant predictors of H(S|M) when compared to Both-Different. This
suggests signal variability is not dependent on condition (when controlling for par-
ticipants and initial language). All other predictors and associated interactions














Figure 3.12: Degree of signal uncertainty, measured by H(S|M). Higher en-
tropy values indicate a higher degree of signal uncertainty. The errors represent
bootstrapped 95% CIs.
Meaning Uncertainty
Figure 3.13 shows the degree of meaning uncertainty produced by participants.
The first point to note is that the average meaning uncertainty in Experiment 3
(M = 0.17, [0.15, 0.20]) is lower than in Experiment 2 (M = 0.29, [0.25, 0.33]). In
short, participants are generalising less across meanings, irrespective of condition.
Furthermore, the trend appears to go in the opposite direction to Experiment 2,
with Shape-Different (M = 0.10, [0.07, 0.14]) now having lower levels of mean-
ing uncertainty when compared to Colour-Different (M = 0.23, [0.18, 0.28]) and
Both-Different (M = 0.18, [0.15, 0.23]). There is a significant interaction between
Colour-Different x Block x Shape-Skewed (β = 0.320, SE = 0.110, p = .004) in
a model with Condition (reference level = Both-Different), Block and Counter-
Balance (reference level = Colour-Skewed) as fixed effects. When there are more
shape features (Shape-Skewed), participants in Colour-Different (when compared
with Both-Different) tend to increase the degree of meaning uncertainty from the
first to the second block. This simply tells us that participants in Colour-Different
are more likely to underspecify (i.e., reusing the same label across multiple mean-
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ings) when there are more shapes than colours – and this increasingly happens
in the second block. All other predictors and associated interactions are non-















Figure 3.13: Degree of meaning uncertainty, measured as H(M |S), for participant
pairs in Colour-Skewed (4 Colours, 3 Shapes) and Shape-Skewed (3 Colours, 4
Shapes).
Feature Uncertainty
Figure 3.14 shows the degree of feature uncertainty for both the Colour and Shape
dimensions. Inspection of the averages reveals that Colour-Different has higher
feature uncertainty for Shape (M = 0.20, [0.16, 0.25]) than Colour (M = 0.07,
[0.04, 0.09]); participants are therefore more likely to underspecify and encode
colour. By contrast, there tends to be little difference in feature uncertainty
for Both-Different (Colour Dimension: M = 0.13, [0.10, 0.17]; Shape Dimen-
sion: M = 0.10, [0.07, 0.13]) and Shape-Different (Colour Dimension: M = 0.07,
[0.05, 0.10]; Shape Dimension: M = 0.04, [0.02, 0.06]). A model with Condition
(reference level = Both-Different), Block, Dimension (reference level = Colour Di-
mension) and Counter-Balance (reference level = Colour-Skewed) as fixed effects
shows there are significant interactions for Colour-Different x Shape Dimension
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x Shape-Skewed x Block (β = 0.285, SE = 0.119, p = .017). As such, when
there are more shapes (Shape-Skewed) in the Colour-Different condition, there
tends to be higher feature uncertainty for the Shape Dimension, with this uncer-
tainty increasing from the first to the second block. That is, when there are more
shape dimensions than colour dimensions, participants in the Colour-Different
condition are less likely to encode shape in their linguistic system. Furthermore,
participants are more likely to not convey shape as they transition from the first
to the second block.
By contrast, the significant interaction for Shape-Different x Shape Dimension
x Shape-Skewed (β = −0.179, SE = 0.083, p = .031) indicates that participants
in the Shape-Different condition tend to produce lower levels of feature uncer-
tainty when there are more shape features. Participants in the Shape-Different
condition therefore tend to maintain the encoding of shape (and colour) in their
linguistic systems. Shape Dimension (β = −0.132, SE = 0.041, p = .001)
is also a significant predictor of H(F |M) and there are significant interactions
for Colour-Different x Shape Dimension (β = 0.227, SE = 0.059, p < .001),
Shape Dimension x Shape-Skewed (β = 0.229, SE = 0.056, p < .001), and
Colour-Different x Shape Dimension x Shape-Skewed (β = −0.171, SE = 0.084,




































Figure 3.14: Degree of feature uncertainty, measured as H(F |S), for the dimen-
sions of Shape and Colour.
3.3.4 Experiment 3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 suggest that considerably more
work is needed to test the general hypothesis that context motivate the loss of
compositionality. The only reproducible result is communicative success: hear-
ers successfully clicked on the target image at levels higher than chance. Signal
uncertainty, meaning uncertainty, and feature uncertainty all differed in funda-
mental ways from the first experiment. The two most notable results being (i) the
drop in overall effect size for meaning uncertainty and feature uncertainty, and
(ii) the disappearance of an effect for shape. Taken together, these two results
suggest the effect of context is relatively small, with the results from Experiment
2 mostly likely being an artefact of the experimental design (see 3.4 for further
discussion).
The drop in effect size for meaning uncertainty and feature uncertainty tell us
that participants across all conditions are underspecifying less: when compared
with the original experiment, participants are more likely to learn and generalise
the compositional rule, irrespective of experimental condition. Not only did the
effect size drop, the direction of effect went in the opposite direction: participants
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tend to underspecify more in Colour-Different than in Shape-Different, resulting
in systems that only encoded colour. Even with this change in both the size
and direction of the effect, context is still a significant predictor: when systems
underspecify they will overwhelmingly convey the dimension relevant for discrim-
inating between the target and distractor (i.e., if colour is the relevant dimension,
and a pair underspecifies, then only colour will be encoded in the linguistic sys-
tem). It appears that manipulations to context do partly motivate the loss of
compositionality – albeit through interacting with other biases.
This brings us to the rationale for counterbalancing: What do these results
mean for our two competing hypotheses of shape bias and skewness? Given the
general trend not to encode shape in Experiment 3 it seems highly unlikely that
the shape bias was driving the effect in Experiment 2. In fact, the results al-
most go in exactly the opposite direction to the Shape Bias predictions: Shape-
Different tended to maintain compositional systems, Colour-Different had the
highest proportion of underspecified systems and these encoded colour, and of
the underspecified systems in Both-Different some only encoded colour and some
only encoded shape. As such, the bias in Experiment 2 was most likely due to the
experimental design, where the meaning space was always Colour-Skewed, and
not due to an intrinsic preference for shape as a categorisation cue.
The skewness hypothesis (SH) performs somewhat better in that it does ex-
plain the results for Colour-Different and Both-Different. First, SH predicts a bias
to underspecify and encode the dimension with the fewest features. For example,
participants in the Both-Different condition tend to encode shape (and ignore
colour) when there are more colours, and encode colour (and ignore shape) when
there are more shapes. The second prediction of SH is that this bias should inter-
act with the context by either amplifying or dampening the effect. This is what
we find in the Colour-Different condition: participants disproportionately under-
specify and encode colour when there is shape-skew (reinforcing bias), whereas
when there is a colour-skew they tend to maintain a compositional system (con-
flicting bias).
The notable omission is the Shape-Different condition: In this case, partici-
pants did not fully follow what the SH would predict, with there being a general
tendency to maintain compositional systems – irrespective of whether or not the
bias was reinforcing or conflicting. One possibility for this outcome is a bias to
encode colour that is independent of the skewness manipulation. The source of
this bias could be the result of an experimental confound: in the third experi-
ment the colours of the stimuli are brighter than those in the second experiment.
Brightness is known to have a visual saliency effect (Milosavljevic et al., 2012) and
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this might explain the preference to maintain compositional systems. An effect of
brightness would also explain why Colour-Different tended to have higher levels
of underspecification. However, it does not explain the pattern of underspeci-
fied systems in Both-Different: the expectation is that there would be a greater
number of systems that only encoded colour; instead, there are a roughly equal
number of systems that underspecify on colour and shape, with these patterns
being predicted by skewness (although we are dealing with a relatively small effect
here, so this interpretation should be treated with caution).
Still, neither skewness nor the shape bias hypotheses predicted the overall
drop in effect size from Experiment 2 to Experiment 3 (i.e., participants are
underspecifying less in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 2). Future work will
need to investigate whether this is due to an experimental confound (e.g., colour
brightness) or some other experimental manipulation. A parsimonious explana-
tion is that both experimental results are partly due to low statistical power (for
a recent discussion on these issues, see: Open Science Collaboration, 2015): i.e.,
there were not enough participants to establish a robust effect and this inflated
the type I error. If this is the case, then the effect of context and skewness is
weaker than we initially expected, and much of the observed variation comes
down to individual participant pairs.
Individual variation suggests some participants are more likely to underspecify
than others, and this is independent of our experimental manipulations. It is well
documented that individuals vary on a whole host of measures, such as attention
span and memory (Sauce & Matzel, 2013), and this might impact upon whether
or not they learn and use a compositional language. Some participants in Shape-
Different were already predicted to maintain a compositional language if they
were exposed to a Shape-Skewed meaning space (conflicting biases). This leaves
us with 8 participant pairs in which we would predict underspecified systems due
to a reinforcing bias: shape is the only useful dimension for discrimination and
there are fewer shapes than colours. However, if individual variation does play a
big role in whether participants underspecify or not, then it may have been the
case that the participants who were more likely to underspecify found themselves
in the Both-Different and Colour-Different conditions in Experiment 3.
One way to resolve this issue is to collect larger samples. This allows us to
detect whether there is an effect of our manipulations to context as well as to
clarify the size of this effect. A drop in the effect size, as a result of a larger sam-
ple, suggests we are dealing with a small number bias (Tversky & Kahneman,
1971): the tendency for small datasets to show a strong effect that decreases
with larger, more representative samples. One possibility, which we attempted
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to investigate in this experiment, is that certain context-types increase the prob-
ability of participants underspecifying. If this is the case, and the effect size is
small, then participants in Shape-Different and Colour-Different are predicted to
underspecify more often than participants in Both-Different. Importantly, this
small effect is mediated by individual variation: some participants will maintain
and generalise a compositional system independent of which condition they find
themselves in.
Another possibility is that we observe patterns of underspecification indepen-
dent of condition. Such a result would bolster the case for individual variation
being the main driver of the results in experiments 2 and 3. Individual variation
relates to the prior probability of participants underspecifying or generalising
the compositional system, with some participants having a higher probability of
underspecifying. The prediction here is that underspecification should occur at
similar levels in all three conditions. Under this account, context is still predicted
to play a role, except now it is not a motivation for underspecification; instead, it
is a communicative constraint on how participants underspecify, i.e., the dimen-
sion participants choose to encode and to not encode for conveying the intended
meaning. So, when underspecification does occur, we predict that participants
in Shape-Different only encode shape in their linguistic systems, participants in
Colour-Different only encode colour in their linguistic system, and Both-Different
will have some systems where only shape is encoded and some systems where only
colour is encoded.
Individual variation is also potentially problematic with regards to the com-
plexities of communication and interaction. For instance, we do not know how
individual variation to learn a compositional system impacts upon strategy choice
in dyadic interaction. It might be the case that, within a dyad, one participant
(A) learns and generalises the compositional mapping and another participant
(B) learns and generalises an underspecified mapping. This then introduces four
possible outcomes in the experiment: participant A accommodates towards par-
ticipant B (resulting in an underspecified system), participant B accommodates
toward participant A (resulting in a compositional system), participants A and B
accommodate towards one another (resulting in a noisy system with some com-
positional mappings and some underspecified mappings) or both participants are
egocentric and maintain their own systems (resulting in two distinct idiolects,
where participant A’s productions are compositional and participant B’s produc-
tions are underspecified). As such, we are now dealing with two levels of individual
variation, with the first being variation in the capacity to learn a compositional
mapping given exposure to a subset of possible form-meaning mappings, and the
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second being variation in strategy choice during communication (e.g., whether
participants are egocentric or accommodating).
3.4 Design Issues and Future Directions
There are a number of areas where the design of the experiment could be improved
and extended. Three areas of immediate relevance are the meaning space, the
referential context, and the task.
3.4.1 Changes to the meaning space
Perhaps the most egregious mistake was to change the colour, and by proxy the
brightness, of the stimuli in the second experiment. Colour saliency can be manip-
ulated based on brightness and this might partly explain why participants in the
second experiment were more likely to generalise and encode colour. One obvious
way to control for this confound is to systematically manipulate the appearance
parameters (hue, lightness, brightness, chroma, colourfulness, and saturation) of
the stimuli – and see whether certain parameters increase the probability of par-
ticipants underspecifying. Another approach would be to manipulate the saliency
of shape. For instance, the bias for shape can be weakened and strengthened with
subtle manipulations to the stimuli, with one relevant manipulation being to re-
move the faces of the stimuli (as objects with eyes dampen the shape bias, see
Jones, Smith & Landau, 1991).
A related problem is that the manipulations to skewness were not comprehen-
sive, as we did not investigate a balanced meaning space (i.e., one where there
was an equal number of shapes and colours). The rationale for manipulating
skewness, rather than introducing a balanced meaning space, is that this is the
simplest manipulation: we wanted to know whether having more colour features
relative to shape features (colour-skewness) was creating a preference to encode
shape. Introducing a counterbalance, whereby half of the participant pairs were
exposed to a meaning space where there were more shape features relative to
colour features (shape-skewness), allowed us to explicitly test this hypothesis. A
balanced meaning space does not test this claim as it introduces an additional
confound in that the size of the meaning space changes (it either shrinks to 3x3
or increases to 4x4). Future work needs to more carefully consider how manipu-
lations to the size, complexity and skewness of the meaning space influence the
loss of compositionality.
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3.4.2 Changes to the context
When it comes to context, the first issue that needs to be addressed is method-
ological: Is the Both-Different condition a good baseline? Our initial assumption
was that participants in Both-Different were more likely to maintain a composi-
tional language: as neither shape nor colour were backgrounded it was hypothe-
sised that this is easier for participants to learn the compositional mapping (when
compared with Shape-Different and Colour-Different where one of the dimensions
was backgrounded and not relevant for discrimination). However, this assumption
ultimately rests on the dimensions being equal, without there being a preference
to encode one over another. Both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 had biased
meaning spaces (as discussed above): to truly test these manipulations we would
need a balanced meaning space.
The context used in this experiment was relatively simple: it consisted of one
target and one distractor with manipulations being to whether or not a feature
dimension was relevant to discrimination. Considerable work still needs to be
done in establishing the effect size of manipulations to the contextual parameters
(e.g., size, variability, complexity). Recent studies have shown that manipulations
to visual-contextual factors, such as the number of dimensions on which objects
in a scene differ (scene variation: Koolen et al., 2013) and the colour variability of
referents in a context (polychrome versus monochrome) influence the production
of colour adjectives (Rubio-Fernández, 2016). Furthermore, there are conceptual
questions about the validity of these manipulations, and whether or not they
actually capture context in the sense used by linguists. For a start, the present
experiment uses an external, referential context as a substitute for processes that
normally take place in the discursive or syntactic contexts. Future experiments
need to establish whether these differences are important when operationalising
variables.
3.4.3 Changes to the task
It is still an open question as to the locus of innovation and change in the loss
of compositionality. Our approach is consistent with claims that these changes
initially arise from imperfect inference (e.g., Andersen, 1973; Lightfoot, 1979;
Kuteva, 2001; Kiparsky, 2012). Under this account, the learner does not infer
the underlying compositional rule, and instead opts for a non-compositional in-
terpretation. The important point is that the learner simply fails to infer the
original mapping. For our experiment, the imperfect inference takes place during
the learning phase, with the change then becoming apparent in the communica-
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tion task where participants need to generalise to an unseen set of meanings. If
future work wants to focus on imperfect inference, then it might be better placed
to simplify the task structure and have a discrimination game where participants
learn and reproduce a language (without a communication component).
This account can be contrasted with the pragmatic reasoning perspective (e.g.,
Nerlich & Clarke, 1992; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Traugott & Dasher, 2002; Smith
& Hoefler, 2015): here, the locus of innovation and change is the speaker, who
strategically uses a compositional form in a novel way that obscures the original
mapping. If pragmatic reasoning is the main mechanism, one possible avenue of
exploration is to manipulate how the communication task is framed: one framing
could emphasise communicative success (as in the current experiment) whereas
another framing might emphasise efficiency (e.g., be as quick as possible) or cre-
ativity. As it currently stands, our current set up is poorly equipped to distinguish
between these two accounts: even though it is more consistent with imperfect in-
ference, we simply do not know whether participants are failing to learn the
compositional mapping or whether they are instead choosing to underspecify (as
this is pragmatically economical).
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter began with the observation that the loss of compositionality ap-
pears to be motivated by context. To test this claim we set out to answer the
following question: Do manipulations to context disrupt an initially composi-
tional language in a discrimination game? More specifically, do contexts that
background a particular feature increase the probability of participants under-
specifying? The results of the second experiment suggest that manipulations
to context interact with a bias to encode shape. This meant participants were
more likely to underspecify when shape was the relevant feature (i.e., Shape-
Different and Both-Different). When shape was backgrounded participants were
more likely to maintain a compositional system (i.e., Colour-Different).
A possible explanation for the shape bias is an experimental confound in the
number of feature dimensions, i.e., there were more colours than shapes. Exper-
iment 3 followed up on this possibility by explicitly manipulating the skewness
in the number of features to test whether or not it interacted with our manip-
ulations to context. The findings somewhat support skewness as a key factor
in whether or not a language loses its compositionality. Furthermore, skewness
does appear to interact with context: when there are fewer colour features we
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find that participants underspecify on this dimension in the Colour-Different and
Both-Different conditions (in contrast to Experiment 2). However, the picture
is still far from clear, and there are several puzzles that remain open for future
work. First of all, the overall effect size in the experiment decreased, with partic-
ipants underspecifying less. Second, the shape bias completely disappeared, even
in cases where it was predicted (i.e., in Shape-Different where there were fewer
shapes than colours). Lastly, for those cases where our predictions matched up
with the results, we still do not have a clear explanation for why participants
underspecified in these instances and not others.
Overall, this leaves us in a situation with many unanswered questions. One
of which is the extent that context can independently disrupt an initially com-
positional system (i.e., without the presence of other factors such as skewness).
Future work can remedy such issues by simplifying the experimental design and




Signal autonomy is shaped by
contextual predictability
4.1 Introduction
In his book, Arenas of Language Use, Herb Clark (1992) argues that speakers
adhere to a Principle of Optimal Design:
The speaker designs his utterance in such a way that he has good rea-
son to believe that the addressees can readily and uniquely compute
what he meant [...] The Principle of Optimal Design relies crucially
on the notion of common ground, technically the mutual knowledge,
beliefs, and assumptions shared by the speaker and addressees... In
our proposal, the speaker intends each addressee to base his inferences
not on just any knowledge or beliefs he may have, but only on their
mutual knowledge or beliefs – their common ground. (Clark, 1992:
80-81; emphases in original).
Clark recognised that language is a useful tool in establishing common ground
through creating conventional form-meaning mappings shared between speakers
and hearers (also see: Grice, 1957; Lewis, 1969; Freyd, 1983; Parikh, 2001). For a
language to arrive at these conventional form-meaning mappings a tradeoff needs
to be reached between what a speaker needs to express and the amount of infer-
ential effort required by the hearer. Chapter 4 investigates this tension between
speakers and hearers by directly manipulating contextual predictability: the extent
to which a speaker can estimate, and therefore exploit, the contextual information
that a hearer is likely to use in interpreting an utterance. In particular, we argue
that contextual predictability is causally related to signal autonomy, defined as
the degree to which a signal can be interpreted without recourse to contextual
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information. Decreasing contextual predictability is therefore predicted to result
in increases in signal autonomy.
Experiment 4 manipulates two aspects of the referential context in an asym-
metric communication game (where speakers and hearers are assigned fixed roles):
(i) whether or not a speaker has access to the contextual information (Access to
Context); and (ii) the consistency with which a particular dimension (e.g., colour)
is relevant in discrimination across successive trials (Context-Type). The results
demonstrate that contextual predictability does shape the degree of signal auton-
omy: when the context is highly predictable, languages are organised to be less
autonomous (more context-dependent) through combining linguistic signals with
context to reduce uncertainty about the intended meaning. When the context
decreases in predictability, speakers favour strategies that promote autonomous
signals, allowing linguistic systems to reduce their context dependency.
4.2 Author contributions
The following section contains a paper which was co-authored with my supervi-
sors, Simon Kirby and Kenny Smith, and submitted to Cognition. The exper-
iments were conceived during supervision meetings, with both co-authors con-
tributing to the analysis and writing of the paper.
4.3 Winters, Kirby & Smith (submitted): Sig-
nal autonomy is shaped by contextual pre-
dictability
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Contextual predictability shapes signal autonomy
James Winters1,∗, Simon Kirby, Kenny Smith
Abstract
At the heart of human communication is the goal of reducing uncertainty about
the intended meaning. This requires solving a recurrent coordination problem5
where speakers and hearers need to align on a shared system of communication.
Governing the tradeoff between what a speaker needs to express and the amount
of inferential effort required by hearer is contextual predictability: to what ex-
tent a speaker can estimate and therefore exploit the contextual information
that a hearer is likely to use in interpreting an utterance. This relationship10
between context and communicative pressures has important consequences for
how languages are structured. In this paper, we test the claim that contextual
predictability is causally related to signal autonomy: the degree to which a sig-
nal can be interpreted in isolation, without recourse to contextual information.
Using an asymmetric communication game, where speakers and hearers are as-15
signed fixed roles, we test for the effect of contextual predictability on signal
autonomy by manipulating two aspects of the referential context: (i) whether
or not a speaker has access to the contextual information used by the hearer
in interpreting their utterance; and (ii) the extent to which successful commu-
nication requires the encoding of a consistent set of semantic dimensions. Our20
results demonstrate that contextual predictability shapes the degree of signal
autonomy: when the context is highly predictable (i.e., the speaker has access
to the context in which their utterances will be interpreted, and the dimension
which discriminates between meanings in context is consistent across commu-
nicative episodes), languages develop which rely heavily on the context to reduce25
uncertainty about the intended meaning. When the context is less predictable,
speakers favour systems composed of autonomous signals, where all potentially
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relevant semantic dimensions are explicitly encoded. Taken together, these re-
sults suggest that pragmatic factors play a central role in shaping the linguistic
systems that emerge over repeated interactions between speakers and hearers.30
Keywords: Language evolution, interaction, communication games, context,
pragmatics
1. Introduction
Reducing uncertainty about the intended meaning is fundamental to any
good communication system (Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2012; Ramscar & Port,
2015). In achieving this aim, speakers and hearers need to coordinate with one
another, relying not only on the creation of conventional forms, but also on the
way these forms interact with the contextual information at hand (Lewis, 1969;
Clark, 1996; Croft, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 2005; Scott-Phillips, 2015). With-
out context, linguistic systems such as English would be woefully ambiguous,
leaving the sentence She passed the mole uninterpretable as to whether the verb
passed refers to a form of motion or an act of giving and whether the noun mole
refers to a small burrowing mammal, a person engaged in espionage, a brand of
Mexican sauce or a type of causeway. In short, when the context is known and
informative, it helps in reducing uncertainty (Piantadosi et al., 2012).
Context in this sense is the mutual cognitive environment in which an utter-
ance is situated (Sperber & Wilson, 2005) and acts as a frame of interpretation
(Goffman, 1974; Minsky, 1975; Fauconnier, 1985; Fillmore, 1985): determin-
ing what is and is not informative for reducing uncertainty in interpretation.
This consists of a figure (the target of interpretation), a ground (the immedi-
ate information brought to the act of interpretation), and a background (prior
knowledge derived from previous fames) (Duranti & Goodwin, 1992; Terkourafi,
2009). And, as with any environment, the context will vary: some contexts are
regular and predictable, whereas others fluctuate and are unpredictable. When
viewed in this way, the context is a variable that determines the extent to which a
speaker can estimate, and therefore exploit, information that the hearer can use
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to reduce uncertainty about the intended meaning – its contextual predictability.
For instance, if a speaker is providing directions to the nearest grocery store,
then the context includes information in the immediate environment, such as the
general direction of the store relative to the present position of the interlocutors,
as well as background knowledge about how a hearer is likely to interpret an
utterance given the outcomes of previous interactions. Predictable contexts are
therefore those where the speaker is able to use information provided by the
context to reduce uncertainty about their intended meaning for the hearer: if
the grocery store is near a park, and the speaker and hearer share knowledge
about where this park is located, then saying “there’s a grocery store about five
minutes away, next to the park where we play rugby” is sufficient for the hearer
to find the grocery store. This is in contrast to a situation where the speaker
and hearer are strangers and uncertainty exists as to the knowledge they both
share with one another (e.g., the hearer is a tourist and does not know about
the existence of a nearby park).
This relationship between context, meaning and uncertainty leads to an in-
teresting trade-off in how linguistic systems are organised. Languages vary in
their degree of signal autonomy: “the capacity for an utterance to be inter-
preted in isolation, without recourse to implicit linguistic, cultural, contextual
or cotextual knowledge. Non-autonomous expression combines linguistic sig-
nals with context, pragmatics, paralinguistic signals and the like” (Wray &
Grace, 2007: 556). One hypothesis is that autonomy is favoured in situations
where speakers and hearers cannot reply on context for disambiguation (Kay,
1977): autonomous signals are advantageous insomuch as they reduce reliance
on shared social and physical context in favour of internal structure (Snow et
al., 1991: 90-91; Hurford, 2011).
In this paper we present experimental evidence demonstrating that the de-
gree of signal autonomy is causally related to contextual predictability: in
an experiment where participants interact using an artificial language, highly
predictable contexts favour systems composed of non-autonomous, context-
dependent signals, whereas decreasing contextual predictability results in in-
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creased autonomy (context-independence). Crucially, these systems arise from
the competing demands of speaker effort and hearer inference, with the degree
of contextual predictability shaping the tradeoff between these two constraints.
1.1. Signal Autonomy and Contextual Predictability
No natural language has completely autonomous signals in the sense of un-
ambiguous clarity; context is always involved in reducing uncertainty about the
intended meaning. But it is relatively uncontroversial to say there are degrees
of autonomy. Consider the possible use of referring expressions in Figure 1.
Describing the object on the left in contexts A and B could be achieved with
with the referential expression the metal cup – this expression is capable of dis-
criminating between referents in both contexts. Yet, based on a long history of
psycholinguistic studies, it is only in context A where the expression the metal
cup is used, with the cup being preferred when the adjective is not needed for
discrimination (Olson, 1970; Pechmann, 1989; Sedivy, 2005; for review, see:
Konopka & Brown-Schmidt, 2014)1. Similar work in audience design (Clark,
1996) shows that speakers produce longer, more elaborate expressions when the
hearer is perceived to be less knowledgeable about a topic (Brown & Dell, 1987;
Isaacs & Clark, 1989; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Heller et al., 2009) and the use of
scalar-modified expressions is partially contingent on whether or not a speaker
and a hearer share the same referential context (Keysar et al., 2000; Nadig &
Sedivy, 2002).
1The use of colour adjectives provides an interesting counterexample to this general picture.
Unlike material and scalar adjectives, which tend be dependent on context, colour adjectives
are often used even when they are uninformative for discrimination (e.g., Sedivy, 2005; Arts et
al., 2011). A growing body of work into these Redundant Colour Adjectives (RCA) provides
two explanations (Rubio-Fernandez, 2016). First, the use of RCAs tends to be contingent
on the semantic category, as evident in their presence for atypical objects (e.g., the brown
banana) and clothes (e.g., collocations such as black tie) and their absence in typical (e.g., the
banana) and geometrical figures (Dale & Reiter, 1995; Sedivy, 2003; Grodner & Sedivy, 2011).
Second, speakers tend to produce RCAs when colour helps facilitate object recognition (e.g.,
polychrome versus monochrome displays), as well as when the language uses pre-nominal (e.g.,




Figure 1: In context A, an English speaker can discriminate between both objects by using
the cup or the bowl, whereas in context B they must use more elaborate expressions: the metal
cup and the wooden cup (assuming the speaker obeys the rules of English for adjective use).
In fact, our everyday language use is littered with options for more or less
autonomous expressions. Contrast the use of indexical (context-dependent) and
non-indexical (autonomous) forms of language: when referring to the day af-
ter today, English users will tend to say tomorrow, rather than the more au-
tonomous counterpart of a specific date (e.g., July 5th 2016) (Hurford, 2011).
Both are perfectly valid forms of expressing the relevant meaning, yet indexical
forms are preferred in the presence of shared-knowledge and predictable contexts
(e.g., James lives on this street), whereas non-indexical forms are useful in pro-
viding specific information in the absence of such contexts (e.g., James lives on
Milton Street). The key point is that all these examples vary in their contextual
predictability: the extent to which a speaker exploits contextual information to
reduce uncertainty about the intended meaning for the hearer.
Contextual predictability, then, can be seen as an organising principle for
how we use language: when the context is highly predictable, use less au-
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tonomous forms, and in less predictable contexts use more autonomous forms.
However, differences in autonomy are not just found in how we use language in
context, but also in the way language is structured. For instance, contrast nouns
with concrete, physical senses (e.g., dog and computer) and nouns that are con-
sidered maximally vague (e.g., stuff and thing): whereas computer is relatively
autonomous, in that we can get some sense of the intended meaning out of con-
text, thing needs contextual enrichment to even get an approximation as to what
a speaker might be referring2. This difference in autonomy holds across parts of
speech categories as well: the most frequent nouns show a tendency to be more
autonomous than the most common verbs and adjectives (Engelkamp, Zimmer
& Mohr, 1990: 190). And, at even higher level of organisation, grammatical
morphemes are less autonomous than lexical morphemes, with the former being
more bound to sentence context (Mihatsch, 2009).
Explanations for language change also bind together these two concepts of
context and autonomy. Work in grammaticalization provides a useful illustra-
tion of the interaction between contextual predictability and autonomy across
historical timescales (Hopper & Traugott, 2003; Traugott & Trousdale, 2012).
A classic example of grammaticalization is the development of gonna from be
going to. In the time of Shakespeare’s English, be going to had its literal mean-
ing of a subject travelling to a location in order to do something, yet over time
this construction extended its original meaning to also include instances where
the motion verb (go) and the purpose clause (to + infinitive) came to express
intentionality and future possibility (Hopper & Traugott, 1993; Croft, 2000).
By expanding its range of uses, be going to underwent a decrease in autonomy,
and became increasingly reliant on contextual information for disambiguation.
For example, saying the leaves are going to fall off the tree is unambiguously
referring to a near future event, with contextual information guiding the reader
2Thing is an example of vagueness in language, defined as the modification of a linguistic
item, phrase or utterance to make its meaning less precise (Channell, 1994: 20; Cutting 2007).
In this sense, an individual may not intend to refer to a specific referent, with vagueness being
“stretched and negotiated to suit the moment-to-moment communicative needs” (Zhang, 2011:
573).
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toward the intended meaning. But there are situations where be going to is
ambiguous as to whether it refers to a form of motion or future intent (e.g.,
I am going to take a nap) – and this opens up the possibility of low contex-
tual predictability triggering uncertainty in interpretation. One solution to the
problem of ambiguity is to enrich the interpretation with additional linguistic
information, as evident in Maria is going to go to London, where both future
intent and motion are separately expressed (making the construction more au-
tonomous). Another way is to create a more autonomous form, as is the case
with gonna, which unambiguously refers to near future events (e.g., The leaves
are gonna fall off the tree is grammatical whereas this is not the case for *Maria
is gonna London).
Languages also appear to vary in their degree of autonomy (Kay, 1977; Wray
& Grace, 2007; Hurford, 2011). An extreme example of the cross-linguistic
variation in autonomy is found in Riau Indonesian – a colloquial variety of
Malay/Indonesian with minimal syntactic structure and highly context-dependent
expressions (for review see Gil, 2005). For instance, consider the possible inter-
pretations found in combining the forms ayam (“chicken”) and makan (“eat”):
ayam makan or makan ayam can refer to anything from the chicken is eating
to the chickens are eating or someone is eating the chicken or even someone is
eating with the chicken (Gil, 2005; Hurford, 2011). In short, the phrase ayam
makan or makan ayam involves anything to do with chicken and eating; contex-
tual information and hearer inference do the rest of the work in sifting through
possible interpretations.
Riau Indonesian fits nicely into the picture presented by Wray & Grace
(2007) that situations characterised by high degrees of shared knowledge re-
sult in less autonomous signals. The reason for this is that shared knowledge
increases contextual predictability: if the speaker and hearer have common
knowledge about a particular topic, and this knowledge is adequate for distin-
guishing between possible interpretations, then there is no need to explicitly
express such information in the linguistic system.
There is therefore converging evidence from usage, change and typology
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suggesting that differences in contextual predictability lead to differences in
autonomy: high contextual predictability biases signals toward becoming less
autonomous, whereas low contextual predictability is associated with an increase
in signal autonomy. However, this still leaves us with the question: What are the
underlying mechanisms linking contextual predictability with signal autonomy?
Wray & Grace (2007: 556) offer one answer:
Individual utterances in any language will, of course, score differ-
ently on the autonomy scale, since it is part of the speaker’s job to
judge how much knowledge the hearer shares, and thus what it is
appropriate not to mention in the interests of relevance and brevity.
As the above quote suggests, differences in autonomy appear to be related
to competing motivations, which, in the next section, we argue consist of a
pressure to reduce speaker effort and a pressure to minimise hearer uncertainty.
1.2. Competing Demands: Minimising Effort and Reducing Uncertainty
Connecting the relationship between autonomy and contextual predictabil-
ity to underlying mechanisms requires we take seriously the problem of linkage
(Kirby, 1999; 2012): How do the behaviours of individuals give rise to the partic-
ular structural properties of language? One solution to the problem of linkage is
to consider how short-term strategies used in solving immediate communicative
needs can give rise to language systems through long-term patterns of learning
and use (Evans & Green, 2006; Steels, 2012; Beuls & Steels, 2013; Winters,
Kirby & Smith, 2015; Pleyer & Winters, 2015).
Shaping these short-term strategies are the competing motivations of speak-
ers and hearers (Zipf, 1949; Horn, 1993; Nettle, 1999; Frank & Goodman, 2012;
Piantadosi et al., 2012). Here, a balance needs to be reached between the de-
mands of the speaker, where the goal is to reduce effort in production, and the
demands of the hearer, where the goal is to reduce effort in comprehension.
Resolving these two forces require speakers and hearers to align on a system:
one that reaches a tradeoff between minimising the energetic expense of the
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speaker whilst also reducing uncertainty about the intended meaning for the
hearer (Piantadosi et al., 2012). The core principle being that a speaker aims
to be efficient and informative given the hearer’s common knowledge, context,
and the task at hand (Frank & Goodman, 2012).
The pressures imposed during communication provide a clear prediction link-
ing together signal autonomy and context. Autonomy is expected when contex-
tual predictability is low. This is because speakers cannot rely on contextual
information when conveying their intended meaning to the hearer, and must
instead explicitly encode more information in the signal (increasing the proba-
bility of the hearer arriving at the correct interpretation). By contrast, when
contextual predictability is high, speakers are expected to use less autonomous
signals: a speaker can rely on context to get some meaning across, allowing
them to reduce their overall effort and encode less information explicitly (with-
out negatively impinging upon the hearer arriving at the correct interpretation).
An optimal system therefore minimises both speaker effort and hearer infer-
ence, resulting in a low cost and functionally adequate mode of communication.
A simple example of this is found in research relating word length, ambiguity and
predictability given the context (Cohen Priva, 2008; Tily & Piantadosi, 2009;
Piantadosi et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2012; Mahowald et al., 2013; Seyfarth,
2014). For instance, Tily & Piantadosi (2009) show that pronouns are used for
referents which are more predictable in context, whereas proper names and full
NPs are reserved for less predictable contexts. Even in pairs of near synonymous
forms, such as exam and examination, the short forms tend to have a lower in-
formation content than the long forms when controlling for meaning (Mahowald
et al., 2012). All of this points to the general conclusion that “shorter and less
informative expressions are favoured when less information is sufficient to carry
the message” (Tily & Piantadosi, 2009: 1).
Such results lend weight to the idea that contextual predictability governs
the extent to which a speaker can reduce their effort without significantly tax-
ing hearer inference. But there are important theoretical differences in how this
tradeoff is reached. Levinson (2000: 29), for instance, argues that an optimal
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system should be skewed in favour of reducing speaker effort at the expense
of minimising hearer uncertainty, his rationale being that “inference is cheap,
articulation expensive, and thus the design requirements are for a system that
maximizes inference”. Meanwhile, audience design (e.g., Bell, 1984; Clark &
Murphy, 1982) and accommodation theory (Giles, Coupland & Coupland, 1991)
paint a slightly different picture: here, perspective taking mechanisms are em-
phasised, with knowledge about hearers being used to optimise messages (Clark
& Carlson, 1982; Levelt, 1989; Blokpoel et al., 2012).
A middle ground between these two perspectives is found in probabilistic
pragmatics (Franke & Degen, 2015; Franke & Jäger, 2016; Pfeifer, 2016) which
argues that population-level phenomena are shaped by heterogeneous pragmatic
reasoners. That is, individuals do not necessarily enter into conversations with
the same default assumptions, and are most likely updating their beliefs about
the pragmatic behaviour of others as the conversation progresses. Solving this
recurrent coordination problem requires the use of communicative strategies to
build common ground – the central task being to negotiate a shared system that
allows for successful communication between speakers and hearers (Lewis, 1969;
Freyd, 1983; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Clark, 1996; Croft, 2000; Gärdenfors,
2000; Parikh, 2001).
Language games (Wittgenstein, 1953; Steels, 1999: 197-8) are useful for
viewing these pragmatic strategies in action. Figure 2 shows a simple language
game where the speaker has to convey the same intended meaning in two differ-
ent contexts (A and B). Context A has referents that share the same colour but
differ in shape, and context B has referents that share the same shape but differ
in colour. In the shared context, the speaker and hearer both have access to
the same contextual information, whereas in the unshared context the speaker
only sees the referent they need to convey. Assuming speakers have knowledge
about a set of signals, and are free to combine them, then there are three pos-
sibilities (for the target referent): the blue one, the square, the blue square. The
optimal solution in the shared context is to minimise effort and only convey
what is necessary: use the square in context A and the blue one in context B.
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This is because the context is to some extent predictable – the speaker and
the hearer share knowledge about the relevant distinctions – and speakers need
not expend effort by using a more autonomous form to achieve communicative
success. However, in the unshared context, speakers only have access to the
target they need to convey, and are therefore unable to condition their signals
on contextual information. To ensure communicative success, speakers need to
expend effort and specify both dimensions in a single signal. By using the more
autonomous form, the blue square, speakers can be sure to convey their intended
meaning across both contexts.
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Figure 2: An example of a language game where the speaker has a set of signals for conveying
a particular meaning (in this case, a blue square). There are two contexts: A and B. In context
A, the target image shares the same colour as its distractor (but differs in shape), whereas in
context B the target image shares the same shape as its distractor (but differs in shape). For
the Shared Context (top box), the speaker has access to the same contextual information as
the hearer. By contrast, in the Unshared Context (bottom box), the speaker does not have
access to the same contextual information as the hearer. The green coloured signals are the
preferred signals for communicating an intended meaning in a particular scenario. The signals
with a strikethrough are those which will not convey the intended meaning in a particular
scenario.
The imagined English-speaking interlocutors in Figure 2 already have a fully
functioning communication system in place for expressing the features of a tar-
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get referent. In order to study how such communication systems develop, and
how the form they take is modulated by contextual predictability, the present
experiment uses an artificial language paradigm (e.g., Saffran, Aslin & Newport,
1996; Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). In particular, we explore how short-term
strategies of achieving communicative success in a referential context influence
the emergence of language systems – and therefore solve the problem of linkage
for signal autonomy.
1.3. Access to Context and Context-Type
For our present purposes, we focus on the emergence of two types of lan-
guage system: context-dependent and autonomous. Context-dependent systems
are expected when signals can be conditioned on contextual information in order
to reduce effort. Out of context, signals in a context-dependent system are less
capable of distinguishing between referents, and we therefore expect that these
systems will only emerge when the context is to some extent predictable. Au-
tonomous systems are expected to develop when the context is less predictable
and more information needs to be explicitly encoded in the linguistic signal.
Communication games are a useful tool for exploring the dynamics underpin-
ning communicative behaviour in a laboratory setting (for review, see: Galan-
tucci, Garrod & Roberts, 2012; Tamariz & Kirby, 2016). In our experiment,
participants are first trained on an initially ambiguous artificial language, and
then placed in an asymmetric communication game (Moreno & Baggio, 2014;
Nowak & Baggio, 2016) where they are assigned fixed roles as either speaker or
hearer. Speaker and hearer play a series of guessing games (Steels, 2003; Silvey,
Kirby & Smith, 2015; Winters, Kirby & Smith, 2015): the task is for the hearer
to discriminate between a target object and a set of distractor objects using
a signal provided by the speaker. Possible referents were drawn from a set of
images which vary in shape and colour.
Our rationale for using asymmetric participant roles is to explicitly investi-
gate how contextual predictability influences a speaker’s behaviour. If partici-
pants alternate between the role of speaker and hearer, then a speaker at time t
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will have gained some relevant knowledge about what contextual information a
hearer has at t+1, which will diminish the effect of our manipulations (see be-
low) — fixing the participant roles for the duration of the experiment removes
this possibility. We also train our participants pre-interaction on an ambiguous
language which underspecifies whether labels encode shape, colour or both (see
below for details of how this is achieved). This creates a generalisation pres-
sure, allowing us to explore how speakers convey novel meanings, and how much
information they choose to encode explicitly in the linguistic signal.
To test for the effect of contextual predictability on autonomy, we made two
manipulations: (i) Access to context (Shared Context/Unshared Context), and
(ii) Context-type (Shape-Different/Mixed). In the Shared Context conditions,
speakers have access to the context against which their utterance will be inter-
preted (i.e., the array of target and distractors that the hearer is confronted
with), whereas in the Unshared Context conditions speakers only see the target
in isolation (although the speaker’s task remains the same: to produce a sig-
nal which allows the hearer to distinguish a target from a set of distractors).
Speakers in Shared Context conditions therefore have knowledge about what
distinctions they need to make on a trial-by-trial basis, whereas speakers in Un-
shared Context conditions only know what target they need to convey (without
any contextual information about the context against which their utterance will
be interpreted, and therefore what the relevant distinctions are for the hearer
in a particular trial).
Our second manipulation of contextual predictability involves context type:
to what extent is a particular dimension (e.g., shape) relevant for discrimination
across successive trials? For the Shape-Different conditions, the context-type re-
mains consistent across trials, with targets and distractors always differing in
shape (but sharing the same colour). Mixed conditions vary their context-type
across trials: half of the trials consist of contexts in which the target and dis-
tractors differ in shape (but share the same colour) and half in which they differ
in colour (but share the same shape). In Shape-Different conditions, encoding
shape is therefore always sufficient to allow the hearer to retrieve the intended
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meanings (although whether the speaker can see this directly or must infer
it from the pattern of communicative successes and failures will depend on the
Shared vs Unshared manipulation); in Mixed conditions, some trials will require
the encoding of shape, some will require colour to be encoded (and whether or
not the speaker knows which dimension is relevant for a given trial will again
depend on the Shared/Unshared manipulation). This gives us four conditions:
Shape-Different + Shared Context, Shape-Different + Unshared Context, Mixed
+ Shared Context, Mixed + Unshared Context.
In terms of contextual predictability, the Shape-Different + Shared Context
condition is the most predictable both within and across trials: the context-type
is consistent, in that Shape is always the relevant feature for discrimination, and
the speaker has access to the same contextual information as the hearer. The
optimal solution here is for speakers to use the contextual information to gen-
eralise and only encode shape in their signals, resulting in a system with low
signal autonomy (out of context a signal has a decreased capacity to discrim-
inate between referents). This is an example of underspecification: speakers
are able to reduce effort because they can abstract across referents, using a
single signal to refer to different meanings based on a shared feature (Silvey,
Kirby & Smith, 2015; Winters, Kirby & Smith, 2015). Underspecified systems
are communicatively functional if contextual information aids in discriminating
between meanings: information about the context, when combined with the
interpretive clues provided by the signal, allows a hearer to correctly infer the
intended meaning.
On the opposite end of the scale of contextual predictability is the Mixed +
Unshared Context condition: context-type varies between trials where objects in
the context differ in shape (but share the same colour) and trials where objects
in the context differ in colour (but share the same shape), with access to this
contextual information being unavailable for the speaker (they only ever see
the target that needs to be conveyed). This low contextual predictability means
that underspecified systems will be ineffective — in order to be sure of conveying
their intended meaning, speakers must instead employ strategies that increase
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signal autonomy, e.g., by encoding both shape and colour on every trial.
For the Shape-Different + Unshared Context and Mixed + Shared Context
conditions there is one manipulation which decreases contextual predictability
and another which increases contextual predictability. In the Shape-Different
+ Unshared Context condition, the fact that the speaker lacks access to the
context favours strategies that increase signal autonomy, as the speaker has no
contextual information regarding what distinctions they need to convey. How-
ever, the across-trial predictability potentially allows speakers to reduce their
signal autonomy, as encoding shape in the linguistic is always sufficient for con-
veying the intended meaning. Whether or not a speaker opts for strategies that
increase or decrease signal autonomy is somewhat contingent on the initial as-
sumptions a speaker brings to the task as well as the feedback they receive from
hearers. The first option is for the speaker to prioritise reducing their effort
and only convey shape, but this strategy runs the risk of failing to successfully
communicate with the hearer (remember: the speaker does not know which dis-
tinctions are relevant for conveying the intended meaning). The second option
is to increase the signal autonomy: this is advantageous in that autonomous
signals are less reliant on the external context for disambiguation. However,
there is a cost associated with this strategy, as speakers now need to encode
more specific information into the signal.
A similar story holds for the Mixed + Shared Context condition. This time
the variability across trials decreases contextual predictability, as the context-
type varies between trials where objects in the context differ in colour and trials
where objects in the context differ in shape; however, the fact that the speaker
has access to the same contextual information as the hearer should increase
contextual predictability. Again, there are two viable strategies in this condition.
The first is a context-dependent strategy: speakers underspecify and encode
shape and colour in distinct signals, with the interpretation being conditioned
on the context-type. As an example, imagine conveying a blue rectangle in a
shape-different and a colour-different context: for the shape-different context,
where the set of distractors consist of a blue blob, a blue oval, and a blue star,
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the speaker uses a signal that conveys rectangle, whereas the speaker uses a
signal to convey blue in the colour-different context, where the set of distractors
consist of a grey rectangle, a red rectangle, and a yellow rectangle. This strategy
is useful insomuch as the speaker is able to reduce their effort – a set of eight
signals is sufficient to convey all 16 meanings. Crucially, the burden is mostly
shifted onto the hearer, who must figure out how the signal-meaning mappings
vary according to context-type. The second strategy is for speakers to provide
more autonomous signals. But, as mentioned above, autonomous signals come
with additional costs of encoding more specific information into a given signal.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
120 undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Edinburgh (79
female, 41 male, median age 20) were recruited via the Student And Graduate
Employment database and randomly assigned to one of the four possible condi-
tions (see § 2.3.3). Each condition consisted of a pair of participants who learned
an artificial language (see § 2.2) and then used this language in a communication
game (see § 2.3.2). Participants were paid £5 for their participation.
2.2. Stimuli: Images and Target Language
Participants were asked to learn and then use an ‘alien language’, consisting
of lower-case labels paired with images. There were 16 images that varied along
three features: shape, colour and a unique identifier (see figure 3 for examples).
Four of these 16 images were randomly selected for training, such that each
colour and shape was represented exactly once and each of the four images
therefore differed from all the others in both colour and shape. Each image was
then assigned a label as follows: From a set of vowels (a,e,i,o,u) and consonants
(g,h,k,l,m,n,p,w) we randomly generated nine CV syllables which were then used
to randomly generate a set of four 2-3 syllable words. Since the four images
used during training differed in both shape and colour, the training labels in
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this language were therefore ambiguous with respect to whether they referred






Figure 3: The meaning space used in our experiment. Referents vary along three dimensions:
a shape, a colour, and a unique identifier. To create an initially ambiguous language we first
randomly selected four meanings that differed from one another on both shape and colour. We




At the start of the experiment, participants were told they would first have
to learn and then communicate using an alien language. Participants completed
the experiment in separate booths on networked computers. The experiment
consisted of two main phases: a learning phase and a communication phase.
Before each phase began, participants were given detailed information on what
that phase would involve and were explicitly told not to use English or any
other language they knew during the experiment3. For the learning phase,
participants were trained separately, and it was only during the communication
phase that they interacted (remotely, over the computer network).
2.3.1. Learning Phase: Training and Testing
The learning phase was broken up into two components: a set of training
blocks and a set of testing blocks. In each training trial, the participant was pre-
sented with an image and a label. After two seconds, the label would disappear,
and the participant was then prompted to retype the label before proceeding to
the next trial. Each training block consisted of twelve trials (each of the four
training images was seen three times, with the order of trials randomised within
the block). For the testing trials, the participant was presented with an image
and prompted to type the label that corresponded to the image. Once they
typed the label, the participant was given feedback as to whether or not they
were correct – if incorrect, they were shown the correct label before moving onto
the next trial. A testing block consisted of sixteen trials (meaning that each of
the four training images was seen four times, with the order of trials randomised
within the block). The training and testing blocks were interleaved as follows:
2 training blocks, 1 testing block, 2 training blocks, 1 testing block.
3Compliance with the instructions was excellent – there were no cases in which participants
used English or any other natural language in the current experiment
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2.3.2. Communication Phase
During the communication phase of the experiment, participants within a
pair were randomly assigned fixed roles of either speaker or hearer:
Speaker On each communication trial, the speaker was shown a target image
that was highlighted with a green border. Whether or not a speaker could
view the distractors depended on the experimental condition (see § 2.3.3).
The speaker was then prompted to type a description that would best
communicate the target to the matcher. Speakers were free to type any
description they wished (subject to the requirement to avoid English or
any other natural language). This description was then sent to the hearer’s
computer.
Hearer Hearers were presented with an array of four images; the description
provided by the director appearing underneath. Of these four images,
one was the target image and the other three images were distractors.
Distractors were randomly generated within the constraints imposed by
the experimental conditions (see § 2.3.3). The hearer’s goal was to click
on the image they thought corresponded to the description provided.
Participants were tested on all 16 images during the communication phase,
requiring the speaker to generalise from the signals provided for the four images
in the training set, and the hearer to interpret these generalisations. Following
each trial, both speaker and hearer were given feedback as to whether or not
the hearer had correctly identified the target image described by the speaker:
both participants were simply informed whether the hearer was correct or incor-
rect. The communication phase was comprised of three blocks, with each block
consisting of 32 trials (trial order was randomised and each of the 16 images
appeared as the target image twice within a block).
2.3.3. Manipulating Access to Context and Context-Type
During communication, we manipulated two variables associated with the
referential context: (i) access to the referential context; (ii) the referential con-
20
text type.
The first manipulation consisted of whether or not a director had access to
the referential context that the matcher saw. In the Shared Context conditions,
directors were exposed to the same referential context as the matcher: that
is, they had access to an array consisting of the target and its distractors.
Conversely, for the Unshared Context conditions, directors only had access to
the target image.
A second manipulation was made to the possible combinations of target
and distractor images within a single trial. For the Mixed conditions, half of
all trials consist of referential contexts in which the target and its distractors
have different shapes (but share the same colour) and half in which they have
different colours (but share the same shape). For the Shape-Different conditions,
the referential context-type remains consistent across trials, with the target and
distractors having different shapes (but sharing the same colour). This gives
us four conditions: (i) Shape-Different + Shared Context; (ii) Shape-Different +
Unshared Context; (iii) Mixed + Shared Context; (iv) Mixed + Unshared Context
(see Figure 2).
2.4. Dependent Variables and Hypotheses
2.4.1. Communicative success
To measure communicative success we recorded the number of successful
trials between the speaker and hearer, i.e., when the hearer clicked on the target
image. The maximum success score was 96 points for three blocks of 32 trials.
The purpose of this measure is to see whether the communication systems which
develop during interaction are communicatively functional.
2.4.2. Total number of signals
One way to distinguish between autonomous and context-dependent systems
is count the total number of unique signals produced. To convey all 16 mean-
ings an autonomous system requires more unique signals (16) than a context-
dependent system (where the same signal can be reused to express different
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meanings).
2.4.3. Measuring uncertainty: conditional entropy
To quantify the types of mappings between signals and meanings we mea-
sure the conditional entropy (Shannon, 1948) of meanings given signals for the
speaker’s productions during interaction (Winters, Kirby & Smith, 2014). This
gives us a measure of predictability that can be applied to meaning uncertainty.
H(M |S) is the expected entropy (i.e., uncertainty) over meanings given a signal,
and therefore captures meaning uncertainty,






P (m|s) logP (m|s) (1)
where the rightmost sum is the entropy over meanings given a particular
signal s ∈ S. P (m|s) is the probability that meaning m is the intended meaning
given that signal s has been produced, and P (s) is the probability that signal
s will be produced (for any meaning). A high H(M |S) corresponds to low
signal autonomy, i.e., out of context a signal is highly uninformative about the
intended meaning, with a speaker reusing that same signal to convey several
meanings. By contrast, an autonomous signal should have zero H(M |S), as
each signal a speaker uses only conveys one meaning.
While this measure captures the extent to which signals are autonomous,
it does not distinguish between context-dependent and counter-functional am-
biguity. For context-dependent ambiguity, contextual information contributes
to reducing uncertainty about the intended meaning, whereas with counter-
functional ambiguity this is not the case. To differentiate these two possibilities
we also include a measure of meaning uncertainty in context, H(M |S,C):






P (m|s, c) logP (m|s, c) (2)
The rightmost sum now takes into account the entropy over meanings given
a particular signal in context s, c ∈ S,C. A context c ∈ C is an array of four
meanings taken from set M and is constructed so that each meaning shares one
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feature in common and differs on the other feature, e.g., shape-different blue =
{blue blob, blue oval, blue square, blue star} and colour-different star = {blue
star, grey star, red star, yellow star}.
Our general prediction is that, even though systems will vary in H(M |S) due
to the effects of contextual predictability on autonomy, all systems will gradu-
ally decrease their H(M |S,C) over time. This is expected when languages are
adapting to optimise their communicative success. As such, a context-dependent
system should therefore have high H(M |S) but low H(M |S,C): this difference
between H(M |S) and H(M |S,C) indicates that signals are hard to interpret in
isolation but contextual information helps in identifying the intended meaning,
i.e., the communication system is functionally adequate in context. Conversely,
for an autonomous system, we expect both the H(M |S) and the H(M |S,C) to
be low, i.e., signals are informative even out of context.
2.4.4. Hypotheses
Here we provide a set of hypotheses and predictions related to our specific
measurements:
Hypothesis One: Communication systems will be functionally adequate for
identifying the intended meaning in context. As such, we predict all
conditions will reach a communicative success score higher than chance
(>25%).
Hypothesis Two: Speakers will consistently use contextual information to re-
duce their effort and only specify shape in the Shape-Different + Shared
Context condition (low autonomy). This will result in underspecified sys-
tems with a low number of signals, a high H(M |S) and a low H(M |S,C).
Hypothesis Three: Strategy choices in the Shape-Different + Unshared Con-
text condition and the Mixed + Shared Context condition will depend
on the relative weighting participants give to minimising speaker effort,
hearer effort and accuracy of communication. If a speaker prioritises re-
ducing their own effort, then the resulting systems will underspecify and
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only encode shape (low autonomy); reflected in a low number of signals,
a high H(M |S) and a low H(M |S,C). However, if a speaker prioritises
reducing hearer uncertainty, then the resulting systems will be more au-
tonomous and have a greater number of signals, a low H(M |S) and a low
H(M |S,C).
Hypothesis Four: Speakers will consistently converge on strategies that pro-
mote autonomous signals in the Mixed + Unshared Context condition.
This will result in systems with a greater number of signals, a low H(M |S)
and a low H(M |S,C).
3. Results
Our analyses involved four separate mixed effect models (lme4: Bates, Mach-
ler, Bolker & Walker, 2014) based on the dependent variables of (a) commu-
nicative success, (b) number of unique signals, (c) H(M |S), and (d) H(M |S,C).
For communicative success we used a logistic mixed effect model and for number
of unique signals, H(M |S), and H(M |S,C) we used linear mixed effect models.
Context-Type (Shape-Different or Mixed), Access to Context (Shared Context
or Unshared Context)4 and Block (1, 2 and 3 — Block was coded such that
model intercepts give performance at block 1) were entered as fixed effects with
interactions. We included random intercepts for Participant and initial train-
ing language, and random slopes for all fixed effects and associated interactions
(following the keep it maximal approach: Barr et al., 2013). P-values for the
fixed effects in the linear mixed effect model were obtained using the lmerTest
package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff & Christensen, 2016).
3.1. Communicative success
All conditions show levels of communicative accuracy substantially higher
than chance (> 25%) in communicating with one another. This is confirmed by a
4Context-Type and Access to Context were centered fixed effects, coded such that posi-
tive values of β indicate higher communicative success/number of signals/entropy in Shape-
Different or Shared conditions
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logistic mixed effect model5, which has a significant intercept (β = 3.440, SE =
0.230, p < .001) indicating performance above chance. This model also indicates
significant effects of Block (β = 0.325, SE = 0.074, p < .001): as can be seen
in Figure 4, participants in all four conditions are increasing their success rate
over time. Access to Context (β = 1.301, SE = 0.401, p < .002) and Context-
Type (β = 2.480, SE = 0.405, p < .001) are also significant predictors of
communicative success: conditions where the speaker has access to the hearer’s
context (Shared Context) and where the context-type remains stable across
trials (Shape-Different) leads to higher communicative success (as highlighted
by the positive coefficients for Access to Context and Context-Type). Finally,
the Shape-Different + Shared Context condition (with the highest contextual
predictability) is clearly something of an outlier, and the model indicates a
significant Context-Type x Access to Context interaction (β = 1.874, SE =
0.801, p = .019) which shows that communicative success in this condition is
higher than we would expect given the independent contributions of shared
and stable context. There were no other significant main effects or interactions
(p > .103).
5The model was adjusted to control for the chance level of communicative success, which

























Shape−Different + Shared Context
Shape−Different + Unshared Context
Mixed + Shared Context
Mixed + Unshared Context
Figure 4: Mean communicative success score by condition over blocks 1-3. Error bars represent
bootstrapped 95% CIs where the original data was resampled 10000 times using the Hmisc
package (Harrell Jr et al., 2014). All of the conditions show a steady increase in communicative
success (although performance in the Shape-Different + Shared Context condition is near
ceiling from block 1), and all participants scored higher than chance (> 25%) in selecting the
target image, indicating that the systems are communicatively functional for identifying the
intended meaning.
3.2. Number of Unique Signals
Figure 5 shows the number of unique signals across condition. As was the
case for communicative success, there are significant effects of Context-Type
(β = −7.361, SE = 1.414, p < .001), Access to Context (β = −5.006, SE =
1.414, p < .001), and a significant interaction for these two predictors (Context-
Type x Access to Context: β = −7.033, SE = 2.828, p = .015): having a
shared context and context-types which remain stable over time (i.e., Shape-
Different conditions) are associated with smaller signal inventories, suggesting
a lesser degree of signal autonomy, and the combination of these manipulations
results in very small lexicons in the Shape-Different + Shared Context condition.
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The marginally significant two-way interaction for Context-Type x Block (β =
−0.983, SE = 0.520, p = .061) tells us that the average number of signals
decreases over time in Shape-Different conditions; however, the significant three-
way interaction between Access to Context, Context Type and Block (β = 2.567,
SE = 1.039, p = .015) suggest that the number of signals in Shape-Different
+ Shared Context condition is trending upwards for some participant pairs
(counteracting the overall negative effect of Block: β = −0.358, SE = 0.230,
p = .171). Overall, these series of results suggest that conditions where the
number of unique signals is low from the offset (i.e., Shape-Different + Shared
Context at Block 1) show an increase in the number of signals, but this increase
is relatively small when compared with the total number of unique signals in
the other three conditions. All other predictors and associated interactions were
























Shape−Different + Shared Context
Shape−Different + Unshared Context
Mixed + Shared Context
Mixed + Unshared Context
Figure 5: Mean number of unique signals by condition over blocks. Participants in Shape-
Different + Shared Context condition use fewer unique signals than participants in the other
conditions, and in the Shape-Different + Unshared Context condition the average number of
unique signals tends to decrease over time, which suggests the systems are moving away from
being autonomous by increasing their context-dependency. Participants in Shape-Different +
Shared Context are near to optimal in using the minimal number of signals (4) required for
successful communication in context, whereas participants in Mixed + Shared Context and
Mixed + Unshared Context use roughly the number of signals (16) required in an autonomous
signalling system. Signalling systems in the Shape-Different + Unshared Context condition
appear to be non-autonomous, in that on average participants tend to produce fewer than 16
signals — the number of unique signals changes over the course of interaction. Error bars
represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
3.3. Conditional Entropy: Meaning Uncertainty
Figure 6 plots the conditional entropy of meanings given signals, H(M |S),
against condition. As a visual inspection of the plot suggests, both Context-
Type (β = 0.783, SE = 0.154, p < .001) and Access to Context (β = 0.406,
SE = 0.154, p = .011) are significant predictors of H(M |S): when contextual
predictability increases so too does the out-of-context ambiguity as measured
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by H(M |S), indicating that higher contextual predictability leads to lower sig-
nal autonomy. Again, the significant interaction between these two predictors
(Context-Type x Access to Context: β = 0.756, SE = 0.296, p = .013) indi-
cates that the combination of a shared and stable context in the Shape-Different
+ Shared condition produces systems of even lower autonomy than we would
expect through the independent contributions of either factor alone. Finally,
there is a significant interaction between Context-Type and Block (β = 0.119,
SE = 0.025, p < .001) which shows that Context-Type influences the evolution
of the signalling systems over successive blocks: Shape-Different conditions tend
to produce higher H(M |S), with participants in Shape-Different + Unshared in-
creasing their average H(M |S), whereas participants in Mixed conditions show












Shape−Different + Shared Context
Shape−Different + Unshared Context
Mixed + Shared Context
Mixed + Unshared Context
Figure 6: Mean meaning uncertainty, measured as H(M |S), by condition over blocks 1-3.
Higher entropy values indicate greater out-of-context ambiguity, i.e., lower signal autonomy.
Whereas participants in Mixed conditions tend to decrease their H(M |S) over time, those
in Shape-Different conditions tend to either have a high H(M |S) throughout (as in Shape-
Different + Shared Context) or gradually increase their H(M |S) (as in Shape-Different +
Unshared Context). The higher H(M |S) in Shape-Different + Shared Context suggests par-
ticipants in this condition are reusing the same signals to express multiple meanings. The low
H(M |S) for Mixed + Unshared Context indicates that participants in this condition use each
signal to express fewer meanings, i.e., are producing signals which are unambiguous even out
of context.
3.4. Conditional Entropy: Meaning Uncertainty in Context
For the conditional entropy of meanings given signals in context, H(M |S,C),
the statistical analysis reveals unexpected differences between conditions: that
is, conditions where the speaker does have access to the hearer’s context (Shared)
and the context-type consistently discriminates on the basis of shape (Shape-
Different) are, on average, more likely to produce languages with lower levels
of uncertainty about the intended meaning in context (Access to Context: β =
−0.051, SE = 0.019, p = .011; Context-Type: β = −0.058, SE = 0.019,
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p = .003). When contextual predictability is high, this allows systems to get
close to an optimal configuration for communication, with many of systems in
Shape-Different + Shared Context reaching zero entropy (i.e., no uncertainty
about the intended meaning in context). For the other three conditions, where
contextual predictability is lower, systems tend to be suboptimal (see figure 7).
But it is important to note that the low entropy values in all four conditions
tells us, even at block 1, all of the communication systems are relatively good












Shape−Different + Shared Context
Shape−Different + Unshared Context
Mixed + Shared Context
Mixed + Unshared Context
Figure 7: Degree of meaning uncertainty, measured as H(M |S,C), against Condition over
blocks. Higher entropy values indicate a higher degree of ambiguity in context. The error
bars represent bootstrapped 95% CIs. All conditions tend to decrease their H(M |S,C) over
successive blocks. This suggests the systems used by participants are moving toward an
optimal configuration for identifying the intended meaning in context.
There was also a significant effect of Block (β = −0.021, SE = 0.003,
p < .001), indicating that average entropy across all 4 conditions decreased
over repeated communication; however, this was moderated by significant two-
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and three-way interactions between Block, Context-Type and Access to Con-
text. The significant interaction between Block and Context-Type (β = 0.027,
SE = 0.007, p < .001), of the same magnitude as the simple effect of Block,
suggests that the Shape-Different conditions (which start with low ambiguity)
show relatively little decrease in ambiguity over blocks - the marginal three-way
interaction between Context-Type, Access to Context and Block (β = −0.026,
SE = 0.014, p = .059) suggests that ambiguity in the Shape-Different + Shared
Context condition might be trending downwards rather than being flat, but not
convincingly so. In contrast to the Shape-Different conditions, the Mixed condi-
tions show a substantial decrease in ambiguity over blocks; however, the signifi-
cant interaction between Block and Access to Context (β = 0.017, SE = 0.007,
p = .012) indicates that effect is less pronounced in the Shared Context con-
dition. Overall, this pattern of interactions suggests that those conditions in
which ambiguity is low right from block 1 (most obviously the Shape-Different
conditions) show relatively little subsequent decrease in ambiguity (since the
systems are unambiguous from very early on); the conditions where ambiguity
is higher at block 1 (both Mixed conditions) show larger decreases, most obvi-
ously in the Mixed + Unshared Context condition where ambiguity is highest
at block 1 but drops very rapidly over the course of interaction to reach levels
similar to those seen in the other conditions by block 3. The remaining interac-
tion for Access to Context x Context-Type (β = 0.041, SE = 0.038, p = .283)
is non-significant.
4. Discussion
We put forward the general hypothesis that contextual predictability shapes
the degree of signal autonomy. To test this claim we manipulated both the
speaker’s ability to access the context in which their utterances were inter-
preted and the variability of context-types across trials. When the context is
predictable, speakers organise languages to be less autonomous (more context-
dependent), exploiting contextual information to reduce effort in production
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while at the same time keeping uncertainty in comprehension low. In conditions
with lower contextual predictability, speakers use more autonomous signals, and
rely less on contextual information to discriminate between possible meanings.
In line with previous work, these results demonstrate that languages adapt to
their contextual niche (Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2012; Silvey, Kirby & Smith,
2015; Winters, Kirby & Smith, 2015).
The key finding is that number of unique signals used and H(M |S) are
predicted by both Context-Type and Access to Context. Furthermore, even
though H(M |S) varies substantially between conditions, all of the communica-
tion systems which develop during interaction are communicatively functional
(i.e., capable of discriminating between meanings in context), as indexed by
our measures of communicative accuracy and H(M |S,C). If the Context-Type
is stable for discrimination across trials (Shape-Different), and speakers have
access to this contextual information (Shared Context), then participants will
produce higher H(M |S) than participants in conditions where one or both of
these variables is less predictable. Having highly predictable contextual infor-
mation allows speakers to produce signals which map onto multiple meanings:
both the signal and the context relay to the hearer what is and is not infor-
mative for discriminating between meanings. As the contextual predictability
decreases, the speaker is unable to estimate, and therefore exploit, this con-
textual information, resulting in an increased pressure to create autonomous
signals (i.e., signals which are identifiable out of context).
Feedback also plays an increasingly important role as contextual predictabil-
ity decreases. For the Shape-Different + Shared Context condition, which was
maximally predictable in terms of context-type and access to context, commu-
nicative success remained constant and high across blocks. This is because the
majority of systems were context-dependent, allowing participants to use a small
number of signals to quickly achieve a high success score: speakers used their
knowledge of the context to leave out the colour-dimension, as this was irrelevant
to communicative success, and only conveyed the shape-dimension in the lin-
guistic system (see Figure 8 for example language). By contrast, in the Mixed
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+ Unshared Context condition, which was maximally unpredictable in terms
of context-type and access to context, the communicative success score gradu-
ally increased across blocks: here, autonomous systems emerged, with speakers

































Figure 8: An example language from the final block of the Shape Different + Shared Context
condition. The speaker labelled each meaning twice during interaction, both labels are shown
here. In this case, the participants maintained the original four labels they were trained on,


































Figure 9: An example language from the final block of the Mixed + Unshared Context con-
dition. Under each meaning are two signals arranged according to trial order (i.e., the first
signal was produced prior to the second signal for conveying a particular meaning). Although
there is some variability, the system can be described as compositional, where the meaning
of an expression is a function of the meaning of its parts and the way in which these parts
are combined (Partee, 1984: 281), with a single signal containing two component parts: the
initial component identifies shape and the final component identifies colour. For example, if
the initial component is mege, then it refers to a blob, and if the final syllable is ha it refers to
blue. The combination of these component parts results in the signal megeha, meaning blue
blob.
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For participants in Shape-Different + Unshared Context, a gradual increase
in communicative success is associated with a drop in the total number of unique
signals, and an increase in H(M |S): on average, speakers end up using fewer
signals to convey more meanings, resulting in increasingly context-dependent
systems (this is illustrated in Figure 10 where part of a signalling system be-
comes more context-dependent over successive blocks). The opposite is true
for participants in Mixed + Shared Context: the average H(M |S) decreases as
the communicative success increases, with the set of signal-meaning mappings
transitioning from a one-to-many to a one-to-one mapping (see Figure 11 for an
example where part of a system becomes less context-dependent over successive
blocks). The divergence between these two conditions suggests context-type
exerts a stronger effect than access to context on the types of systems which
emerge. Communicatively successful systems in Shape-Different + Unshared
Context evolve to become increasingly context-dependent (and move closer to
the systems found in Shape-Different + Shared Context) whereas the systems
in Mixed + Shared Context become more autonomous (and move closer to the




























Figure 10: A subset of a gradually emerging context-dependent system in the Shape-Different
+ Unshared Context condition. At the first block, the system is relatively autonomous, in
that each blob has a unique signal that identifies whether it is a blue, grey, red, or yellow
one. However, by block 3 the signal kinumus refers to the grey, red, and yellow blobs (the
exception being the blue blob which retains a unique identifying signal, kim). For the full





























Figure 11: A subset of a language in the Mixed + Shared Context condition showing the emer-
gence of an autonomous system. The first row in each block contains signals used in shape-
different contexts and the second row contains signals used in colour-different contexts. At
block 1, the system is context-dependent, with an underspecified signal, memuno, being used
in shape-different contexts to refer to blob, and compositional signals, memunopewa, memu-
nonoka, memunomemuno, and memunokihimo, being employed for colour-different contexts.
By block 3 the underspecified mappings are no longer used and the system is no longer context-
dependent (compositional mappings are used in both shape-different and colour-different con-
texts). The only exception is for the red blob, which uses memuno in the shape-different
context and a reduplicated form, memunomemuno, in the colour-different context. For the
full language see supplementary materials.
The final systems (those at the last block of communication) in Shape-
Different + Unshared Context and Mixed + Shared Context conditions tended
be more heterogeneous than those in conditions at the extremes of contextual
predictability (Shape-Different + Shared Context, Mixed + Unshared Context).
This suggests that differences in strategy choice at the individual level can re-
sult in markedly different systems of communication. For instance, if speakers
prioritised reducing their effort, then the resulting systems have lower levels
of autonomy, with the set of signals being conditioned on context-type. Con-
versely, if speakers aimed to reduce inference for the hearer, then systems at the
final block were more autonomous. This variation in individuals lends weight to
the idea of populations being composed of heterogeneous pragmatic reasoners;
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speakers do not necessarily start out with the same initial assumptions, even if
they eventually converge on the same set of behaviours (Franke & Degen, 2015).
Our approach shows how to unmask these differences by manipulating whether
contextual predictability is reinforcing (i.e., both manipulations either decrease
or increase predictability) or conflicting (i.e., when one manipulation increases
predictability and the other decreases predictability). When contextual pre-
dictability is reinforcing, as is the case in Shape-Different + Shared Context
and Mixed + Unshared Context, participants are more likely to converge on
similar systems. In cases where the contextual predictability is conflicting, as
in Shape-Different + Unshared Context and Mixed + Shared Context, partici-
pants with differing initial assumptions can produce radically different systems
of communication.
This variation in the emergence of context-dependent and autonomous sys-
tems is nicely demonstrated in the Mixed + Shared Context condition. Here,
the systems could broadly be described as compositional, where the meaning
of an expression is a function of the meaning of its parts and the way in which
these parts are combined (Partee, 1984: 281). However, there are clear differ-
ences in autonomy for these systems: if you placed compositional systems on a
cline of more to less autonomous, those found in the Mixed + Shared Context
can generally be described as less autonomous than those found in the Mixed


































Figure 12: An example language from the final block of the Mixed Shared condition. Un-
der each meaning are two signals: the first corresponds to the signal used in Shape-Different
context-types and the second is the signal used in Colour-Different context-types. Notice
that in the Shape-Different context-types an underspecified signal is used, whereas in Colour-
Different context-types a compositional signal is used (where information about both colour
and shape dimensions is encoded through the use of word order). For example, using the
underspecified signal, mopola, in shape-different contexts refers to rectangle, whereas in
colour-different contexts each meaning has a unique compositional signal (mopola mopola,
mopola nunuki, mopola lono, mopola kewu). Interestingly, the compositional system is order-
dependent, with a word initial mopola referrring to rectangle, whereas a word final mopola
refers to the colour blue.
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Some systems in the Mixed + Shared Context condition are ones which
produce marked and unmarked forms depending on the context (see Figure 12).
For instance, an unmarked signal, kewu, is used to convey shape information
(blob) in shape-different contexts, whereas in colour-different contexts marked
forms are used (e.g., kewu mopola for the referent blob blue). This use of
marked and unmarked forms speaks to Horn’s (1993: 40-41) Pragmatic Division
of Labour:
[...] given two co-extensive expressions, the more specialized form –
briefer and/or more lexicalized – will tend to become R-associated
[reduce speaker effort] with a particular unmarked, stereotypical
meaning, use, or situation, while the use of the periphrastic or less
lexicalized expression, typically (but not always) linguistically more
complex or prolix, will tend to be Q-restricted [minimise hearer un-
certainty] to those situations outside the stereotype, for which un-
marked expression could not have been used appropriately.
Why would unmarked forms be associated with Shape-Different contexts
and marked forms Colour-Different contexts? One possible explanation is a
shape-bias (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003): speakers reason that hearers are go-
ing to more easily guess the intended meaning in Shape-Different contexts than
Colour-Different contexts. This could also be a low-level bias, in that speak-
ers automatically associate their training forms with shape, and ignore colour.
However, given the high level of lexical ambiguity in the use of these forms (e.g.,
kewu refers to the shape blob and the colour yellow depending on the context),


































Figure 13: An example language from the final block of the Mixed Shared Context condition.
Under each meaning are two signals: the first corresponds to the signal used in Shape-Different
context-types and the second is the signal used in Colour-Different context-types. A single
signal is composed of two parts: the initial signal refers to shape (e.g., wakilo refers to rectan-
gle) and the second signal refers to colour (e.g., wakilo refers to yellow), regardless of context
type.
In Mixed + Shared Context we also saw compositional systems where sig-
nals were not context-dependent (see Figure 13). While this system exhibits
some ambiguity at the lexical level (gokohu can be used to convey shape or
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colour), complete utterances are interpretable out of context and therefore au-
tonomous, as each compositionally-formed signal unambiguously conveys the
intended meaning. This process of shifting autonomy to different levels of organ-
isation relates to grammaticalization, with lexical forms becoming increasingly
dependent on the constraints of the linguistic system (Haspelmath, 2004).
Context-dependent compositionality also explains why participants in Mixed
+ Shared Context sometimes produce more signals than necessary for conveying
all 16 referents: there are a set of autonomous signals which convey the intended
meaning in colour-different contexts and a set of underspecified signals which
convey the intended meaning in shape-different contexts. However, this fails to
explain the even higher levels of variability in Mixed Unshared Context, where
it is impossible for speakers to condition their signals on contextual informa-
tion. A contributing factor to this unexpected signal variation is that speakers
adjust their signals based on negative feedback (i.e., when the hearer clicks on
the incorrect meaning). That is, if a speaker receives negative feedback for a
particular signal-meaning mapping, then they are more likely to modify this sig-
nal for future communicative interactions (see Figure 14). This suggests (some)
speakers are principally focused on the immediate communicative requirements;
using feedback to fine-tune their signals as the interaction progresses. An addi-
tional advantage of this explanation is that it accounts for high signal variability
at later stages of the experiment (where one might have expected more regu-
lar one-to-one mappings between signals and meanings): speakers and hearers
get trapped in a coordination problem, where a speaker changes a signal (for
a particular meaning) based on an incorrect guess by a hearer, and the hearer
guesses incorrectly when presented with a different a signal (as they make the
(approximate) inference that a modified signal must refer to a different mean-
ing).
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Figure 14: An example of signal variation for a single target meaning (grey oval) across all
three blocks in Mixed + Unshared (rows are ordered on the basis of trial: the top row being the
first trial where grey oval was the target and the bottom row being the final trial where grey
oval was the target). In the left column is the signal that a speaker produced for the target
meaning. The centre column contains the intended meaning of the speaker (which in this case
was always the grey oval) and the right column contains what meaning the hearer selected.
A correct trial is one where the speaker’s intended meaning and the hearer’s interpretation
are the same meaning. For most of the trials, the hearer selected the incorrect meaning,
and the speaker modified the signal in the subsequent trial. Despite this variation pockets of
systematic regularity do emerge (e.g., the use of kewa to refer to oval).
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In our experiment, we did not have any a priori assumptions about the
relationship between contextual predictability and the emergence of composi-
tionality. This is because lexical and compositional systems are both viable
strategies for creating autonomous signals in that a meaning can be inferred
out of context. However, as the results demonstrate, compositional systems
are overwhelmingly favoured. Why did compositional systems emerge and not
lexical ones? One explanation for this preference is that compositional sys-
tems reduce hearer uncertainty to a greater extent than lexical systems. From
the starting point of our experiment, where the initial training language was
ambiguous with respect to colour and shape, the task is for the speaker to suc-
cessfully convey a set of 16 meanings to the hearer (12 of which are meanings
neither the speaker nor the hearer have been previously exposed to). To create
a lexical system speakers need to devise 12 signals that not only refer to every
new meaning, but are also distinct from the signals they have already used.
Hearers then need to infer what each new signal maps onto with relatively few
interpretative clues. Assuming hearers are faced with a new meaning in a par-
ticular trial, and they only know the signals for the four original meanings, then
any given context (array) will contain only one referent they can rule out, with












Figure 15: Top: A hypothetical trial where a lexical signal, qweg, is invented to convey the
intended meaning (which, in this case, is a red rectangle). The box with the dotted line around
it contains the signal-meaning pairs both the speaker and hearer share in common. A hearer
should, through inference and a bias for mutual exclusivity (Markman & Wachtel, 1988), be
able to rule out the red star as the intended meaning (as it already has a conventional signal).
But, without any other information, a hearer still has to guess what the signal refers to out of
three possible candidates. Bottom: A hypothetical trial where a compositional signal, lopola,
is invented to convey the intended meaning. Using knowledge that parts of the signal, pola
and lo, belong to the signals for blue rectangle and red star, a hearer should be able to infer
that the red rectangle is the intended meaning.
A compositional system minimises inferential effort when contrasted with
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a lexical one (Selten & Warglien, 2007). Here, speakers can reuse and modify
the signals they were trained on in predictable ways, providing more clues for
the hearer to identify the intended meaning. For instance, if the signal mopola
refers to a blue rectangle and the signal lono refers to a red star, then creatively
segmenting and reusing components to create a new signal (e.g., lopola) helps
reduce the burden of hearer inference by narrowing down the space of possible
referents in a given context. Imagine the signal lopola is used in a Shape-
Different context: the rational inference is that lopola could only refer to the
red rectangle – hearers have knowledge that pola is a part of the signal for a blue
rectangle and lo is a part of the signal for a red star. Given that the context does
not have a blue star, and the red star is already designated with signal lono,
then it is reasonable to infer that the signal lopola refers to the red rectangle.
The current experiment was far from exhaustive and can be extended in
several ways. One possible extension is to manipulate the number of objects
in the referential context (see Rubio-Fernandez, 2016). In terms of identifying
the intended meaning, a larger referential context has higher uncertainty than
a smaller context, with a hearer needing to sift through more distractors. The
reverse is true for the speaker: a larger referential context is more informative
than a smaller context. For the largest possible context, where the number of
objects is equal to the total number of referents, speakers have access to more
information about the necessary distinctions which are globally required by the
linguistic system. By contrast, having to discriminate between a single target
and distractor only reveals what is locally relevant for discrimination, and is
therefore less informative for the speaker in discovering the optimal system for
conveying the intended meaning. This tension between what is informative for
the speaker versus what is predictable for the hearer is a promising avenue for
future research.
The experimental pragmatics literature also offers a few other avenues for
stress-testing the relationship between signal autonomy and contextual pre-
dictability. For instance, there are various gradations to the possible context-
types which remain unexplored, with this set up being restricted to contexts
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that unambiguously highlight an informative dimension and background an un-
informative dimension. As an example, Frank & Goodman (2012) made a series
of manipulations to the context-type, systematically varying whether one, two,
or all three of the distractors in a referential context share a feature with the
target. Another extension is found in experiments looking at common ground
(for reviews, see: Brennan, Galati & Kuhlen, 2010; Konopka & Brown-Schmidt,
2014). In contrast to the current experiment, where the focus is on whether
or not the speaker shares access to the hearer’s context, common ground ex-
periments have also investigated the opposite situation: whether or not the
hearer shares access to the speaker’s context (e.g., Horton & Keysar, 1996).
Incorporating these more fine-grain manipulations to contextual predictability
is important if we are to link up predictions about the pragmatic reasoning of
participants with differences in signal autonomy.
Lastly, as the communication game had fixed participant roles (they were ei-
ther a speaker or a hearer), future manipulations could investigate how systems
in this experiment vary according to asymmetric and symmetric participant
roles (see Moreno et al., 2015 for such a comparison in signalling games). This
asymmetric division was necessary in our experiment as we were explicitly in-
terested in the effect of shared information (access to context). Introducing
symmetrical participant roles provides the hearer with more knowledge about
what distinctions are necessary, and this should decrease the impact of whether
the context is shared or unshared. However, having both participants involved
in sending and receiving might influence the rate at which interlocutors align
on a shared system of communication (e.g., symmetric conditions might take
longer to establish a shared system than asymmetric conditions as there are now
two participants involved in producing utterances).
There are also important implications for the typological distribution of
languages. In this experiment, the final languages varied considerably for con-
ditions where our manipulations to contextual predictability were conflicting
(e.g., Shape-Different + Unshared Context and Mixed + Shared Context). If
real-world languages are subject to similarly weak constraints, then one general
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prediction is that cross-linguistic variation should not straightforwardly reflect
a direct relationship between contextual predictability and signal autonomy. In-
stead, the outcomes will to some extent be historically contingent, albeit with
the space of possible languages being bounded by cognitive, contextual, and
communicative factors.
5. Conclusion
A good system of communication entails a balance between the demands of
the speaker (to reduce their energetic expense) and the demands of the hearer
(the speaker needs to provide signals which allow the hearer to identify their
intended meaning). We set out to investigate how these two pressures are in-
fluenced by the context in which languages were used. By manipulating both
Access to Context and Context-Type, we showed that contextual predictability
shapes the degree of signal autonomy. When the context is predictable, speak-
ers use this reliable information to reduce their effort in formulating signals,
whilst also maintaining the minimal requirement of being informative about the
intended meaning. This results in low autonomy: the signals in these systems
are dependent on contextual information for disambiguation. However, when
the context decreases in predictability, speakers increasingly rely on the signals
themselves to reduce uncertainty about the intended meaning, resulting in a
greater level of autonomy.
6. References
Arts, A., Maes, A., Noordman, L., & Jansen, C. (2011). Overspecification
facilitates object identification. Journal of Pragmatics, 43: 361-374.
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects
structure in mixed-effects models: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and
Language, 68(3): 255-278.
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-
49
Effects Models Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1): 1-48. doi:
10.18637/jss.v067.i01.
Bell, A. (1984). Language style as audience design. Language in Society, 13:
145-204. doi: 10.1017/S004740450001037X.
Beuls, K., & Steels, L. (2013). Agent-based models of strategies for the emer-
gence and evolution of grammatical agreement. PLoS ONE, 8(3): e58960.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0058960.
Blokpoel, M., et al. (2012). Recipient design in human communication: simple
heuristics or perspective taking? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, Special
Issue: Towards a neuroscience of social interaction.
Brennan, S. E., Galati, A., & Kuhlen, A. K. (2010). Two Minds, One Dialog:
Coordinating Speaking and Understanding. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The Psy-
chology of Learning and Motivation, 53: 301-344. Burlington: Elsevier.
Brown, P. M., & Dell, G. S. (1987). Adapting production to comprehension:
The explicit mention of instruments. Cognitive Psychology, 19: 441-472.
Channell, J. (1994). Vague Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, H. H. (1996). Using Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, H. H., & Carlson, T. B. (1992). Context for Comprehension. In H. H.
Clark, Arenas of Language Use, 60-77. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Clark, H. H., & Murphy, G. L. (1982). Audience design in meaning and refer-
ence. Advances in Psychology. 9: 287299.
Croft, W. (2000). Explaining Language Change: An evolutionary approach.
Harlow: Longman.
50
Cutting, J., (2007). Vague Language Explored. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmil-
lan.
Dale, R., & Reiter, E. (1995). Computational interpretations of the Gricean
maxims in the generation of referring expressions. Cognitive Science, 19:
233-263.
Diesendruck, G., & Boom, P. (2003). How specific is the Shape Bias? Child
Development, 74(1): 168-178.
Duranti, A. & Goodwin, A. (1992). Rethinking Context: Language as an inter-
active phenomenon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Engelkamp, J., Zimmer, H. D. & Mohr, G. (1990). Differential memory effects
of concrete nouns and action verbs. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 198: 189-
216.
Evans, V. & Green, M. (2006). Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Fauconnier, G. (1985). Mental Spaces. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fillmore, C. (1985). Frames and the Semantics of Understanding. Quaderni Di
Semantica, 6(2): 222-254.
Frank, M. C., & Goodman, N. D. (2012). Predicting pragmatic reasoning in
language games. Science, 336: 998.
Franke, M., & Degen, J. (2016). Reasoning in reference games: individual- vs.
population-level probabilistic modeling. PLoS ONE, 11(5): 1-25.
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Establishing common ground in communication requires speakers and hearers
negotiate a conventional system of form-meaning mappings. These mappings
emerge incrementally, resulting from interactions between context (discrimination
pressure), cognition (generalisation pressure), and communication (coordination
pressure). Here, we introduced strong discrimination and generalisation pressures,
and investigated how solutions to the coordination pressure are influenced by
manipulations to Access to Context and Context-Type. Together, these two
manipulations correspond to contextual predictability, with the experiment in
this chapter specifically testing the hypothesis that contextual predictability is
causally related the degree of signal autonomy.
When the context is predictable, speakers use this reliable information to
reduce their effort in formulating signals, whilst also maintaining the minimal re-
quirement of being informative about the intended meaning. This results in low
autonomy: the signals in these systems are dependent on contextual information
for disambiguation. However, when the context decreases in predictability, speak-
ers become increasingly reliant on the signals themselves to reduce uncertainty
about the intended meaning, resulting in a greater level of autonomy. Lastly,
we showed how conditions where our manipulations to contextual predictabil-
ity are conflicting (Shape-Different + Unshared Context and Mixed + Shared
Context) produce more heterogeneous outcomes than conditions where contex-
tual predictability is reinforcing (Shape-Different + Shared Context and Mixed
+ Unshared Context).
Taken together, these results show that context, cognition, and communica-
tion all interact to shape the organisation and structure of language.
170
Chapter 5
Linguistic diversity and traffic
accidents
5.1 Introduction
Experiments are not the only way one might go about investigating the relation-
ship between context and language structure. The Kantian philosopher, Wil-
helm Windelbrand (1894/1998), described two distinct methodological traditions
(Hurlburt & Knapp, 2006). The first of these, termed idiographic, refers to a
narrow focus on specific phenomena, often employing case studies, unstructured
observation, and other qualitative methods as a means of discovery. The notion
of context has been a guiding principle for using qualitative methods to study
language: as no two contexts are the same, language use is subject to consid-
erable variation, with research efforts being focused on providing rich, detailed
descriptions (e.g., see ethnography of communication: Hymes, 1987).
By contrast, nomothetic approaches make use of large-scale surveys, experi-
ments, and statistical analyses in an effort to seek general, law-like explanations.
In particular, the last decade or so has seen a rise in the number of studies taking
advantage of large-scale, cross-cultural datasets, and newly available statistical
techniques, to investigate the relationship between language structure and non-
linguistic variables (Dediu & Ladd, 2007; Hay & Bauer, 2007; Lupyan & Dale,
2010; Atkinson, 2011; Chen, 2013; Roberts, Winters & Chen, 2015; Everett, Blasi
& Roberts, 2015; Lewis & Frank, 2016).
Lupyan & Dale (2010) provide an illustrative example for how one might
go about investigating the relationship between language structure and context.
Here, the authors use three demographic variables – population size, geographic
spread, and degree of language contact – as a proxy for social context. The
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idea being that languages with small populations, occupying a geographically
restricted area and having relatively few linguistic neighbours, closely corresponds
to situations which call for esoteric, or intra-group, communication: languages
predominately used in societies comprising of close intimates, where the social
structure results in individuals sharing a high degree of contextual and cultural
knowledge. This is in contrast to exoteric, or inter-group, communication where
the social structure leads to a greater proportion of non-native adult learners and
individuals who share less common cultural and contextual knowledge with one
another. Differences between esoteric and exoteric forms of communication are
therefore predicted to shape the structure of language as it is learned and used
(also see: Trudgill, 2004; Wray & Grace, 2007; Trudgill, 2011; Hurford, 2011;
Nettle, 2012).
Operationalising social context in this way allowed Lupyan & Dale (2010) to
indirectly test whether languages used for esoteric communication have greater
levels of morphological complexity1 than languages used for exoteric communica-
tion. Indeed, this is what they found in a sample of over 2000 languages, with
population size being the strongest demographic predictor of morphological com-
plexity: small populations are more likely than large populations to use languages
which rely on morphological strategies to encode semantic distinctions. Still, even
though population size is a significant predictor of morphological complexity, all
this establishes is that a pattern exists between two variables. Lupyan & Dale
have a preferred explanation for why morphological complexity persists in eso-
teric communities and undergoes simplification in exoteric communities2. But
statistical analyses are not a causal explanation of such relationships – and they
do not necessarily rule out competing explanations for the fit between language
structure and social context (see: Dale & Lupyan, 2012; Nettle, 2012; Atkinson,
Kirby & Smith, 2016).
This chapter highlights several problems with using a statistical approach.
First, spurious correlations are a common property of cross-cultural datasets –
historical descent, geographic diffusion, and high signal-to-noise ratios all play a
role in shaping the relationship between variables. Controlling for these factors is
contingent not just on the sophistication of the statistical methods, but also the
1Morphological complexity is defined as the use of morphological strategies over lexical ones
to encode semantic distinctions like evidentiality, future tense, and epistemic possibility (Lupyan
& Dale, 2010).
2Lupyan & Dale (2010) argue that morphological paradigms are difficult for adults to learn;
therefore, languages exoteric communities are more likely to lose complex morphological sys-
tems. They also provide a tentative explanation for why complex morphology is maintained
in esoteric communities: morphological overspecification facilitates child learning by providing
multiple cues during language acquisition.
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quality of the data being used to perform the correlation. Second, in line with
Nettle (2007), I argue statistical studies are better viewed as hypothesis-generating
as opposed to hypothesis-testing. This is especially relevant when there are no
a-priori assumptions about the directionality of the effect. Lastly, the chapter
concludes by stating how these approaches are not suitable for investigating the
causal relationship between language structure and context, and instead argues
for the use of laboratory experiments.
5.2 Author contributions
The following section contains a paper which was co-authored with Sean Roberts
and published in PLoS One. Each author jointly contributed to the writing of
the paper and the analyses contained within.
5.3 Roberts & Winters (2013): Linguistic diver-
sity and traffic accidents
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variables and cultural traits from large, cross-cultural datasets. The insights from these studies are important for
understanding how cultural traits evolve. While these studies are fascinating and are good at generating testable
hypotheses, they may underestimate the probability of finding spurious correlations between cultural traits. Here we show
that this kind of approach can find links between such unlikely cultural traits as traffic accidents, levels of extra-martial sex,
political collectivism and linguistic diversity. This suggests that spurious correlations, due to historical descent, geographic
diffusion or increased noise-to-signal ratios in large datasets, are much more likely than some studies admit. We suggest
some criteria for the evaluation of nomothetic studies and some practical solutions to the problems. Since some of these
studies are receiving media attention without a widespread understanding of the complexities of the issue, there is a risk
that poorly controlled studies could affect policy. We hope to contribute towards a general skepticism for correlational
studies by demonstrating the ease of finding apparently rigorous correlations between cultural traits. Despite this, we see
well-controlled nomothetic studies as useful tools for the development of theories.
Citation: Roberts S, Winters J (2013) Linguistic Diversity and Traffic Accidents: Lessons from Statistical Studies of Cultural Traits. PLoS ONE 8(8): e70902.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902
Editor: Frank Emmert-Streib, Queen’s University Belfast, United Kingdom
Received January 23, 2013; Accepted June 24, 2013; Published August 14, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Roberts, Winters. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: Seán Roberts was partly supported by an ESRC grant ES/G010277/1. James Winters is supported by an AHRC grant AH/K503010/1. The funders had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: sean.roberts@mpi.nl
Introduction
Recent studies have been uncovering some surprising links
between cultural traits. For example, between chocolate consump-
tion and the number of Nobel laureates a country produces [9],
between the number of phonemes in a language and distance from
East Africa [3], between a language’s tense system and the
propensity to save money [2], between the quality of the sounds of
a language with the amount of extra-marital sex [6] and genetic
influences on political outlooks [4,5].
Nomothetic studies (statistical analyses of large-scale, cross-
cultural data) are possible because of recently available, large-scale
databases and new statistical techniques which give social scientists
more statistical power to explore the relationships between cultural
phenomena. They are quick and easy to perform. However, there
are several potential problems with this type of study. While it is
common knowledge that correlation does not imply causation,
there are few studies that utilise methods to address the problems
caused by cultures being related by descent (Galton’s problem,
[10], see [11]) and by geographic diffusion [12]. Furthermore, the
data used in these studies is inherently coarse, which can create
apparent correlations. There is also the problem of inverse sample-
size: with larger amounts of data, a spurious correlation becomes
more likely.
These problems combine to increase the likelihood of finding
correlations between cultural traits. In this paper we demonstrate
that it is possible to link a wide variety of cultural traits in a chain
of correlations, all of which may seem rigorous, but some of which
are not plausibly causal. In fact it may be possible to find
apparently rigorous evidence for any hypothesis. It is also tempting
to fit post-hoc hypotheses to correlations that fall out of
nomothetic studies. However, without a proper awareness of the
problems, this kind of study could be damaging to the direction of
research and public policy.
The inter-connectedness of cultural traits that we demonstrate
raises problems for the usefulness of statistical analyses as
independent sources of knowledge. However, we suggest that
nomothetic studies should be seen as hypothesis-generating tools
that can work with and direct other methods such as idiographic
studies, computational modelling, experiments and theoretical
work [13,14]. We also suggest some methods that might improve
statistical inference and insight in nomothetic studies, including
phylogenetic techniques and inferred causal graphs [15]. To our
knowledge, this is the first application of high-dimensional causal
graph inference to cultural and linguistic data.
The paper is ogranised in the following way. First, we
summarise some nomothetic case-studies. We outline some
problems facing nomothetic studies and suggests some criteria
for evaluating them. Our results section demonstrates a chain of
statistically significant links between cultural traits, followed by a
short discussion. Finally, we suggests some solutions to the
problems discussed.
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Nomothetic Studies
One example of a nomothetic study used the World Atlas of
Language Structures (WALS) [16] database to demonstrate that a
community’s size is related to the morphological complexity of its
language [1]. This is a well controlled statistical test which is robust
across language families. The suggested mechanism behind this
link, motivated by prior theory (e.g. [17–19]), is the difference
between adult and child language learning. Because larger
communities are more likely to have more adult second language
learners, and adults are worse at learning morphology than
children [20], this puts pressure on languages of large communities
to become less morphologically complex over time.
Another study discovered a link between areas with a
prevalence of a recently mutated geneotype and populations with
tonal languages (languages where lexical contrasts can be made by
altering pitch patterns) [7]. This generated the hypothesis that
linguistic structure could be affected by small genetic biases over
time. Because the baseline level of chance correlation is difficult to
estimate, the statistical significance was computed by comparing
the strength of the link to the strength of the link between
thousands of other linguistic and genetic variables. By demon-
strating that the hypothesised link was stronger than competing
hypotheses, a convincing claim was made for the further
experimental investigation of this hypothesis. In order to develop
the basis of the general theory, a follow-up experimental study
found support for part of the hypothesis in that there are individual
differences in the perception of pitch [21], and a computer
simulation demonstrated that such differences could influence
linguistic structure in the long-term [22].
A number of studies have demonstrated links between a
community’s size and the number of contrasting sounds
(phonemes) in its language. Hay & Bauer demonstrate a positive
correlation between population size and phoneme inventory size
[8] (replicated in [3,23]). However, recent analyses using larger
samples and accounting for the relatedness of languages find no
such correlation [24,25]. While the original results might be
debatable, and despite the proposed link between phoneme
inventories and social structure being well-established (e.g. [26]),
the debate surrounding the original nomothetic study did offer the
opportunity for the development and application of a wide variety
of statistical techniques. This includes the use mixed effects models
that can control for nested data by placing predictors at differing
levels [24,27].
Ecological aspects have also been shown to predict linguistic
variables. Correlations are reported in [28] between the average
sonority of a language – the average amplitude of its phonemes –
and the local climate and ecology. The proposed hypothesis
includes people in warmer climates spending more time outdoors,
and sonorous sounds being more effective at communicating at a
distance. This finding was extended to account for cultural
features such as the amount of baby-holding, levels of literacy and
attitudes towards sexual promiscuity [6]. The link with sexual
attitudes is hypothesised as being due to sexual inhibition
discouraging speaking with a wide open mouth. Below, we show
that population size also correlates with these variables.
Nomothetic studies can also straddle relatively disparate fields.
For example, two studies find a correlation between the
distribution of political attitudes (individualist versus collectivist)
and the prevalence of a gene involved in the central neurotrans-
mitter system 5-HTTLPR [4,5]. The social sensitivity hypothesis
suggests that, because alleles of this gene affect the likelihood of a
depressive episode under stress [29], communities with a higher
prevalence of this gene will require more social support.
Therefore, these communities will develop to be more collectivist
rather than individualist. However, a missing element of this
hypothesis is how a difference in the distribution of these alleles
emerged in the first place. By exploring the inter-connectedness of
many different variables, we develop a hypothesis which suggests
that migration and environmental conditions could bring about
this distribution (see the section ‘Causal graphs’).
Figure 1. The scientific processes of different nomothetic
studies. Observations are drawn from the world, either as idiographic
studies or experiments. These observations can be compiled into large-
scale cross-cultural databases. Scientific elements include theory,
hypotheses and testing. Trajectories indicate the process of different
studies. Processes start at a dot and continue in the direction indicated
by the arrows. The ideal trajectory is the following: A theory generates a
hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests data to collect, which is then
tested. The results of the test feed back into the theory. Lupyan & Dale
(2010) follow this trajectory, although they take their data from a large-
scale cross-cultural database. Lupyan & Dale’s theory was generated by
previous testing of (small-scale) observations by Trudgill and others.
The trajectory of Dediu & Ladd’s study differs in two ways. First, the
trajectory starts with large-scale cross-cultural data rather than small-
scale observations. Secondly, the testing generates the hypothesis,
which suggests a theory. However, Ladd et al. (2013) use this theory to
motivate a hypothesis which is tested on experimental data. Since
developing theories from small-scale observations takes time and effort,
Dediu & Ladd’s study has effectively jump-started the conventional
scientific process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g001
Figure 2. Linguistic diversity and traffic accidents. Countries’
linguistic diversity (Greenberg diversity index) as a function of the
annual traffic fatalities per 1000 people, with linear regression line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g002
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Media attention
Nomothetic studies often demonstrate surprising links between
cultural phenomena. For this reason, they often receive media
attention. For example, based on research that flavenoids found in
chocolate benefit cognitive function [30], a study demonstrated
that countries which have a higher per-capita consumption of
chocolate produce more Nobel laureates [9]. The study used a
simple linear correlation, without controlling for any other factors,
yet received a large amount of media attention [31–33]. Even
though the study may have intended the correlation to be
interpreted as an example of spuriousness, it failed to control for
other factors and possible confounds. This is an example of a
misapplication of statistical techniques. While this particular study
may seem harmless, below we use the same data to demonstrate
correlations which appear to have more serious implications for
public attitudes and policy.
Another study that has received media attention is the finding
that speaking a language that has an overt morphological future
tense predicts economic behaviour such as the propensity to save
money [2]. This study was discussed before publication in public
forums online [34–36] and in the media [37–41]. The media
typically exaggerate the implications of this type of finding and try
to link it to current events rather than emphasise the long-term
change implied in most studies. For instance, one popular science
review of study [2] suggested ‘‘Want to end the various global debt
crises? Try abandoning English, Greek, and Italian in favor of
German, Finnish, and Korean.’’ [38].
Problems
In this section we review three problems that cause spurious
correlations in nomothetic analyses of cultural phenomena.
Galton’s problem
One of the better-known issues facing nomothetic researchers is
that of Galton’s Problem [10]. Named after Sir Francis Galton,
following his observation that similarities between cultures are also
the product of borrowing and common descent, Galton’s Problem
highlights that researchers must control for diffusional and
historical associations so as to not inflate the degrees of freedom
in a sample [42].For example, the likely magnitude of a correlation
emerging between two independent traits is much higher if the
traits diffuse geographically than if they change randomly [34].
Cultural traits, then, form a complex adaptive system [43] where
some links are causal and some links are accidents of descent. For
this reason, we would expect to see spurious correlations appearing
between unlikely cultural variables.
Ascertaining the degree of independence between cases is a
concern that has a long history in cross-cultural research [44].
Numerous methods have been proffered as potential solutions,
notably: spatial autocorrelation, phylogenetics and generalised
linear mixed models [12]. One debated difference is the amount of
horizontal transmission that occurs in cultural traits [45–48]).
While there are well-developed models for genetic evolutionary
change that are used in phylogenetic analyses [49], it is less clear
whether they are suitable for assessing cultural change. Compli-
cating this is the difficulty of identifying cultural traits in the past
due to a lack of comparative evidence and the transience of
cultural traits such as spoken language.
Large datasets and complex relationships are dealt with
regularly in fields like genetics. However, there is an active debate
about the role of statistics in causal inference [50]. Neuroscience
studies involving brain imaging also deal with large, complex
datasets. However, spurious correlations are also a problem here
[51,52], and the inference based on some advanced techniques
have been recently questioned [53]. Despite an awareness of the
problem, there are few studies with a sophisticated approach to
addressing it. In general, review of statistics used in studies of
culture and language may be less rigorous than in other fields [54].
This might suggest that, for researchers, the crux of the problem is
a lack of tools, not a lack of awareness of the problem.
Distance from data: Are linguists the main drivers of
changes in consonant inventory sizes?
Nomothetic studies often use databases that exhibit a distance
from the real data. This is particularly salient when the datasets
consist of statistically rare observations i.e. one researcher
generated all the data for one particular data point. The amount
of variance and selection bias introduced via the process of getting
Figure 3. Chains of spurious correlations. Statistical links can be
found between these cultural traits. Links from previous studies are
labelled with the authors’ names. The links from the results section of
the current study are labelled ‘results’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g003
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from actual data-collection to the database in question can be
problematic in terms of analysis.
An illustrative example is found in classifying the size of a
particular constant inventory for WALS. WALS determines its
consonant inventory size data by binning raw consonant counts
into the following categories: small (6–14), moderately small (15–
18), average (2263), moderately large (26–33) and large (34 or
more) [55]. These categorical variables are useful for the context in
which WALS was created: to highlight the geographic distribution
of typological diversity around the globe. However, such coarse
lumping into categorical variables might inflate error, especially
when the variables could lend more weight to finding a particular
correlation than another.
Still, there can also be considerable distance between the
observations of different field linguists. Take the reports of
consonant inventory sizes for the Wichı́ language – a member of
the Matacoan language family spoken in various parts of South
America’s Chaco region [56]. For instance, in 1981 when Antonio
Tovar published an article on the Wichı́’s phoneme inventory
[57], he arrived at a figure of 22 consonants. Jump forward 13-
years to 1994 and Kenneth Claesson’s report [58] would tell you
the Wichı́ are down to just 16 consonants. This is just one of what
is likely be many examples of huge degrees of variation in linguistic
observations for rare languages. The difference in reports would
be enough to change the categorical value in WALS from an
average consonant inventory size to a moderately small one.
There are several explanations for the variance in such reports.
Some instances could be genuine differences between speech
communities in the form of dialectal variation. Other reasons take
the form of theoretical motivation. Claesson, for instance, chose to
omit glottalized consonants from his description of Wichı́. His
rationale being that these ‘‘are actually consonant clusters of a stop
followed by a glottal stop’’ [56,37–38]. In summary, both sources
of data are sensitive to the biases of the researchers: for each
language, or dialect, these observations are reliant on the choices
of potentially one researcher, at a very specific point in time, and
with only a finite amount of resources. We believe such sources of
variance are not limited to phoneme inventory data, but rather are
endemic in these sorts of data, which leads to the problem of
having ‘‘too many variables (but too little data per variable)’’ [59].
Inverse sample size problem
Whilst we believe big data is a valuable resource for social
scientists, the type of big data collected, as well as the types of
questions asked in relation to these datasets, are of a fundamentally
different nature to those found in other areas that rely on large
datasets. Pick up any statistical textbook and it is likely you will
read something along the lines of ‘‘as is intuitively obvious,
increases in sample size increase statistical power’’ [60]. This is
certainly true on an absolute basis where there is a decrease in the
noise-to-signal ratio. For instance, the extremely small sample sizes
in neuroscience are probably responsible for the overestimates of
effect size and low reproducibility of results ([52]; but also see [61]
for a more general discussion on this problem across all sciences).
We have also seen great successes in physics where large amounts
of data were crucial in the discovery of the Higgs Boson [62,63] or
in astronomy with the spectroscopic survey of millions of stars (the
Sloan digital sky survey [64]). Yet, as Gary Marcus recently noted,
large datasets in physics are characterised by certain properties:
‘‘Big Data can be especially helpful in systems that are
consistent over time, with straightforward and well-
Figure 4. The most likely directed, acyclic graph of causal relationships between different variables in this study. Boxes represent
variables and arrows represent suggested causal links going from a cause to an effect. See the methods section for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g004
Figure 5. Relationship between siestas and number of
grammatical categories a verb can take.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g005
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characterised properties, little unpredictable variation, and
relatively little underlying complexity’’ [65].
It is tempting to apply the same principled reasoning to the
nomothetic approach to culture. However, nomothetic studies
tend to rely on data that falls on the opposite end of the spectrum:
these datasets tend to be incomplete, complex and based on
inconsistent criteria. Problems such as those in the case of the
Wichı́’s consonant inventory are just some issues that we know
about. There are likely to be unknowable confounds that increase
the amount of hidden error in a particular sample. As such, the
types of data found in nomothetic approaches are faced with an
inverse sample size problem: the noise-to-signal ratio increases
exponentially with an increase in the size of the dataset. This is not
to say that small data has a higher signal-to-noise ratio. But it does
raise the problem that these various confounding factors in large
datasets make finding a signal in amongst the noise increasingly
difficult. As Taleb cogently puts it:
‘‘This is the tragedy of big data: The more variables, the
more correlations that can show significance. Falsity also
grows faster than information; it is nonlinear (convex) with
respect to data’’ [59].
Evaluating Nomothetic Studies
We can use two of the issues above to evaluate nomothetic
studies. First, the extent to which the experimental hypothesis is
embedded in an existing theoretical framework. This relates to the
hypothesised mechanism that causes the correlation that is
presented. The second issue is the extent to which the study
attempts to control for alternative hypotheses, particularly
involving the historical relatedness of the observations. This
relates to the strength of the correlation.
The interaction between these two issues lead to four types of
study. First, there are studies that are motivated by prior
theoretical and experimental work and are statistically rigorous.
For example, the relationship between population size and
morphological complexity (see above). This type of study can be
valuable for testing hypotheses, generating hypotheses and acting
as a catalyst for interdisciplinary work [14].
The second type of nomothetic study, which may also be
valuable, includes studies which may not have been motivated by
prior theories, but rigorously demonstrate that the hypothesised
link is statistically sound. For example, Dediu and Ladd’s study of
genetic correlates of speakers of tonal languages demonstrated that
their hypothesised link was significantly stronger than thousands of
similar links. This type of study can be very useful for discovering
new links that can motivate new avenues of research [13],
especially when direct evidence is difficult to obtain. The link
between tone and specific genes might have taken much longer to
discover by small-scale studies. However, the statistical analysis
does not directly support the hypothesised mechanism behind the
link [14]. This must be done with methods other than nomothetic
studies, such as experiments (e.g. [21]).
It is not always easy to judge whether the right controls are in
place. Below we demonstrate a correlation between traffic
accidents and linguistic diversity. This was not motivated by a
prior theory, but it remains robust against controls for many
factors. This type of study can be difficult to evaluate because the
factors may be related in complex ways that are difficult to intuit
about, or simply that the probability of a spurious correlation is
increased in studies with large datasets.
The other two types of study may be detrimental. Those that
are grounded in existing theories, but are poorly controlled risk
missing hidden complexities which might challenge or develop the
theory. For example, the study linking chocolate consumption and
Nobel laureates (see above) was based on experimental findings on
the cognitive benefits of chocolate. However, the statistical method
was simply a linear correlation without any control variables. We
find that the correlation does not remain significant when
controlling for gross domestic product (GDP) and climate (see
methods). More importantly, it is difficult to see what extra insight
the this study provides over the controlled experiments that
motivated it. This particular study has certainly gained public
attention, but this might be dangerous if public opinion or policy is
affected by poorly controlled studies.
Finally, studies that are not grounded in theory and are also
poorly controlled can be misleading. It is difficult to distinguish
these studies from ‘fishing’ for correlations from a large set of
variables, then fitting a post hoc hypothesis to the strongest
outcomes. As we demonstrate below, since cultural phenomena
are subject to non-intuitive constraints, such as Galton’s problem,
it is relatively easy to produce evidence for a link between almost
any two cultural variables that has the appearance of rigour. For
example, we find that the per-capita consumption of chocolate
also predicts the number of serial killers and rampage killers a
Figure 6. Relationship between population size and frequency
of extramarital sex in a society.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g006






(Intercept) 7.40 1.94 3.82 0.01 *
Population
density
0.32 0.11 2.85 0.01 *
Premarital
sex frequency
20.39 0.21 21.90 0.07
Premarital
sex deterrence
20.22 0.34 20.65 0.52
Extramarital
sex frequency
20.38 0.17 22.21 0.04
Extramarital
sex deterrence
20.31 0.30 21.05 0.31
Results of a regression using population size as the dependent variable and
independent variables including population density and four measures of
patterns of and attitudes to extramarital sex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.t001
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country produces (see methods). There was no prior reason to
think that this relationship would hold, apart from the likelihood of
cultural traits being correlated. Despite this, it appears to support
negative effects of chocolate, in opposition to the positive
associations of the study above [9]. There is a danger that these
methods could be exploited by researchers, politicians or the
media to support particular agendas.
An example from economics highlights this danger. A well-cited
study found a correlation between countries with a high ratio of
national debt to GDP and countries with slow GDP growth [66].
The authors interpret this as economic growth being stifled by
high debt. Although this goes against established theories [67], this
interpretation has been widely cited in the media [68] and has
been used in testimony before the US senate budget committee in
order to support budget cuts [69]. However, the results have
recently been shown to be an effect of poor statistical controls and
the accidental exclusion of a cluster of related countries [68]. A
more careful analysis revealed that countries with high debt to
GDP ratios actually had positive growth [68]. Despite this radical
change in implication, some commenters are already predicting
that it will have little effect on policy, since the statistic was being
used opportunistically to support claims for which theoretical
arguments were more valid [70]. In this sense, correlational studies
can be used as rhetorical devices with the appearance of rigour,
but which actually have low explanatory power. Furthermore,
damage caused by misleading studies may not be easy to fix.
The potential negative implications of nomothetic approaches
can be addressed by applying more rigorous standards to statistical
methods and increasing the awareness amongst researchers and
the general public of the fragility of simple correlational studies.
We hope to contribute to this awareness by demonstrating a chain
of surprising links.
Processes
Another way to think about the differences between nomothetic
studies is by tracking the way they develop. The two useful types of
study follow different processes (see figure 1). The ideal process of a
study is for a theory to generate an experimental hypothesis, the
hypothesis to suggest data to collect and a way to analyse or test
them, and then the results of the analysis to feed back into a better
understanding of the theory. The study on the relationship
between population size and morphological complexity [1] follows
this process trajectory, although it uses large-scale cross-cultural
data. Of course, all theories have to start somewhere, and the
theory that the study was based on was developed from small-scale
idiographic data. This is an example of how a nomothetic
approach can use large-scale data to test hypotheses suggested by
small-scale studies.
The study of genetic correlates of linguistic tone [7] had a
different trajectory. Here, there was no prior theory. Instead, a
pattern in large-scale data suggested a hypothesis which was
developed into a theory (see [71]). However, this theory went on to
suggest an experimental hypothesis which was tested on small-
scale experimental data [21]. This is an example of how a
nomothetic study can use large-scale data to generate hypotheses
that motivate small-scale, experimental studies.
The two approaches follow different approaches to science. The
former fits with a hypothetico-deductivist approach, the latter fits
with a more inductive approach to science (although the division
between the two approaches is not always clear-cut) [72].
However, the small-scale study in the latter example also followed
the more conventional scientific process. In this sense, since
developing theories from small-scale observations takes time and




If cultural traits are co-inherited, by descent or horizontal
transmission, we should expect to find correlations between many
cultural and demographic traits. For instance, the linguistic
diversity of a country is correlated with the number of fatalities
due to traffic accidents in that country, even controlling for
country nominal GDP, per-capita GDP, population size, popula-
tion density, length of road network, levels of migration, whether
the country is inside or outside of Africa (a strong predictor of road
fatalities), distance from the equator and absolute longitude
(r = 0.45, F(97,10) = 2.03, p = 0.003, see figure 2 and methods).
This result is also robust to controlling for the geographic
relationships between countries (r = 0.22, p = 0.000001, see
methods).
Figure 7. Individualism-Collectivism as a function of migration.
Data shown for 28 countries with linear regression line. Large values on
the y-axis indicate greater individualism.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g007






(Intercept) 119.0229 30.6819 3.88 0.0009
5-HTTLPR short-short
allele prevalence
21.1268 0.2478 24.55 0.0002 *
Gini coefficient 20.5244 0.2977 21.76 0.0935
Contemporary
pathogen prevalence
0.3800 0.8025 0.47 0.6409
Historical
pathogen prevalence
27.7133 6.3512 21.21 0.2387
GDP 20.0002 0.0003 20.71 0.4855
Net migration 5.0025 1.5565 3.21 0.0044 *
A linear regression with levels of collectivism in a country as the dependent
variable and independent variables including the prevalence of an allele of the
serotonin transporter functional polymorphism 5-HTTLPR, Gross Domestic
Product, Gini coefficient, measures of pathogen prevalence and contemporary
migration levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.t002
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Furthermore, it is possible to demonstrate a chain of relation-
ships between cultural variables (see figure 3): Linguistic diversity is
linked with climate [73]. Climate affects the likelihood of cultural
siestas [74]. Cultures that take siestas tend to have languages with
less morphological complexity (t = 3.47, p = 0.001, see methods).
Morphological complexity is linked with group size [1]. Group size
is linked to the levels of extra-marital sex in a community
(r = 20.54, p = 0.001, see methods). Levels of extra-marital sex
have been linked to a language’s phoneme inventory [6]. Phoneme
inventories have been linked to patterns of migration [3].
Migration patterns are linked to the level of political collectivism
in a culture (r = 0.42, p = 0.004, see methods). Collectivism is
predicted by genetic factors [4,5]. There are also genetic correlates
of linguistic tone [7]. Tonal languages co-occur with acacia trees
(t = 3.77, p = 0.0002, see methods). To bring the chain full-circle,
the presence of Acacia nilotica also predicts a greater number of
traffic accident fatalities, controlling for linguistic diversity, length
of road network, GDP, distance from the equator, population size
and population density (t = 3.26, p = 0.0014, see methods).
Discussion
In the analyses above, we demonstrated a chain of correlations
between cultural and demographic features. Some links are well
motivated by prior hypotheses and statistically sound (e.g.[1], as
discussed above). Others might not have had prior motivation, but
are statistically sound and, in some cases, have gone on to be tested
by experiments (e.g. [7], as discussed above).
In contrast, some of the studies fail the evaluation criteria
discussed in the previous section. Some of the analyses are poorly
controlled. For example, the link between acacia trees and tonal
languages does not account for obvious environmental features
such as temperature and altitude. However, some of the analyses
appear statistically sound, but have no prior motivation and are
not plausibly causally linked. For example, the link between traffic
accidents and linguistic diversity controlled for many relevant
factors. One could hypothesise that miscommunication between
speakers of different languages could cause accidents, but it is more
likely that a third variable such as the stability of the state explains
both linguistic diversity and traffic safety. In this example, the
confound is fairly obvious. However, as the number of variables
involved increases, and the processes become more complex, it can
become increasingly difficult to have intuitions that would lead to
this resolution. Political stability might be an obvious control to
include for a political scientist, but might not occur to a linguist.
The kinds of aspects that nomothetic studies are being used for are
typically on the border between two or more disciplines (Genetics
and Linguistics [7]; Economics and linguistics [2]; Morphology,
language change and demography [1]). Without a broad
knowledge of these disciplines, or collaboration, this is exactly
the kind of situation which might be difficult to intuit about.
The opposite problem – of knowing which variables to exclude
from an analysis – may be equally difficult to answer. Since there is
a chance that any cultural traits will be correlated, and since we
actually demonstrate some above, there is an argument for
including more control variables. For example, if a study
investigates linguistic diversity, should it take the number of traffic
accidents into account? Worse, since we demonstrate a chain of
links, should a study of any of them control for all of the others?
That is, if a study is interested in morphological complexity, should
it take the collectivism of its speakers into account? For many
methods, including more variables reduces statistical power and
complicates the analysis. While intuition and theory play a role in
knowing what to control for, in the next section, we suggest some
practical solutions to these problems.
Solutions
Building better corpora
One of the most challenging issues to resolve is minimising the
distance between those doing the data analysis and those
researchers involved at other levels (e.g. field linguists). Part of
the appeal of the nomothetic approach is the ease and cost-
effectiveness in performing the analysis [14]. However, if the
fundamental problems outlined in this paper are to be overcome,
then there a few solutions we can apply to this distance problem
which involve improving the data quality. First, we want to
increase the resolution of each individual variable. So, to take the
previous example of consonant inventory size, the aim should be
to report all accounts and not select one on the basis of prior
theoretical assumptions. Having more data per variable will
increase the statistical power for nomothetic studies. Second,
minimising distance can be achieved by using multiple and,
ideally, independent datasets that work together to build up
mutually supporting evidence for or against a particular hypoth-
esis. Different datasets can take the shape of those derived from
different large-scale studies (e.g. Phoible [75] and WALS for
phoneme inventory counts [55]), idiographic accounts of individ-
ual case studies and experimental data.
Thirdly, databases such as the WALS indicate linguistic norms
for populations, but may not capture the variation within and
between individuals. One solution is for the primary data to be raw
text or recordings of real interactions between individuals [76] and
for population-level features, such as grammatical rules, to be
derived directly from these. While collecting adequate amounts of
data of this kind is more difficult, and while it is not free of biases,
it offers a richer source of information.
Furthermore, databases should be collected and coded with
specific questions in mind, otherwise there is a risk that correlations










21.0900 0.2012 25.42 0.0001 *
Gini coefficient 20.4310 0.2694 21.60 0.1292
Contemporary
pathogen prevalence
20.6594 0.6995 20.94 0.3599
Historical
pathogen prevalence
25.5039 5.9007 20.93 0.3648
GDP 20.0002 0.0003 20.74 0.4717
Net migration 4.1561 1.3598 3.06 0.0075 *
Biodiversity 0.1925 0.0718 2.68 0.0163 *
Minimum
average temperature
2.7335 0.8841 3.09 0.0070 *
Mean growing
season_calc





20.3352 0.1049 23.20 0.0056 *
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.t003
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could emerge due to biases in the original motivation for the
database. For example, the database that was used to demonstrate a
link between future tense and economic behaviour was designed to
identify similarities between European languages, which also
happen to be culturally related and relatively wealthy [36].
Model comparison
The correct null models to use when assessing cultural traits can
be difficult to estimate, or unintuitive. As we shall demonstrate
below, standard baselines of chance may not be conservative
enough to eliminate spurious correlations. Rather than use
random chance as a baseline, studies should compare competing
hypotheses (as in [7]). Model comparison techniques allow
researchers to test one model against another to see which better
explains a particular distribution of data [77,78]. So, whereas
standard regression techniques are able to tell you the amount of
deviance explained by a particular model, they do not provide
information about whether you should have a preference for one
model over another given a particular set of data. Model
comparison techniques are therefore useful summaries of the
available information and are better viewed as inductive-style
approaches that should be complementary to the hypothetico-
deductive and falisificationist approaches more typically associated
with the scientific process [72]. Model comparison can also be
used to test linear versus non-linear assumptions.
Phylogenetic comparative methods
A simple, although conservative, test that controls for the
relatedness of languages is to run the analysis within each language
family (as in [1]). For example, the correlation between acacia
trees and tonal languages is only significant for one language
family, which is evidence against a causal relationship. However,
more sophisticated methods are available. Studies of cultural traits
have borrowed tools from biology to control for the non-
independence of cultures [11]. Comparative methods include
estimating the strength of a phylogenetic signal [49,79] and
estimating the correlation between variables while controlling for
the relatedness of observations [80–82]. For example, in the
analyses above we found that speakers who take siestas have
grammars with less verbal morphology. While experiments show
that daytime naps affect procedural memory [83], which has been
linked to morphological processing [84], the predictions run in the
opposite direction to the results. However, doing the same
analysis, but accounting for the relatedness of languages using a
phylogenetic tree [80], this correlation disappears entirely
(r = 0.017, t = 0.13, p = 0.89, see methods). This highlights the
very different implications that can come out of nomothetic studies
when considering the independence of the observations.
While phylogenetic methods are relatively new and phyloge-
netic reconstruction (see below) is computationally expensive,
software for phylogenetic comparative methods is freely available
(e.g. packages for R, [85–88]) and do not require intense
computing power. The more limiting factor for studies of linguistic
features is a lack of standard, high-resolution phylogenetic trees.
Other phylogenetic techniques have been used to reconstruct
likely trees of descent from cultural data (e.g. [89–91]). These may
also be useful as further steps for determining whether links
between cultural traits discovered by nomothetic studies are
robust. For example, apparent universals in the distribution of
linguistic structural features may actually be underpinned by
lineage-specific trends [92].
Causal graphs
Our analyses above suggests that cultural features are linked in
complex ways, making it difficult to know what to control for in a
specific study and potentially casting doubt on the value of
nomothetic approaches. However, we see nomothetic studies as a
useful tool for exploring complex adaptive systems. One change to
the approach which could offer better resistance to the problems
above would be to move away from trying to explain the variance
in a single variable of interest towards analysing networks of
interacting variables.
One method that could aid this type of analysis is the
construction of causal graphs from large datasets [15]. While
mediation analyses are often used to assess the causal relationship
between a small number of variables [4], recent techniques are
designed to handle high-dimensional data. We applied this
technique to many of the variables in the study above. Figure 4
shows the most likely directed, acyclic graph that reflects the best
fit to the relationships between the variables. We emphasise that
this graph should be interpreted as a useful visualisation and as a
hypothesis-generating exercise rather than representing proof of
causation between variables.
Figure 8. The proportion of tone languages within a country as
a function of the presence of Acacia nilotica.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g008
Table 4. Tone and acacia trees by language family family.
Family Observations t p
Afro-Asiatic 29 21.11 0.29
Austro-Asiatic 16 0.66 0.54
Austronesian 42 21.73 0.17
Indo-European 30 0.27 0.81
Niger-Congo 64 4.99 0.000006
Nilo-Saharan 26 1.37 0.19
Sino-Tibetan 25 1.98 0.06
Trans-New Guinea 19 0.88 0.40
Results of t-tests for the relationship between linguistic tone and the presence
of acacia trees within different language families. Columns indicate the
language family, the number of languages used as observations in the test, the
t-test statistic of the difference between tonal and non-tonal languages in
terms of the presence of acacia trees and the probability value associated with
that t-value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.t004
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Some interesting relationships emerge. First, some elements
make intuitive sense, like the contemporary pathogen prevalence
relying on the historical pathogen prevalence and the Gini
coefficient (the balance between rich and poor within a country).
Also, environmental variables like the number of frost days, mean
growing season and mean temperature are linked.
More importantly, while the initial analysis above finds a direct
correlation between linguistic diversity and road fatalities, even
controlling for many factors, the causal graph analysis suggests
that linguistic diversity and road fatalities are not causally linked.
Instead, linguistic diversity is affected by demographic variables
such as population size and density while road fatalities are
affected by economic indicators such as GDP and the Gini
coefficient. Similarly, the analysis suggests that tonal languages
and the presence of acacia trees are not causally linked.
While the causal graph mainly provides evidence against some
of the correlations above, it may also suggest interesting areas of
further investigation. Interestingly, the causal graph suggests that
collectivism is not directly linked with the genetic factors
implicated by [4], but the relationship is mediated by (current)
migration patterns. While speculative, it would be interesting to
test the hypothesis that the distribution of genetic factors that are
correlated with collectivism emerged by a process of selective
migration (although see [93]). For example, the genotype that
correlates with more collectivist countries is associated with a
greater risk of depression under stress [29], so perhaps this gene
came under selection in harsher climates. Indeed, we find some
support for this idea, since adding environmental variables
improves the fit of the model predicting the distribution of
genotypes (compared to [4], see methods section). In this way,
causal graph analyses may be a useful additional tool that can be
used to explore relationships between complex adaptive variables
such as cultural traits. Since the range of hypotheses suggested by
inductive approaches can be very large, methods such as causal
graphs can point to fruitful hypotheses to develop with more
conventional approaches such as experiments.
Conclusion
Due to increasingly accessible data and analysis methods, there
has been a recent rise in studies that use large-scale cross-cultural
databases to demonstrate correlations between cultural and
demographic variables. While these studies may be useful for
generating hypotheses and fostering interdisciplinary work, there
are also problems which mean that they may have little
explanatory power [14]. One of these problems is the relatedness
of cultural groups and the correlated inheritance of cultural traits
(Galton’s problem). In this paper we illustrate the scale of the
problem by demonstrating a chain of correlations between a
diverse set of cultural traits. The probability of a spurious
correlation between any two cultural traits is higher than is
sometimes appreciated by researchers, the media and the general
public.
We suggest four ways of addressing the problem of spurious
correlations. First, better data will can reduce the likelihood of
correlations generated by noise. Secondly, we suggest that null
models should be derived from alternative hypotheses rather than
random chance. Thirdly, we encourage the development of
phylogenetic techniques that account for the relatedness of
cultures. Finally, we suggest moving from a paradigm of trying
to explain the link between two variables towards explaining
networks of interacting variables.
Although the explanatory power of these studies is weak, the
appearance of rigour in the correlational analysis gives the related
hypotheses credibility. Given the potential implications on policy
for some cultural phenomena, conclusions from nomothetic
studies could have negative effects. Researchers and reviewers
should be cautious when evaluating approaches which link
variables that are related by descent.
Materials and Methods
Here we describe the data and analyses used to demonstrate the
spurious correlations between cultural variables discussed above.
Linguistic diversity and traffic accidents
The first analysis compared the linguistic diversity of a country
to the number of fatal traffic accidents. The analysis contained
data from 117 countries. A multiple regression was carried out
Figure 9. The mean number of annual road fatalities per
100,000 people within a country as a function of the presence
of Acacia nilotica.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g009






(Intercept) 18.5610 1.8427 10.07 ,0.0001 *
Presence of
acacia trees
4.9211 1.5106 3.26 0.0014 *
Length of
road network
20.0067 0.0038 21.77 0.0790
Greenberg
diversity index
10.3095 2.1952 4.70 ,0.0001 *
Nominal
GDP
20.0000 0.0000 21.30 0.1949
Distance
from equator
20.1524 0.0414 23.68 0.0003 *
Population
size
20.0000 0.0000 21.09 0.2781
Population
density
20.0038 0.0010 23.65 0.0004 *
A linear regression predicting the levels of road fatalities using presence of
acacia trees, km of road, greenberg diversity index, nominal GDP, absolute
latitude, population size and population density.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.t005
Linguistic Diversity and Traffic Accidents
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 August 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 8 | e70902
with the Greenberg diversity index [94] as the dependent variable
and the following independent variables: Road fatalities per
100,000 inhabitants per year [95]; population size [94]; population
density [96]; nominal GDP, per-capita GDP [97]; net migration
rate [98]; absolute latitude; absolute longitude; whether the
country was inside or outside of Africa (a strong predictor of road
fatalities) and total length of road network [99]. The fit of the
model is improved by adding road fatalities after entering all other
variables (RSS = 7.4781, F (106,1) = 8.9, p = 0.0035). Model
adjusted R2 = 0.23, F(106,10) = 4.56, pv0.0001. Road fatalities
coefficient = 0.012, r = 0.45, data available in Supporting
Information S1, file S1_01.csv).
Siestas and morphological complexity
Countries with cultures of taking afternoon naps [100] are less
morphologically complex, as measured by the mean number of
grammatical categories a verb can take [101] (n = 137, t = 3.47,
p = 0.001, see figure 5, Data available in Supporting Information
S1, file S1_02.csv). Note that countries in Asia, Europe and South
America take daytime naps. To test whether this is affected by
Galton’s problem, the language classifications for 127 languages
were retrieved from the Ethnologue [102] and used to generate a
phylogenetic tree (using H. Bibiko’s AlgorithmTreeFromLabels
program [103]). Without the phylogenetic tree, the correlation is
significant (logit model: r = 20.36096, z = 22.755, p = 0.00586).
To account for the phylogenetic tree, a generalised estimating
equations test was run with binomial response distribution [80,85]
(comparison suggested by chapter 7.7 of [88]). In this case, the
correlation disappears (r = 0.017, t = 0.13, p = 0.9, dfP = 63.2,
estimated scale parameter = 1.17, data available in Supporting
Information S1, file S1_02b.zip).
Extramarital sex and population size
Extramarital sex is correlated with population size (r = 20.54,
df = 31, p = 0.001), data from [104]. A regression using population
size as the dependent variable and independent variables including
population density and four measures of sexual attitudes showed
that extramarital sex frequency was the best predictor after
population density (see figure 6 and table 1, adjusted R2 = 0.38, F
(26,5) = 4.84, p = 0.003, Data available in Supporting Information
S1, file S1_03.csv.).
Migration and Collectivism
Cultural values of collectivism are related to the prevalence of
an allele of the serotonin transporter functional polymorphism 5-
HTTLPR [4]. The original study used a linear regression with a
measure of a country’s collectivism as the dependent variable and
independent variables including the prevalence of the 5-HTTLPR
short-short allele, GDP, Gini coefficient and measures of pathogen
prevalence. We replicated exactly the original finding that
prevalence of the short-short allele is a significant predictor of
collectivism (coefficient = 20.85, t = 22.94, p = 0.0079). Adding
contemporary migration levels [98] shows that migration levels are
a significant predictor (n = 28, r = 0.42, see figure 7 and table 2)
and improves the fit of the model (RSS difference = 1334, F(22,1)
= 10.3, p = 0.004, adjusted R2 = 0.73, data is available in
Supporting Information S1, file S1_04.csv). Higher levels of
collectivism (lower levels of individualism) correlate with lower
migration rates.
Furthermore, we find that adding environmental variables
(biodiversity [105], mean minimum annual temperature [106] and
mean growing season [105] improves the fit of the model on top of
the contribution from migration (RSS difference = 1318.8,
F(16,4) = 4.1745,p = 0.017, adjusted R2 = 0.83, see table 3).
Tone and Acacia Trees
Countries in which the acacia tree Acacia nilotica grows [107]
were compared with countries which include tone languages
(languages that use ‘‘pitch patterns to distinguish individual words
or the grammatical forms of words’’, [108]). Acacia trees and tone
languages (simple or complex) co-occur with a probability greater
than chance (617 languages in 114 countries, x2 with Yates’
continuity correction = 47.1, df = 1, pv0.0001, see also [109],
data available in Supporting Information S1, file S1_05.csv). The
proportion of tonal (vs. non-tonal) languages in a country is
significantly higher if that country has acacia trees (mean
proportion of languages using tone in countries with acacia trees
= 55.9% (41 countries), without acacia trees = 23.3% (73
countries), t = 4.2, df = 76, p = 0.00007, see figure 8). The
proportion of languages with linguistic tone in a country predicts
the presence of acacia trees, even when controlling for latitude
(linear model, tone coefficient = 0.39, t = 3.77, p = 0.0002).
We can run an analysis of the relationship between tone and
acacia trees within each language family. Enough data and
variance was available for 8 language families (see table 4). The
relationship was only significant for languages from the Niger-
Congo family.
Acacia Trees and traffic accidents
Countries in which the acacia tree Acacia nilotica grows [107]
have higher incidences of road fatality [95] (see figure 9, mean
road fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants per year in countries
without acacia trees = 15.84, mean in countries with acacia trees
= 24.98654, df = 85, p = 0.0000006). A linear regression predicting
the levels of road fatalities using presence of acacia trees, km of
road [99], greenberg diversity index [94], nominal GDP [97],
absolute latitude, population size [94] and population density [96]
(see table 5), shows that the presence of acacia trees is a significant
predictor (adjusted R2 = 43.1%, data available in Supporting
Information S1, file S1_6.csv).
To test the geographic relatedness of countries, the distance
between each country in the sample was calculated (great circle
Figure 10. Chocolate consumption per capita (kg) as a function
of the log number of serial and rampage killers per capita since
1900.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070902.g010
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distance from the center of each country) to produce a geographic
distance matrix. Similar distance matrices were made for the GDI
and road fatalities variables (absolute difference between coun-
tries). A Mantel test was used to calculate the probability of a
correlation between GDI and road fatalities (r = 0.22,
p = 0.000001, one million permutations). This remained signifi-
cant when controlling for geographic distance with a partial
Mantel test (r = 0.22, p = 0.000001, although see [48] for problems
with Mantel tests).
Chocolate consumption and serial killers
We take five variables from Wikipedia: the number of Nobel
prizes awarded by country of recipient (and the population of that
country) [110]; The nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita [111]; the number of road fatalities per 10,000 population
[112]; the number of serial killers since 1900 [113] and the
number of rampage killers since 1900 [114]. The average annual
temperature was obtained [105]. Data on the average IQ of the
populations of different countries were obtained from [115]. The
collected data is available in the supporting materials (Supporting
Information S1, file S1_07.csv).
We replicated the finding from [9] that chocolate consumption
per capita correlates with the number of Nobel laureates per captia
(r = 0.73, p = 0.00007). However, a linear regression controlling
for per-capita GDP and mean temperature found that chocolate
consumption was not a significant predictor of the number of
Nobel laureates (F(1,19) = 3.6, p = 0.07). Countries with higher
GDP and lower mean temperatures correlate with higher Nobel
laureates per capita (r = 0.7, 20.6, p = 0.0002,0.0016). Further-
more, the average IQ of a country did not correlate with chocolate
consumption (r = 0.27, p = 0.21). Additionally, for 18 countries
where data was available, the level of chocolate consumption per
capita is significantly correlated with the (log) number of serial
killers and rampage killers per capita (r = 0.52, p = 0.02, see
figure 10). We assume that there is no causal link here. Also, we
found that the number of road fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants
per year correlates with the number of Nobel Laureates
(r = 20.55, p = 0.0066), which we also assume has no causal link.
Causal graphs
The data from the studies above were aggregated over countries
and combined into a single dataset. We used the PC algorithm
[116] as implemented in the R package pcalg [117] to compute
the most likely directed acyclic graph of relationships between
variables. The algorithm has a parameter that determines the
threshold at which links should be included. The results come from
using the smallest threshold that included all the variables in a
single connected component. We note that the exact causal links
that are selected are sensitive to this parameter and to different
subsets of the data. Therefore, we suggest that this method is only
an exploratory tool rather than a formal proof of relationships. We
look forwards with anticipation to the development of this tool.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 Contains: S1_01.csv: Data on
road fatalities, linguistic diversity and demographic variables for
countries. S1_02.csv: Data on Siestas and morphological
complexity. S1_02b/AlgTree_ASJP_Ethno.nwk: Phylogenetic
tree of languages. S1_02b/s.csv: Data on Siestas and morpho-
logical complexity. S1_02b/Siesta_PhyloLogit.r R script for
running phylogenetic generalised estimating equations test.
S1_03.csv: Data on population size and extramarital sex
frequency. S1_04.csv: Data on genetic correlates of collectivism
and migration. S1_05.csv: Data on Tone langauges and Acacia
trees. S1_6.csv: Data on Acacia tree and traffic accidents.
S1_07.csv: Data on Chocolate consumption and serial killers.
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57. Tovar A (1981) Relatos y diálogos de los matacos: Seguidos de una gramática
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5.4 Conclusion
There are several challenges with using large-scale, cross-cultural analyses to in-
vestigate the relationship between context and language structure. Some of these
challenges include: (i) finding a candidate dataset that allows us to operationalise
context, (ii) controlling for confounding factors, and (iii) systematically testing
hypotheses about the relationship between context and language structure.
First of all, finding a candidate dataset is beset by the general issue of an
inverse sample size problem: the signal-to-noise ratio is likely to be large in cross-
cultural datasets, as these tend to be incomplete, complex, and based on incon-
sistent criteria. Secondly, this chapter showed that any attempt to demonstrate
a correlation needs to overcome the twin problems of shared descent between
cultural groups (Galton’s Problem) and the diffusion of cultural traits due to ge-
ographical proximity. Lastly, even if we overcome these two major problems, the
focus of the study becomes about predicting typological distributions, and not
about establishing whether there is a causal relationship.
Experiments on the other hand are well placed for this type of investigation:
they allows us to probe whether or not a variable, when removed from its natural
environment, has a causal effect on another variable (Nunan, 1992). As demon-
strated in this thesis, experimental methods can directly test the hypothesis that
context is a constraint on the structure of language, through framing what is
and is not informative for discrimination. Relating experimental results to typo-
logical patterns is a necessary next step, and it only when this is done can we






Why does the structure and organisation of language appear to be context-
dependent? One answer is that language did not evolve for the purposes of com-
munication (Chomsky, 2002; Berwick & Chomsky, 2016). Under this account,
properties such as ambiguity are viewed as an impediment to communication,
with contextual information being utilised to solve these problems. Another per-
spective flips the argument on its head and claims the exact opposite: language
is context-dependent because it is communicatively efficient (Piantadosi et al,
2012). Irrespective of one’s stance on these matters, what both of these propos-
als highlight is that understanding the relationship between context, cognition,
and communication is fundamental in any account of how language evolved.
The first step is to arrive at a tractable definition of context. The argument
put forward by this thesis is that context is best thought of as a frame of inter-
pretation. Context in this sense consists of a figure (the target of interpretation),
a ground (the immediate information brought to the act of interpretation), and
a background (prior knowledge derived from previous frames). When interpret-
ing a linguistic utterance, such as James passed the port, contextual information
fills in the expressive gaps by highlighting the relevant information (such as our
knowledge that port is a type of fortified wine and James is at a dinner party)
and backgrounding irrelevant information (such as our knowledge that port is
also a type of harbour). This definition of context as a frame of interpretation is
important because it allows us to investigate the relationship between language
structure and context as a discrimination pressure: determining what is and is
not informative in reducing uncertainty in interpretation.
Importantly, this link between language structure and context emerges via
cultural evolutionary processes, where the discrimination pressure interacts with
two other pressures inherent to cognition and communication: a generalisation
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pressure, which arises across repeated exposures and refers to the discrepancy be-
tween what is currently predicted and incoming sensory data, and a coordination
pressure, where speakers and hearers must align on shared frames of interpreta-
tion. Language adapts to these pressures by establishing a set of conventional
form-meaning mappings that are both expressive and compressible. A key ques-
tion this thesis set out to answer is: How can we investigate these pressures in a
systematic manner?
The majority of this thesis was therefore devoted to a series of experiments
which investigated the effects of context on the structure of language. Experiment
1 set the groundwork for the rest of the thesis and demonstrated three points.
First, manipulations to the referential context can be considered a useful proxy for
investigating the general effects of context as a frame of interpretation. Second,
on a methodological front, Experiment 1 brought together insights from work in
artificial language learning, reference games, iterated learning, and communica-
tion games to create a framework for systematically investigating the effects of
context on language structure. Lastly, the experiment showed how simple ma-
nipulations to the referential context result in radically different communication
systems, with languages gradually adapting to how context interacts with these
pressures of discrimination, generalisation, and coordination.
Experiment 2 began by reversing the usual premise found in these experi-
ments: rather than investigating how structure emerges in language, this ex-
periment focused on the relationship between context and the loss of language
structure. One of the motivating factors for investigating the loss of language
structure comes from observations in the historical record: here, due to the ef-
fects of reinterpretation and chunking, individual constructions undergo a loss of
compositional structure. Context is viewed as a key factor in instantiating this
change by introducing ambiguity into how a form maps onto a meaning. To tackle
this specific issue, Experiment 2 addressed the question of whether changes to
the discrimination pressure interacted with a pressure to generalise: when con-
text backgrounded a dimension (e.g., colour) an initially compositional language
is predicted to lose this distinction when generalising to new, unseen referents.
The findings somewhat supported this general prediction, but only when context
interacted with a shape bias. Experiment 3 built upon these findings by control-
ling for a possible confound (i.e., counterbalancing for the number of features),
using brighter coloured referents, and employing a larger sample. With these
changes the shape bias disappeared, and was replaced by a general preference to
encode colour (albeit at a lower overall effect size than in Experiment 2).
Experiments 2 and 3 tell us there is much to learn about the relationship
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between the loss of structure and context. One tentative conclusion from these
two experiments is that, in this specific instance at least, the effect of context
is not very robust – and is mediated by interactions with other biases acting on
maintaining or decreasing language structure. For instance, in Experiment 2 the
saliency of shape was increased, and this led to languages being underspecified
on colour, and in Experiment 3 the saliency of colour was increased, and this
led to languages being underspecified on shape. Whatever the reason is for the
increase in saliency, be it due to an unbalanced meaning space or some intrinsic
property of the stimuli, underspecification only happens when it is functionally
adequate for discriminating between referents in a context. The logical next step
is to probe deeper into clarifying the size and robustness of these effects.
The idea that the effects of context are mediated by other biases and con-
straints permeates the thinking behind Experiment 4: we investigated how context-
type and access to this contextual information interact in shaping the degree of
signal autonomy. Conditions where manipulations to contextual predictability are
reinforcing result in participants converging on similar solutions to the coordina-
tion pressure. In Shape-Different + Shared Context this meant the systems were
consistently context-dependent and in Mixed + Unshared Context this resulted in
more autonomous systems. When these manipulations to contextual predictabil-
ity are conflicting, as was the case in Shape-Different + Unshared and Mixed +
Shared, participants produce heterogeneous systems in terms of autonomy (some
were autonomous, some were context-dependent). Predictable contexts allow
speakers and hearers to coordinate on a shared system which relies less on lin-
guistic information to convey the intended meaning; context and hearer inference
fill in any expressive gaps. As contextual predictability decreases, speakers be-
come increasingly reliant on the linguistic system for coordinating with hearers,
using strategies that promote more autonomous signals.
There are plenty of opportunities for future work in this area. One possible
extension is to manipulate the size of the referential context. The experiments
in this thesis ranged from contexts consisting solely of a target and a distractor
(Experiments 1, 2 and 3) to contexts with a target and three distractors (Ex-
periment 4). In terms of identifying the intended meaning, a larger referential
context has higher uncertainty than a smaller context, with a hearer needing to
sift through more distractors. What is interesting about this example is that the
reverse is true for the speaker: a larger referential context is more informative
than a smaller context. For the largest possible context, where the number of
objects is equal to the total number of referents, speakers have access to more
information about the necessary distinctions which are globally required by the
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linguistic system. By contrast, having to discriminate between a single target and
distractor only reveals what is locally relevant for discrimination, and is therefore
less informative for the speaker in discovering the optimal system for conveying
the intended meaning. This tension between what is informative for the speaker
versus what is predictable for the hearer is a promising avenue for future research.
The experimental pragmatics literature offers a few interesting extensions for
investigating the effects of context on language structure. As an example, Frank
& Goodman (2012) provide a series of manipulations to the context-type, sys-
tematically manipulating whether one, two, or all three of the distractors in a
referential context share a feature with the target. More fine-grain manipulations
of the referential context would allow us to stress test some of the claims made
in this thesis. To illustrate, consider a set of distractors which share a particular
feature in common (e.g., red oval, red rectangle, red star) versus a set of distrac-
tors which are maximally distinct from one another (e.g., grey oval, red rectangle,
yellow star). Now, imagine the target is a blue blob: in both context-types the
optimal signal is one which underspecifies and conveys either blue or blob. Yet we
do not know whether speakers will underspecify in such situations (as opposed to
using, say, a compositional signal) and neither do we know whether one context-
type will favour the encoding of one dimension over another (e.g., encoding shape
instead of colour). Furthermore, were speakers to underspecify more frequently
in the maximally distinct context, then this would run counter to the predictions
outlined in Chapter 3 (i.e., participants are more likely to underspecify when one
of feature dimensions is backgrounded to a certain extent). Such manipulations
are important for linking up predictions about short-term pragmatic reasoning
with the long-term emergence of communication systems.
Manipulations to the contextual information shared between interlocutors
(i.e., common ground) is also a prominent feature of experimental pragmatics
(for reviews, see: Brennan, Galati & Kuhlen, 2010; Konopka & Brown-Schmidt,
2014). Yet, in contrast to Experiment 4, where our focus was on whether or not
the speaker shared access to the context given to the hearer, common ground
experiments have also looked at the opposite situation: where access to the con-
text is modulated for the hearer (e.g., Horton & Keysar, 1996). Introducing
additional manipulations of the shared context, such as providing speakers and
hearers with access to different referents in an array, will offer further insights
into the relationship between signal autonomy and contextual predictability.
Another possible extension is to use the framework presented in this thesis
to help address outstanding questions in referential games. For instance, unlike
material and scalar adjectives, which tend be dependent on context, colour ad-
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jectives are often used even when they are uninformative for discrimination (e.g.,
Sedivy, 2005; Arts et al., 2011; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016). Much of the current
research into Redundant Colour Adjectives (RCA) has only looked at their use in
natural languages. Artificial languages are well-placed to investigate under what
conditions RCAs do and do not emerge in communication systems. Furthermore,
investigating RCAs using artificial languages has the added advantage of resolv-
ing some of the issues raised in Chapter 3, especially in understanding the role
colour saliency plays in these experiments.
These experiments also provide some insights into how the generalisation pres-
sure relates to the emergence of language structure. In the case of Experiment 1,
participants at the first generation were faced with a strong generalisation pres-
sure, as it was extremely difficult for them to memorise all of the signal-referent
mappings in the initial language. For Experiments 2, 3 and 4, the generalisation
pressure was more explicit: we restricted the number of referents participants
saw and investigated how unseen referents were expressed during communica-
tion. Future work should systematically delineate between these different types
of generalisation pressures in communication games (but see: Cornish, 20101).
This will allow us to see under what conditions these two types of generalisation
pressure produce similar and different outcomes with respect to the emergence of
language structure.
The experimental models in this thesis were idealised versions of communica-
tion, leaving out integral properties inherent to the day-to-day use of language.
Much of the work presented comes from a tradition of starting from the per-
spective of learning (e.g., early iterated learning models: Kirby & Hurford, 2002;
Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008) and gradually incorporating more aspects of com-
munication into our models of language (Kirby et al., 2015; Tamariz & Kirby,
2016). Still, much work remains to be done in bridging the gap between useful
abstraction and real-world constraints, especially in regards to the importance
of turn-taking (Stivers et al., 2009; Levinson, 2016) and conversational repair
mechanisms (Hayashi, Raymond & Sidnell, 2013; Dingemanse, Torreira & En-
field, 2013). The present set of experiments were relatively simple in this respect.
There was no real-time repair and turn-taking was either restricted to simple
alternations (Experiments 1, 2 and 3) or non-existent (Experiment 4). Incorpo-
rating these aspects might diminish the impact of the referential context – as
1Cornish (2010) contrasts two types of generalisation pressure, a memory bottleneck (mem-
ory limitations of a participant to learn a set of form-meaning mappings) and a data bottleneck
(the number of form-meaning mappings a participant is exposed to in their training set), but
this has only been investigated in iterated learning (diffusion chain) experiments and not the
communication game framework employed in this thesis.
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participants have recourse to a new source for reducing uncertainty about the
intended meaning. Although it remains to be seen whether or not participants
will privilege repair and turn-taking over information provided by the referential
context.
The last major point is a methodological one. Chapter 5 highlighted the
challenges of a cross-linguistic approach as a means of investigating the relation-
ship between language structure, context, and other pressures found in cognition
and communication. Due to the nature of culturally transmitted behaviours,
which are characterised by inheritance and borrowing, cross-cultural datasets are
highly susceptible to spurious correlations. When combined with difficulty of
operationalising context, especially in regards to investigating causal effects on
language structure, the chapter concluded by arguing for an experimental ap-
proach. But this is not to say these approaches should never be employed. There
is plenty of scope for cross-linguistic correlations to kick-start the traditional sci-
entific process and stress-test previous empirical findings (for further discussion
on both these points, see Roberts, Winters & Chen, 2015). Furthermore, if we
are to relate the experimental results of this thesis to the typological patterns
observed in the world’s 6-7000 languages, then this gap between methodological
approaches needs to be bridged (see Lewis & Frank, 2016 for a useful demonstra-
tion as to how one might link experimental findings to typological patterns with
regards to conceptual complexity). Ideally, statistical approaches can be com-
bined with simulations in generating testable hypotheses, helping whittle down
the parameter space to a level that is tractable for experimental research (for
tentative first steps in this direction, see: Winter & Ardell, 2016).
In summary, context is considered a crucial component in both learning and
using a language, yet its role in cultural evolutionary accounts of language struc-
ture was traditionally taken as a given (see Scott-Phillips, 2015 for a fuller dis-
cussion on the role of pragmatics in language evolution research). This thesis
demonstrates that context plays an important part in the cultural evolution of
language. The first step was to establish context as a frame of interpretation:
this allowed us to describe the effects of context as stemming from a discrimina-
tion pressure that interacts with the pressures of generalisation and coordination.
Second, the thesis highlighted the strengths of using an experimental approach –
contrasting this with other means of investigation such as cross-linguistic corre-
lations – and demonstrated its utility for systematically investigating the effects
of context on language structure. Lastly, the results of these experiments show
how context constrains language structure in predictable ways, opening up new
avenues for exploring the cultural evolution of language.
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Appendix A: Languages Experiment 1
Initial Languages
The randomly generated initial languages used in the experiment. First column
contains the meaning and all subsequent columns are the signals that participants
with trained on (organised by chains within the Mixed, Shape-Different, and
Shape-Same conditions). To save space, the data is available online at: http://
www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_initial.pdf
Mixed Chain 1
Chain 1 in the Mixed condition. The first column contains the meaning, with
all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each gener-
ation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http://www.
replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_MX1.pdf
Mixed Chain 2
Chain 2 in the Mixed condition. The first column contains the meaning, with
all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each gener-
ation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http://www.
replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_MX2.pdf
Mixed Chain 3
Chain 3 in the Mixed condition. The first column contains the meaning, with
all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each gener-




Chain 4 in the Mixed condition. The first column contains the meaning, with
all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each gener-
ation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http://www.
replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_MX4.pdf
Shape-Different Chain 1
Chain 1 in the Shape-Different condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SD1.pdf
Shape-Different Chain 2
Chain 2 in the Shape-Different condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SD2.pdf
Shape-Different Chain 3
Chain 3 in the Shape-Different condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SD3.pdf
Shape-Different Chain 4
Chain 4 in the Shape-Different condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SD4.pdf
Shape-Same Chain 1
Chain 1 in the Shape-Same condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
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generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SS1.pdf
Shape-Same Chain 2
Chain 2 in the Shape-Same condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SS2.pdf
Shape-Same Chain 3
Chain 3 in the Shape-Same condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SS3.pdf
Shape-Same Chain 4
Chain 4 in the Shape-Same condition. The first column contains the meaning,
with all subsequent columns being the signal output for participants at each
generation and block. To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp1_SS4.pdf
Appendix B: Languages Experiment 2
Both-Different
Initial languages and participant output for Both-Different condition. Pair refers
to the particular participant pair within the condition. The first two columns are
the target meaning (shape, colour). Initial is the training language participant
pairs were trained on. In the block columns are the signals produced by partic-
ipant pairs during interaction. For example, Block 1a refers to the first block of
interaction and the first set of signals produced for each unique meaning (i.e., a
signal for Blob Blue at block 1a preceded the signal for Blob Blue at block 2b).




Initial languages and participant output for Both-Different condition. Pair refers
to the particular participant pair within the condition. The first two columns are
the target meaning (shape, colour). Initial is the training language participant
pairs were trained on. In the block columns are the signals produced by partic-
ipant pairs during interaction. For example, Block 1a refers to the first block of
interaction and the first set of signals produced for each unique meaning (i.e., a
signal for Blob Blue at block 1a preceded the signal for Blob Blue at block 2b).
To save space, the data is available online at: http://www.replicatedtypo.
com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp2_CD.pdf
Shape-Different
Initial languages and participant output for Shape-Different condition. Pair
refers to the particular participant pair within the condition. The first two
columns are the target meaning (shape, colour). Initial is the training lan-
guage participant pairs were trained on. In the block columns are the signals
produced by participant pairs during interaction. For example, Block 1a refers
to the first block of interaction and the first set of signals produced for each
unique meaning (i.e., a signal for Blob Blue at block 1a preceded the signal for
Blob Blue at block 2b). To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp2_SD.pdf
Appendix C: Languages Experiment 3
Both-Different
Initial languages and participant output for Both-Different condition. Pair refers
to the particular participant pair within the condition. The first two columns are
the target meaning (shape, colour). Initial is the training language participant
pairs were trained on. In the block columns are the signals produced by partic-
ipant pairs during interaction. For example, Block 1a refers to the first block of
interaction and the first set of signals produced for each unique meaning (i.e., a
signal for Blob Blue at block 1a preceded the signal for Blob Blue at block 2b).




Initial languages and participant output for Colour-Different condition. Pair
refers to the particular participant pair within the condition. The first two
columns are the target meaning (shape, colour). Initial is the training lan-
guage participant pairs were trained on. In the block columns are the signals
produced by participant pairs during interaction. For example, Block 1a refers
to the first block of interaction and the first set of signals produced for each
unique meaning (i.e., a signal for Blob Blue at block 1a preceded the signal for
Blob Blue at block 2b). To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp3_CD.pdf
Shape-Different
Initial languages and participant output for Shape-Different condition. Pair
refers to the particular participant pair within the condition. The first two
columns are the target meaning (shape, colour). Initial is the training lan-
guage participant pairs were trained on. In the block columns are the signals
produced by participant pairs during interaction. For example, Block 1a refers
to the first block of interaction and the first set of signals produced for each
unique meaning (i.e., a signal for Blob Blue at block 1a preceded the signal for
Blob Blue at block 2b). To save space, the data is available online at: http:
//www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/exp3_SD.pdf
Appendix D: Languages Experiment 4
Initial Languages
The initial languages used in Experiment 4. The first column is the randomly
generated language and the second column is the meaning. Each initial language
consists of 4 signals paired with 4 meanings. To save space, the data is avail-
able online at: http://www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
11/exp4_initial.pdf
Shape-Different + Shared Context Output
The output for the Shape-Different + Shared Context condition. Pair refers to the
particular pair involved in interaction (which, in this case, consists of fixed roles
for speakers and hearers). The first column is the target meaning a speaker needed
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to convey. Distractor 1, 2 and 3 is the referential context within which the target
was situated: this is what the hearer saw when they needed to select an image.
Description is the signal produced by the speaker. Data is sorted according to tar-
get. To save space, the data is available online at: http://www.replicatedtypo.
com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/SD-Shared-Context.pdf
Shape-Different + Unshared Context Output
The output for the Shape-Different + Unshared Context condition. Pair refers
to the particular participant pair involved in interaction (which, in this case,
consists of fixed roles for speakers and hearers). Each separate table within a
pair refers to a block of interaction. The first column is the target meaning
a speaker needed to convey. Distractor 1, 2 and 3 is the referential context
within which the target was situated: this is what the hearer saw when they
needed to select an image. Description refers to the signal produced by a speaker.
Data is sorted alphabetically according to the target. To save space, the data
is available online at: http://www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/11/SD-Unshared-Context.pdf
Mixed + Shared Context Output
The output for the Mixed + Shared Context condition. Pair refers to the par-
ticular participant pair involved in interaction (which, in this case, consists of
fixed roles for speakers and hearers). Each separate table within a pair refers
to a block of interaction. The first column is the target meaning a speaker
needed to convey. Distractor 1, 2 and 3 is the referential context within which
the target was situated: this is what the hearer saw when they needed to se-
lect an image. Description refers to the signal produced by a speaker. Data is
sorted alphabetically according to the target. To save space, the data is avail-
able online at: http://www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
11/MX-Shared-Context.pdf
Mixed + Unshared Context Output
The output for the Mixed + Unshared Context condition. Pair refers to the
particular participant pair involved in interaction (which, in this case, consists
of fixed roles for speakers and hearers). Each separate table within a pair refers
to a block of interaction. The first column is the target meaning a speaker
needed to convey. Distractor 1, 2 and 3 is the referential context within which
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the target was situated: this is what the hearer saw when they needed to se-
lect an image. Description refers to the signal produced by a speaker. Data is
sorted alphabetically according to the target. To save space, the data is avail-
able online at: http://www.replicatedtypo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
11/MX-Unshared-Context.pdf
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